The July Crisis of 1914: Chronology of Events
The immediate origins of World War I lie in the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the
Austro-Hungarian empire, on June 28, 1914. The assassins
were Bosnian youths of Serb background, aided by conspirators in neighboring Serbia where
the plot was hatched. In essence, therefore, the deed was perpetrated by
Austrian subjects (for Bosnia was Austrian territory) who, as mainly ethnic
Serbs and Croats, favored the Pan-Slav aspirations of Serbian nationalism
which, as the Greater Serbia (i.e, Serbia in addition
to the Austrian-controlled Slav provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other
Slavic regions) movement was at this time supported by open nationalist
organizations in Serbia as well as by the illegal terrorist organization known
as the Black Hand. While it is true that Black Hand conspirators included
Serbian civilians as well as persons in government service (as soldiers, civil
servants, etc.), there is no hard evidence that members of the Serb government
itself were engaged in secret, terrorist, anti-Austrian activity or supported
groups, such as the Black Hand, which were involved in such activity.
That the assassination portended much wider and more
serious implications than a mere quarrel between Austria and Serbia derives
from the fact that nearly two decades of arms escalation, imperialist
rivalry, fear and mistrust had produced two blocs of mutually suspicious
European great powers whose destinies became entangled in a
web of alliances and illusions about their 'rightful' place in an insecure
world. Austria was such a great power, though in the eyes of senior
members of the German
government, hardly deserving of that status. Now, however, her every action in
the international sphere (in this case holding Serbia to account for the
assassination) would be monitored by her rival Russia lest it threaten her
security or prestige in a kindred Slavic region that she regarded as a
sphere of
interest. But any Russian challenge would expect an answer from Austria's loyal ally, Germany
whose challenge to Russia
would in turn invite the attention of the latter country's ally, France.
And could the
world's foremost power, Britain,
be expected to ignore the menace of such events to the peace of Europe or to the balance-of-power relationships conducive
to peace that she sought to preserve. A crisis of this nature had
already
taken place in 1908-09 over the annexation of Bosnia
by Austria, which was
opposed by Russia but
resolved through Russia's
humiliating climb-down in the face of Germany's threat. It was Russia's
predictable response in the crisis of July 1914 that set in train the elements of an
ancient Greek tragedy that hurtled the European peoples into the cauldron of
terrible war.
Bibliography
Albertini, L., The Origins of the War of 1914 (Vol. II)
Fay, S.B., The Origins of the
World War
Geiss, I., July 1914
Montgelas, M. et al., The Outbreak of
the World War
Scott, J.B.,
Diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the European war
Selected Cast of Characters:
Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria
Count Berchtold, Austrian
Foreign Minister
Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf,
Austrian chief of staff
Count Tisza, Hungarian prime minister
Count von Hoyos,
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry
Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia
Sergei Dimitrievich Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister
The German Kaiser, Wilhelm II
T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German chancellor
Gottlieb von Jagow, German
Secretary of State for foreign affairs
Count Helmuth von Moltke, German army chief of staff
Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary
R. Poincaré,
President of
France
René Viviani, French
prime minister
M.N. Pasic,
Serbian prime
minister
Note:
European capitals mentioned: Vienna
(Austria), Berlin
(Germany), St.
Petersburg (Russia),
London (Great
Britain), Paris (France),
Belgrade (Serbia).
For convenience, Austria-Hungary
is denoted as Austria
or A-H throughout. Mention of the names of individual countries or their
capital cities makes reference to the respective government. In the
main, the communications referenced below occur as direct communications
[via
telegram or telegraph (usually in cipher)] from government leaders (see
Cast of
Characters) to their counterparts in other countries or as similar memoranda to
their own respective ambassadors or representatives to those other countries,
either to guide their actions or convey information (support, warnings,
threats. . .) to the governments to which they are accredited.
In what follows, primary emphasis is on the
chief actors
embroiled in the crisis, namely, Austria,
Germany, Russia and Britain.
1914
June 4 . . . Newspaper reports of a planned visit of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife to Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia. Object was to attend the
army maneuvers as well as create a favorable impression on this his first visit
to the Bosnian subjects of this recently acquired territory.
June 26 . . . Franz Ferdinand and his wife arrive in Sarajevo and mingle
with the crowds.
June 28 . . . Sunday. On their
return (official) visit, the royal couple is assassinated by the Bosnian youth Gavrilo Princip.
June 29 . . . In discussion between Berchtold (Austrian foreign minister) and Conrad (army
chief of staff), the latter urges immediate military action against Serbia.
In a discussion between Berchtold
(Austrian foreign minister) and Count Tisza (Hungarian prime minister), the
former indicates his intention to confront Serbia while the latter warns of possible Russian intervention
and, moreover, is doubtful about German support. Decision is made to first
ascertain the position of Austria's
ally, Germany.
June 30 . . . [Note that at this time and
subsequently the Serbian government took no action to investigate on their
own account any complicity in the assassination by groups in Serbia.
This apparent unconcern was faulted by some observers for ignoring the matter
and allowing Austria
to present her own version of events. Others felt that that the inaction
stemmed from the danger that could be presented by an investigation that could
have exposed
circumstances embarrassing to the Serbian
government. There was also the concern that a submissive attitude could provoke
unrest among the Serbs.]
July 1 .
. . The ever cautious Tisza warns the
emperor Franz Joseph of the, as yet, absence of any evidence of the involvement
of the Serb government in the crime. At the same time the emperor refuses
Conrad's request to proclaim martial law, a move that could provoke unrest
among Austria's
diverse, non-German ethnic groups.
July 2 .
. . The German ambassador at Vienna advises Berchtold to develop a definite plan of action in
confronting Serbia,
for only such would ensure a German commitment of support. There is no hint of
German caution in this or in the later response of the Kaiser.
July 4 . . . Count Hoyos (Austrian foreign ministry official) is sent to Berlin to ascertain
German policy. The German military are in favor of early aggressive action by Austria while Russia is unprepared.
[Note the influence on the German government of
Kaiser Wilhelm's comment: "Now or never ... The Serbs must be disposed of, and
that right soon!," more especially, as was
thought, with Russia's
military unpreparedness.]
July 5 . . . The German Kaiser, confident of
Bethmann-Hollweg's acquiescence, offers Austria
the so-called 'blank check' of full military support and not to delay in taking
whatever action Austria
decides. Conrad now urges mobilization of the army, which, at this early stage,
the emperor refuses.
[The problem
for the 'war party' in the Austrian government is to secure the agreement of
the reluctant Tisza, an effort that will not
succeed until July 14.]
In a letter to the Kaiser, the Austrian emperor
places blame on the Serb government and asserts Austria's
aim is to "isolate and diminish" Serbia
(presumably via territorial adjustments in favor of other Balkan states) and
thus eliminate Serb influence in southeastern Europe.
[Although it will not become clear what recourse
Austria will adopt until the July 23 ultimatum to Serbia is made known to
the powers the day after, it may be taken that considering the mutual
antagonism of Austria and Serbia,
Austria will make retributive demands that could lead to a serious
international crisis, as is hinted in the Austrian representative's interview
with Sazonov on July 6. Otherwise, complete silence,
excepting in the case of Germany,
is maintained as to Austrian intentions before July 24, though rumors circulate
throughout.]
July 6 .
. . The German Kaiser leaves on his Scandinavian cruise, in the belief that
neither Russia nor France will
take action. He will not return to Berlin
until July 27 though being kept informed of developments and in contact with
his government in the meantime.
[The Kaiser is kept away from Berlin deliberately until after the Austrian
ultimatum has been issued so as to avoid a premature return that might alert
the other powers that something is afoot. Several other leading Austrian and
German figures (Bethmann, Conrad, Moltke
. . .) also soon leave on vacation, a deliberate deception to allay any
fears of the
Entente Powers (Britain, France, Russia) that a war crisis was at hand].
[The Austrian local investigation discloses that the
plot
had been hatched in the Serb capital Belgrade
and implicated a Serb employee of one of the government ministries as well as
Serb army officers (see July 13)]
Bethmann-Hollweg informs Austria
that she "may be sure that His Majesty [the Kaiser], in accordance with
his treaty obligations and old friendship, will stand by Austria's
side," thus endorsing his master's 'blank check' of the previous day. The
decision for action, which should not be delayed, is to be Austria's. Jagow
later remarks :
. . . it is for us a matter of vital interest to uphold our Austrian
ally's status in the world" Greatly encouraged by these assurances, Berchtold hopes that the crisis can be contained by a
localized war against Serbia
alone.
Sazonov, Russia's
foreign minister, is informed by the
Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St.
Petersburg that Austria
may be forced to send agents to Serbia
to investigate the assassination. "Do not embark on such a course" is
Sazonov's warning response.
July 7 . . . M.N. Pasic, Serbian prime minister, denies foreknowledge of
the assassination plot.
At the meeting of the Austrian Joint
(Austria and Hungary)
Council of Ministers in Vienna, all but
Tisza, fearful of Russian intervention on the side of Serbia, urge
military action. Berchtold, though realizing the
probability of Russian intervention, urges that any diplomatic action taken
should "only end in war." Austria,
he asserts, cannot afford to show weakness through inaction, especially
following Germany's
promise of unconditional support. Tisza is alone in his lack of enthusiasm for
war and insists that any ultimatum to Serbia should not be weighted with
"unacceptable demands." Nevertheless, the meeting ends with a
decision endorsing Berchtold's view.
July 8 ….Berchtold
reports to Tisza his conversation with the
German ambassador. The latter has again warned of the danger of losing German
support if any weakness is shown in confronting Serbia. He also, for the first time, informs Conrad
that an "ultimatum" will be prepared and sent to Serbia in about
two weeks.
