On March 7, 1936 a small contingent of German troops, increased considerably
in number in the following days, marched into the Rhineland demilitarized zone bordering France.
Hitler's excuse (as if he needed one) was the ratification one month earlier of a mutual assistance
pact between France and Russia that he chose to regard as directed against Germany. Though the
demilitarized zone was German territory, the Treaty of Versailles (Arts. 42, 43) had decreed that no
troops or fortifications were ever to be placed there--as a permanent guarantee of French security.
Though a blatant defiance of the treaty, it should be noted that the force of the Treaty had been
considerably weakened since Hitler's advent to power in 1933. In 1935 the Treaty had been
successfully defied by the German announcement of rearmament and the introduction of a military
draft: the Treaty's guarantors--Britain and France--merely condemned the unilateral German
actions. Worse still, Britain separately concluded a naval pact with Hitler that same year allowing
Germany to build a battle-fleet that included submarines--a British validation of Treaty
violations!
The militarization of the Rhineland was a direct blow to French security inasmuch as it rendered
worthless the promises of military aid by France to her eastern European allies Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and Romania if any of them were attacked by Germany. Despite the brave talk, France
was not disposed to take action without the assistance of Britain, at least. Besides, the military
chiefs advised against military action and public opinion showed no enthusiasm for war.
Nonetheless the timorous British attitude--favoring negotiation at all cost--was a sore
disappointment to the French whose military strength at this stage greatly exceeded German
strength: at the height of the 'crisis', only some 20,000 German troops had occupied the zone. Thus,
the "last chance" to stop Hitler's gallop passed off with no more than denunciations and
recriminations, despite the judgment of the League of Nations that Hitler had again violated the
Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's gambling on the defensive posture of France paid off.
M. FLANDIN said that it would be normal if the French Government should at the outset state their point of view. As to events themselves, