The greatest measurement of whether the police have really gone through a reformation is to evaluate its activities. A variety of different measures can be used to determine the effectivenss of police integrity control strategies and action programs. Various measurements have been made in an attempt to evaluate the New York City Police Department.
While settling a lawsuit is not an official acknowledgement that abuse occured, city Comptroller Alan Hevesi said he believes most settlements in police cases are "an admission of some wrongdoing."(Sontag, D. and Barry, D., 1997)
In 1996 the New York City Police Department paid 27.3 million dollars and 19.5 million dollars the previous year.
Most police misconduct cases, like other lawsuits, are settled for pragmatic reasons: the plaintiff may be sympathetic, while the officer is defensive, inarticulate or sloppy in procedural work. And New York City juries, while more likely to believe the officers 20 years ago, are now more likely to favor the victims and return far more substantial awards than the city pays in settlements.
(Sontag, D. and Barry, D., 1997)
Amnesty International Country Report: United States Of America-Police brutality and excessive force in the New York City Police Department
In 1996 Amnesty International released their evaluation of police brutality and excessive force in the New York City Police Department. The report was conducted over an 18 month period, including two visits to New York. "Amnesty International acknowledges that a number of reforms have taken place within the NYPD during the past three years, partly in response to a commission of inquiry into police corruption which was appointed in 1992" (Amnesty International, 1996).
The Civillian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), which takes a range of complaints from use of deadly force to offenseive language, has shown a rise in the number of complaints lodged. "The CCRB reported that it received 4,920 new complaints in 1994, an increase of 37.43% over the previous year. . . . A further increase of 31.8% was noted for the first six months of 1995 (the last figures available) compared to the first six months of 1994" (Amnesty International, 1996).
These statistics have been questioned by Police Commissioner Bratton citing part of the increase may be due to the merger of NYPD with the Transit and Housing police. Also, officials within the Department suggest that the increase may be due to the aggressive quality-of-life policing strategy pursued by the NYPD from 1994-1996. "The CCRB conceded in its reports that no firm conclusions could be drawn from the increases solely on the raw data on incoming complaints, and that part of the increase in complaints could be due to more civillian-police interactions during the anti-crime operations" (Amnesty International, 1996).
The Commission to Combat Police Corruption-Executive Summary
In December of 1996 the Commission to Combat Police Corruption released its First Annual Report which evaluated the Department's integrity efforts.
INTEGRITY TESTS
"During 1995 and the first half of 1996, 826 random tests, involving 240 officers, were conducted. The random test produced one criminal failure and seven procedural failures. The targeted tests produced twenty-two criminal failures and one procedural failure" (Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 1996). The Commission determined that the integrity program instituted by NYPD is unique and shows a positive attempt by the Department to instill integrity. The Commission believes that the feeling of an omnipresent IAB is having a deterrent effect on corruption within the Department. In addition, the Commission suggested that the number of targeted tests be increased, along with continuing its random integrity tests. Also, the Commission suggested not publicly reporting the exact number of integrity tests the Department performs as a deterrent to the integrity testing program(Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 1996).
INTEGRITY CONTROL OFFICERS
The Commission determined that Integrity Control Officers (ICO) have too many administrative duties that do not relate to anti-corruption duties. The ICOs do not spend enough time outside of the precinct. However, the Commission did find that with the Department's new policy of inclusion that there is more communication between ICOs and IAB. The Commission suggested that ICOs spend a designated percentage of their time outside of the precinct and the Department should find better measures for evaluating work performance of ICOs (Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 1996).
THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
The Commission to Combat Police Corruption also conducted an evaluation of the Department's disciplinary system. The focus of their attention was placed on false statements by officers. The Commission found that in cases involving false statements where the officer was not criminally convicted, the departmental penalties were not sufficient given the nature of the offense. The Commission recommended that when an officer is convicted in a criminal proceeding, for perjury or any other felony, they should be terminated. The Police Commissioner adopted a policy of termination from the Department if an officer is found guilty by the Trial Commissioner or by guilty plea, absent exceptional circumstances. The Commission felt that the offense of failing to report the misconduct had not been adequately punished. The Commission also felt that the Department needed to evaluate the penalties in other areas of misconduct, like off-duty misconduct where there was use of a weapon or excessive force (Commission to Combat Police Corruption).
In addition, the NYPD has proposed several legislative intiatives:
- Expanding the authority of the Commissioner to impose penalties beyond the current maximum 30-day suspension and dismissal probation or termination to include the possibility of suspension without pay for up to one year, imposition of monetary fines and demotions in grade, title, or rank;
- Extending the statute of limitations for the discipline of non-criminal misconduct from 18 months to 3 years;
- Tightening procedures to preclude corrupt officers from receiving pensions; and
- Extending the time period during which officers charged with crimes can be suspended prior to trial from 30 days. While the Department proposed an unlimited period the Commission believes that 6 months would be appropriate (Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 1996).
Finally, the Commission found that the Department has taken steps to strenghthen their disciplinary system and these steps include: increasing the level of penalites imposed, consistency in penalties, consultations between the First Deputy Commissioner's office and the Advocate's office before a plea is negotiated, limiting pleas on serious cases, and cutting the prosecution time of cases in the disciplinary system (Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 1996)
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Copies of reports issued by the Commission to Combat Police Corruption can be requested by writing to The Commission to Combat Police Corruption, 17 Battery Place, New York, New York, 10004 or by calling (212) 487-7350.
References
- Amnesty International. (1996). Amnesty International country report-United States of America: Police brutality and excessive force in the New York City Police Department.
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Commission to Combat Police Corruption. (1996). Executive Summary: 1. New York City Police Department: Random integrity testing program, 2. New York City Police Department: The role and utilization of the integrity control officer, and 3. New York City Police Department: How the Department disciplines its members who make false statements.
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Sontag, D. and Barry, D. (1997, September 17). Using settlements to measure police abuse. The New York Times.
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