Again Tisza shows his disinclination for aggressive
action in informing Franz Joseph of his reservations: Austria's attack on Serbia could provoke a world war.
July 9 ....The
German ambassador in London, after conversation with Sir Edward Grey, British
foreign secretary, reports to Berlin the intention of the British government to
act according to its own judgment and "in no circumstances would be found
on the side of the aggressors" in the event of war. But Austria should not make demands on Serbia that would invite the intervention of Russia. [Grey
is described as seeing “no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation.”]
July 10 ….Information
from the German ambassador at Vienna, following conversation with Berchtold, discloses to his government that certain demands
"that would be wholly impossible for the Serbs to accept" will be
made on Serbia to which they must agree within 48 hours, a brief period
designed to limit Serb communications with Russia.
July 12 ….The Austrian ambassador at Berlin reports to Berchtold the
fact that the German Kaiser and political leaders urge “an action against Serbia,
which may eventually end in war.”
July 13 ....The
Austrian Legal Counselor reports finally that the local investigation of the
crime revealed absolutely no complicity on the part of the Serb government
in the assassination plot. That government could only be accused of tolerating
the existence of anti-Austrian organizations in Serbia.
July 14 ....Count
Tisza, influenced by evidence about the plot and by the belligerent and
provocative tone of the Serbian press, withdraws his objection to military
action against Serbia but insists on no territorial acquisition.
On this and the following days, the notion of
intended Austrian action against Serbia is circulating among
diplomatic circles. The German ambassador in Vienna informs Berlin that the ultimatum will be delivered
on July 23.
July 15 ....The
French president and prime minister leave on previously planned visit to Russia, arriving in St.
Petersburg on July 20 for a three-day visit: they will not return
to Paris until
July 29.
July 16 ....The
Russian ambassador at Vienna reports to his
government that Austria is
to present demands "such as would be unacceptable to the dignity" of Serbia.
The British ambassador in Vienna
similarly reports to Grey that "a kind of indictment is being
prepared [by Austria]
against the Serbian government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy.
[During these days
the British foreign minister appears to show little concern about the urgency
of the situation, typically adopting a wait-and-see attitude, despite the
rumors of Austrian intentions, until his interview with the Austrian ambassador
on July 24.]
July 17
….Berchtold reveals to the German Chargé d’Affaires his hope that Serbia will reject Austrian
demands.
July 18 ....Sazonov warns Austria
that Russia would not
tolerate "any blow to Serbia's
independence."
Jagow explains his
government's views on the crisis to his ambassador at London. Austria can no longer be regarded
as a formidable power, which renders her a weak ally. Now is her chance to
restore her position by bold action. In any event, however, Germany is tied to Austria
and cannot afford to leave her at the mercy of Russia:
"We cannot sacrifice Austria
. . . we dare not flinch."
Further German knowledge of the ultimatum includes
the Austrian demand to participate in the enquiry to be undertaken on Serbian
soil.
July 19 ....The
Austrian Council of Ministers approves the text of the ultimatum to be sent to Serbia.
Meanwhile, secret Austrian military preparations are already underway.
The Serbian ambassadors to the several Powers are advised
to make known to those governments that while Serbia in its desire for peace
with Austria will work to accommodate the wishes (as yet unknown) of the
Austrian empire, it “can never comply with demands which may be directed
against
the dignity of Serbia . . .”
Jagow requests from Austria
immediate knowledge of the text of the ultimatum as soon as it is made
available to the Austrian emperor.
July 20 ....The
Austrian ultimatum is dispatched to the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade
(capital of Serbia)
for presentation to the Serbian government on July 23.
[The date is considerably later than had been
hoped for by Germany.
The reason for delay included the fact that it was considered opportune to
issue it just after the French delegation had left St. Petersburg. Also a factor was the
conventional use of soldiers during July to help with the harvest.]
July 21 ....French
president Poincaré at St.
Petersburg informs the Austrian ambassador that "The Russian
people are very warm friends of the Serbians, and France
is Russia's
ally," suggesting the dangerous implications that could be drawn.
Sazonov confronts the
German ambassador on the crisis, asserting that it is Austria’s intention to annihilate Serbia.
July 22 ….The
German government receives in advance the text of the ultimatum to be delivered
next day; it had no hand in its drafting other than exerting the pressure from
the outset that helped induce Austria
to frame its "unacceptable" demands. Jagow
relays his government's agreement with the demands to the Austrian ambassador.
[For other evidence of German foreknowledge, see also July 10, 18]
Although Italy is a member of the Triple
Alliance (with Germany and Austria),
Austria had hitherto chosen
not to include her in the
discussions with Germany, even though Bethmann
had urged her to do so as early as July 6.
France,
via her ambassador at Vienna, urges moderation
on Austria and to avoid the
dangerous consequences of any "violent pressure" on Serbia.
July 23 ....Thursday. At 6
p.m. the Austrian ten-point ultimatum demanding unconditional acceptance within
48 hours, thus leaving no time for negotiations, is delivered to the Serbian
government. The preamble referred to Serbia's
permitting the anti-Austrian criminal activities of secret societies and press
propaganda to go unchallenged, a "culpable tolerance" that had
presented a "perpetual menace" to the peace of Austria. Its
terms include the fatal clauses (art. 5) requiring participation of A-H
officials and police in suppressing the subversive anti-Austrian activity in Serbia as well
as (art. 6) participating in the judicial investigation to be conducted there.
As per Berchtold's
instructions to his ambassador in Belgrade,
"Any conditional acceptance, or one accompanied by reservations, is to be
regarded as a refusal."
The French president and prime minister leave St. Petersburg by ship, having affirmed France's
obligations under the Franco-Russian alliance. They arrive back in Paris six days later.
July 24 ....Austria delivers to the governments of Britain, Germany,
France, Russia and Italy copies of the text of her ultimatum to
Serbia.
Sazonov's response on
reading the ultimatum is "It's a European war." He urges Berchtold to extend the brief time-limit in order to
conduct negotiations and so avert the "fatal consequences" that
otherwise might ensue. [A later judgment by Sazonov
suggested that Austria,
by her uncompromising demands, had sought “to secure her own hegemony in the
Balkans”]
The Crown Prince of Serbia appeals to the
tsar—"to your noble Slav heart"—for immediate aid.
The Russian Council of Ministers resolves to advise Serbia not to
oppose an Austrian invasion, in anticipation of resolution of the crisis by the
Powers. The ministers also request the tsar to authorize partial
mobilization of the army (i.e., along Russia's
border with Austria)
to be instituted only as circumstances decree). There is a discussion between Sazonov and the army chief of staff on the issue of
mobilization. The military desired general mobilization (i.e., against
both the Austrian and German borders) but only partial mobilization is approved
by the tsar, though not to be carried out until July 28.
The French ambassador at London tries to wake up Grey
to the realization that it would be too late for mediation once Austria
moved
against Serbia were the ultimatum rejected.
Grey's response to the ultimatum is conveyed to Vienna. He notes the
severity of art. 5 as tantamount to compromising Serbia's independence as a nation
and is also critical of the very brief time-limit.
Grey suggests to the German ambassador that Serbia could
not under any circumstances accept the Austrian ultimatum as worded and warns
of the danger of a European war. He proposes that Germany
should join with France, Italy and Britain
in an effort to mediate the developing crisis between rivals Russia and Austria. Also, it would be up to Germany to put pressure on Austria to
extend the time-limit and undertake no military action so that mediation via a
four-power conference could proceed. The latter idea was forwarded to Austria, without a recommendation, by Jagow but (perhaps deliberately) it arrived at Vienna after the
time-limit had expired (see July 25 report of the Austrian ambassador).
In a conversation between Jagow
and the French ambassador, the former professes prior ignorance of the demands
of the Austrian ultimatum (see July 22).
Sir Eyre Crowe, senior British foreign office official,
offers his assessment to Grey : "Our interests
are tied up with those of France
and Russia in this struggle,
which is not for the possession of Serbia,
but one between Germany
aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe
and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom." He, therefore,
advises that Britain should
indicate to Germany that
"war will find England by the side of France and Russia."
Germany
communicates with the British and French governments, emphasizing that the
crisis should be settled by Austria
and Serbia
alone, i.e., to keep the conflict localized. The interference of other powers,
it claims, could be followed by "incalculable consequences" It will
not participate in the conference proposed by Grey that is tantamount, as Jagow put it, to a "court of arbitration" not
requested by either Russia
or Austria.
July 25 ....
Report of the Austrian ambassador to Berlin on the state of mind of the German
government: "Here it is universally taken for granted that an eventual
negative reply by Serbia will be followed by a declaration of war from
[Austria] . . . Any delay in commencement of military operations is regarded
here [i.e., by the German government] [as presenting] a great danger of the
interference of other Powers. They urgently advise us to go ahead and confront the
world with a fait accompli . . . The German government tenders the most
binding assurances [to Austria] that it in no way associates itself with the
(English) proposals [for mediation]; is even decidedly against their being
considered, and only passes them on in order to conform to the English
request."
[According to the Austrian chief-of-staff, 16 days would
be required before military operations could begin].
Saturday.
Noon---Sazonov, following the government's decision of the
previous day, requests Austria to extend the 48-hour
time-limit due to expire at 6 p.m. Austria
refuses.
3 p.m. Serbia orders general mobilization.
5.58 p.m. Serbia makes reply to the
ultimatum. It is most conciliatory in tone (and so judged by the Entente
Powers), even to accepting in principle the collaboration demanded by A-H (art.
5). However, it refuses to concede the judicial involvement of Austrian
officials demanded by art. 6, which would violate Serbia's
constitution. But Serbia
stood ready to have the matter adjudicated by either the International Court at the Hague or by the
Great Powers. The reply is rejected by Austria.
[It was felt by some observers that Serb acceptance
of all the demands would have provoked a revolutionary upsurge from the Serb
people].
The Russian Ministerial Council meeting in the
presence of the tsar decides that partial mobilization would come into
operation once Austria
troops crossed the Serb border.
Sazonov in a highly-agitated conversation with the German
ambassador excoriates Austria's policy, claiming that it is her intention
to
“devour” Serbia.
"In that event," states Sazonov, " . . . Russia
will go to war with Austria,"
which he regards as an expansionist power. On being informed, the Kaiser, with
typical bluster, comments: "All right! Let her."
[A former German chancellor, Prince von Bülow, had a rather low opinion of the military abilities
of his imperial master. " . . . he never led an army in the field . . . He
was well aware that he was neurasthenic, without real capacity as a general,
and still less able, in spite of his naval hobby, to have led a squadron or
even captained a ship."]
The British ambassador at St. Petersburg, anxious for Grey's mediation efforts to
continue and concerned over possible Russian mobilization alerts Sazonov to the likelihood that any Russian mobilization
would provoke Germany
to immediate war. Sazonov’s counter argument
is that war could be avoided if Britain
made clear to Germany her
resolve to stand by Russia
and France.
Otherwise, "rivers of blood would flow" and Britain would
inevitably be dragged into war along with everyone else. The ambassador
declines Sazonov’s suggestion as it was Grey’s
opinion that any such admission would only harden the resolve of Germany to
support her ally.
The French begin secret military preparations (recall
of troops overseas, etc.).
The German ambassador informs Grey that his government had
no prior knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum [This was a lie, of course, though
the ambassador was not aware of this highly secret deception by his
government]. Grey replies:". . . between Serbia and Austria I [feel] no
title to intervention, but as soon as the question became one between Austria
and Russia it was a question of the peace of Europe, in which we must all take
a hand," a statement that hardly makes explicit reference to what action
Britain would take.
The Austrian emperor signs the order for
mobilization, to come into effect the next day.
[The Serbs, however, confident of Russian support, decline
to do the one thing that might avoid an escalation, namely, capitulate entirely
to the Austrian demands. It is probable, however, that such submission would
have prompted further Austrian claims, such as payment for the costs of mobilization , not to mention the problems that might occur
within Serbia should the
government make such an abject surrender to Austria.]
July 26 ....Fortress
towns in parts of Russia
facing the German and Austrian borders are placed in a 'state of war' and
rumors abound in Germany
of the call-up of Russian reservists, though the latter is denied by Sazonov. He vainly attempts to interest Germany in
seeking mediation.
[Note that Germany
refrains from any overt military measures until it becomes aware officially on
July 31 that Russia
has ordered general mobilization.]
Sazonov carelessly admits
to the German ambassador that "certain military preparations had already
been taken by Russia to
avoid surprises "but that mobilization would not be ordered until Austria had
crossed the Serb frontier.
Sazonov proposes to Austria joint Austro-Russian negotiations in
order that the demands of the ultimatum could be moderated and made
acceptable to Serbia.
Grey, via the German ambassador, requests the German
government to use its influence with Austria to get her to negotiate
with the Serbs, accept the Serbian reply to the ultimatum and be "restrained
from prosecuting a . . foolhardy
policy of 'crushing' Serbia that would surely escalate
into an Austro-Russian conflict." Bethmann does
not
accede to the request.
July 27 ....The
reply of the tsar to Serbia's
appeal of July 24 urges Serbia
not to take any step that would bring on the "horrors of war" while
his government pursues a peaceful solution to the crisis. Russia, however, will not abandon Serbia to the mercy of Austria.
Sazonov discusses the
Austrian ultimatum with the A-H ambassador. He finds paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 to
be unacceptable and hopes A-H will tone down its demands on Serbia.
Jagow expresses his
displeasure to the Austrian ambassador at the delay in undertaking military
action: the Austrian army chief of staff, Conrad, had figured on starting
military operations on or after August 12. Now under German pressure, the
date
is brought forward to July 28.
Britain
decides to concentrate its fleet in home ports (i.e., be ready for action), a
clear warning to Germany.
The final German refusal of Grey’s 4-Power conference is
delivered. Jagow dismisses it as tantamount to a
“court of arbitration” to be imposed on Austria;
it would depend on the acquiescence of both Russia
and Austria and Austria has
refused. [Germany’s refusal
necessarily nullifies the acceptance of France
and Italy].
As a preparatory military measure, French overseas
troops are returned to garrisons in France.
July 28 ....Upon
reading the Serb reply to the Austrian ultimatum, the Kaiser (just returned
from his Scandinavian cruise) reverses his hitherto bellicose stance, regarding
the response as Serbia's
capitulation to Austria's
"wholly uncompromising attitude."
This prompts Bethmann-Hollweg to offer the
Kaiser's mediation so as to avoid a world war. The Kaiser's proposal is for Austria to "Halt in Belgrade,"
i.e., occupy the Serb capital as a preliminary to
negotiations between Austria
and Serbia.
However, the idea is marred by Bethmann's independent
call for early action by Austria
if full compliance with the demands is not forthcoming from Serbia. And,
anyway, A-H is about to declare war on Serbia.
[Some historians have accused Bethmann
of playing a double game--pretending to cooperate with
Russia
and Great Britain while
urging on Austria: note that
the Kaiser's proposal was not forwarded to Vienna until the following day, after
war had been declared.]
Sazonov's proposal to Austria for
direct Russo-Austrian talks in search of an agreement is rejected by Berchtold as "useless."
The British ambassador at Vienna reports to Grey his
conversation with Berchtold who stated that Austria
was not prepared to alter its demands or delay war measures against Serbia as
the prestige of the monarchy was at stake.
6 p.m. Austria
declares war on Serbia.
Russia
advances its military preparations following Austria’s partial mobilization of her army
and presumed imminent invasion of Serbia. The German government is advised that
"no aggressive intention exists on the part of Russia
towards Germany."
[Note Sazonov's dilemma: his desire to avoid war prompts him to
put the kind of pressure on Austria
(via mobilization) that would make her draw back from the brink. But in doing
so invites German support for Austria
that would make war inevitable unless Russia made a humiliating
climb-down, as in the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9. Besides, the
promise of German help serves
to stiffen Austria
not to hold back. Some historians feel, therefore, that it would have been
better for the Russians to have avoided a hasty reaction. Yet Russian public
opinion would hardly have tolerated, without retaliation, Austria's subjugation of Serbia.]
The German government warns Russia
that her military mobilization, even if only against Austria,
would force Germany
to mobilize, rendering war all the more inevitable.
The French army chief advises the Russian military
attaché of France's
"full and active readiness faithfully to execute her responsibilities as
an ally."
Bethmann becomes concerned
at the appearance of German intransigence on the question of mediation as well
as Austria’s silence on its
intentions towards Serbia.
In a directive to his ambassador at Vienna he states: " It is imperative
that the responsibility for the eventual extension of the war among those
nations not originally immediately concerned should, under all circumstances,
fall on Russia . . . you will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the
impression that we wish to hold Austria back. The case is solely one of finding
a way to realize Austria's desired aim, that of cutting the vital cord of the
Greater Serbian propaganda without at the same time bringing on a world war,
and, if the latter cannot be avoided in the end, of improving the conditions
under which we shall have to wage it."
[Note: If Austria
agreed to limit its action by not annexing Serb territory while insisting on
securing its ‘legitimate’ demands, Russia could appear in the wrong if
she refused to accept that].
July 29 ....Wednesday.
Austria opens the war with the bombardment of
the Serb capital, Belgrade.
With the opening of hostilities by Austria and her
rejection of all attempts at mediation, the tsar orders both partial and
general mobilization pending institution of one or the other as military
considerations decreed. However, against the wishes of the army chiefs, the
order for partial mobilization against Austria
is issued in response to Austria's
opening attack on Serbia.
[Thus Russia
is prepared to mobilize against Austria
even though Austria has not
herself mobilized against Russia.]
The Kaiser attempts to induce Russia to negotiate with Austria; The Russian reply is conciliatory but
the tsar counters with a proposal to submit the matter for arbitration at the International Court
at the Hague
(dubbed 'Nonsense' by the Kaiser).
The German government warns Russia that her military preparations would
force Germany
to mobilize, rendering war all the more inevitable.
The German chancellor, in a bid for British
neutrality, promises Britain
that in a general war there would be no
annexation of French territory in Europe by Germany
if Great Britain
remained neutral in the impending conflict. He would give no assurance about
respecting the neutrality of Belgium (which was a main concern of Britain),
indicating that she would have to yield to 'military necessity' as judged
by army HQ, i.e., accord with the Schlieffen (war) Plan of attacking France via
Belgium through violating the latter country's
internationally-sanctioned neutrality.
[This reply was described by Grey as
"infamous" and adjudged by the historian of the July Crisis, Luigi Albertini, as "a revelation of utter political
incompetence."]
Grey warns Germany that "Britain would not stand
aside if efforts to keep the peace failed . . . If Germany became involved and
France became involved, . . . we should have to decide what British interests
required us to do," hence the urgent need for mediation. He hopes Bethmann can persuade Austria
to come to terms with Russia
in order to save the peace of Europe.
Berchtold, cognizant of Russia's mobilization against Austria, tries to induce Germany to mobilize against Russia and thus
force a climb-down similar to that in 1909 over the Bosnian crisis. This,
however, would not accord with German plans at this juncture (see Bethmann's directive of July 28).
July 30 ….The
Russian proposal to Germany
for the intervention of the Hague Court is rejected (Austria will not cease her military operations
as long as Russia is
mobilized, nor will Russia
recall its mobilization while Austria
is at war with Serbia).
Grey adjudges Bethmann's
communication of the previous day as a virtual "intention to violate
Belgian neutrality." He rejects the German request for British neutrality:
"To make this bargain with Germany
at the expense of France
would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never
recover."
[Note that the invasion of Belgium
was for Britain
the ‘casus belli’. British strategic concerns
vis-à-vis Europe required the permanent neutrality
of this tiny state].
Bethmann,
having received no reply from Austriato the Kaiser's proposal of
July 28 and alarmed at the veiled
threat implicit in Grey's remarks of the previous day, again pressures
Austria to
reverse her hitherto unyielding stance. He informs his ambassador at Vienna: "We must
urgently and emphatically commend to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet
[i.e., the Austrian government] the acceptance of mediation. "
Austria's ignoring of Bethmann's entreaties prompts the latter's further
advice to his ambassador at Vienna for Austria: "We are ready
. . . to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but must refuse to allow
ourselves to
be drawn . . . into a world conflagration frivolously
and in disregard of our advice" (A much changed attitude after weeks of pressure for early
action!).
[All these efforts of Bethmann failed to move Austria, however, as events
are overtaken by the Russian mobilization the next day]
France, though anxious that no pretext be given for
escalating the crisis, orders military preparations for protection of her
frontier with Germany; though no troops were to move closer than about 6 miles
to the German border. The French government assures
Britain that "France, like Russia, will not fire the first
shot.
The French president attempts to get Britain to declare openly her intention to
support France so as to
induce moderation from Germany.
As heretofore, Grey remains non-committal, wishing to avoid commitments
announced in advance.
The tsar, concerned to avert what he dubbed "an
ignoble war," pleads with Kaiser Wilhelm to "do what you can to stop your
ally from going too far. Unfortunately, he also informs the Kaiser that Russian
military preparations had begun on July 25. This is a surprise to Wilhelm and,
presuming bad-faith negotiations by Russia, he declares his efforts at
mediation at an end.
The French ambassador, on instructions from prime minister Viviani, urges Sazonov that Russia
should take no military measures (i.e., general mobilization) that would induce
an aggressive response from Germany.
5 p.m. The tsar, under intense pressure from the
military and public opinion and in the false belief that secret German military
preparations had been taking place over several days, now takes a fatal,
climactic step without consulting his ally France. He orders general mobilization
to come into effect the next day, thus rendering war all but inevitable.
July 31 . . .
Friday: Noon.
Germany receives word
of the general mobilization of the Russian armed forces, thus giving her the
'green light' (and justification before the German people) to move against Russia and her
ally France in accordance with her long-held war plans. She proclaims a state of "threatening
danger of war," (kriegsgefahrzustand) as
preparatory to actual mobilization, soon to follow.
12.30 p.m. Austria proclaims general mobilization (i.e., against Russia).
While
the Austrian emperor reminds the Kaiser of Germany's obligation to "
stand
with my Empire . . . in unchanging loyalty as an ally," likewise the
German chancellor requests "the immediate active participation of
Austria in the war against Russia."
The tsar, still committed to a peaceful settlement by
negotiation, gives his "solemn word" to the Kaiser that though
mobilization cannot be withdrawn, for technical military reasons, there would
be no provocative action taken as long as Austro-Serb negotiations took place.
This, of course, is hardly possible given the attitude of Austria and, moreover, is rendered nugatory by
the fact that for Germany
itself the act of mobilization irrevocably signified war.
British memoranda to France
and Germany request
assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected. France gives an immediate, unqualified
assurance but Germany
declines to do so.
Conversation between Grey and the
French ambassador, Paul Cambon, in which the latter
asks whether England would
help France if she were
attacked by Germany.
Grey’s alarming reply, indicative of his continued ‘wait-and-see’ attitude, is:
" . . . as far as things had gone at present . .
. we could not undertake any definite engagement."[!] The Cabinet had decided to ascertain first
whether both Germany and France intended to respect the neutrality of Belgium].
7 p.m. Germany asks France to declare its intentions
within 18 hours (i.e., by 1 p.m. Saturday). France replies evasively that
she will
"act in accordance with her interests," an answer that was deemed
unsatisfactory because it failed to choose the option to remain
neutral.
[It was later
discovered that if France
had opted for neutrality, Germany
would have demanded the turning over to Germany
of her vital frontier fortresses of Toul and Verdun, to be held as a pledge of French neutrality until
the end of the war with Russia!]
Grey’s final request to Germany to opt
for peaceful negotiation hinges, according to Jagow,
on the withdrawal of Russian mobilization.
11 p.m. Germany demands written confirmation
of the suspension of Russian war measures within 12 hours.
[Privately, however, both the tsar and Sazonov had indicated to the German
ambassador that military considerations precluded any withdrawal of the
mobilization of the army]
Aug 1 ....General
mobilization ordered both by France(4.45 p.m.) and Germany (5 p.m.).
6 p.m. Having received no formal reply from
Russia, Germany
declares war on her, thus branding herself as the aggressor since neither Russia nor France has begun military action.
The tsar in a personal telegram to the Kaiser
explains that he is not prepared to take aggressive action as long as
negotiation could be maintained, a vain hope in view of the German
interpretation of mobilization as an act of war.
Italy
declares herself to be neutral on the grounds that Austria was engaged on an
aggressive war, hence relieving her of her obligations under the Triple
Alliance, which is couched in defensive terms.
[It may be noted that throughout the crisis Austria did not take Italy into her confidence, as would
have been expected from an ally.]
The French ambassador, horror-stricken by Grey's admission
that for Britain to send supporting troops to France at this time would be
"regarded here as very dangerous and doubtful," pleads with him to
honor Britain's "moral obligation" to France.
[Note that the Anglo-French Agreement of 1912 had
provided for French naval protection of Mediterranean waters while Britain would protect France's Atlantic coast.]
Aug 2 ....German
forces enter Luxemburg, contrary to the neutrality agreement of the Treaty of London of 1867, on the false
pretext that French troops were approaching the frontier.
3 p.m. Grey secures the agreement of the Cabinet to
protect the French Atlantic coast and shipping in the event of hostile German naval
activity, leaving open the question of committing troops to the continent. He
also gains its approval, though only under the threat of resigning, to confront
Germany should she move
against Belgium.
[Note: both actions require the assent of parliament due to meet the next day].
Bearing a note prepared by Jagow
on July 29, the German ambassador at Brussels
demands from Belgium access
for German troops on their way to France
or be regarded as an enemy of Germany.
The excuse is the false claim that France
was preparing to attack Germany
from Belgian territory.
Aug 3 ....Monday:
7 a.m. Belgium refuses the German demand
for access as a "flagrant violation of international
law," which brings on a full-scale invasion of the country.
[Note: Belgium
had been designated a neutral state by international treaty in 1839, a status
recognized by Germany
in 1870. In a speech in the German parliament the next day, Bethmann,
while acknowledging the violation, offers the shameless excuse that
"Necessity knows no law."]
At the crucial meeting of the House of Commons, Grey
explains his case for defending Belgium
and supporting France.
The defense of Belgium is
required by "the country's honor and the country's interests" while Britain would "sacrifice [its] respect and
good name and reputation before the world" were she to desert France in her
hour of need.
6.15 p.m. Germany
declares war on France.
[She used the false pretext of the alleged bombing of
Nuremberg by French planes when, in fact, the Germans employed their own planes
for the purpose of "justifying" the declaration of
war]
Aug 4 ....Germany
attempts to buy British neutrality with a promise not to annex Belgian
territory, claiming that military necessity (suspicion of French intentions)
compelled the German violation. But Grey answers by
requesting from Germany
assurances by midnight respecting Belgium’s
neutrality, which Britain
is determined to uphold.
[Note: .A main concern of Britain when
the prospect of a European war loomed was the observance by the powers of
Belgian neutrality. Germany
was the sticking point and British pressure on her failed to extract a
satisfactory answer. As late as the evening of August 4 a heated discussion
took place between a highly agitated Bethmann-Hollweg and the British
ambassador in which the German chancellor harangued
the diplomat over the British insistence on honoring what he outrageously dubbed
a “scrap of paper,” namely, the guarantee by the powers of Belgium’s neutrality. He now blamed
Britain
for the “terrible events” that would follow (!). Obviously, Bethmann’s
agitation arose from the realization that Germany’s foolish expectation that Britain
would stand aside had collapsed like a house of cards.]
The British ultimatum to Germany to withdraw her forces from Belgium
expires unmet. With its rejection, Britain
declares war on Germany.
Aug 6 ....Austria declares war on Russia.
Britain
decides to send troops to the continent in support of France and Belgium and these begin to arrive
four days later.
Note: The war saw two opposed groups of states
in conflict—the Central
Powers and the Allied Powers. The former included Austria, Germany,
Bulgaria and Turkey while the Allies initially (1914)
comprised Serbia, Russia, Belgium,
France, Britain, Montenegro
and Japan.
Alone of the European powers, Italy,
economically weak and militarily unprepared, did not enter in 1914. Although a
member with Germany and Austria of the Triple Alliance, she had
underlying problems with Austria,
distrusting that country’s ambition to spread its influence in the Balkans, for
parts of which Italy
had ambitions of her own. She entered the war in May 1915 on the side of the
Allies, under the promise of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Austria once
victory was achieved.
From the outset Britain was able to call on the
support of the entities comprising the British empire and, accordingly, troops
from India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa fought alongside
British ‘Tommies’. Also entering on the side of the
Allies, in addition to Italy,
were Portugal and Romania (1916), Greece
and the United States
(1917). As a reward for minor
contributions to the Allied war effort, several Caribbean and South American
countries as well as China
and others found seats at the Conference that produced the Treaty of Versailles
in 1919.
A number of European nations managed to maintain
their neutrality throughout this mainly European struggle. These were the
Scandinavian trio (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) as well as Holland,
Switzerland and Spain.
FIN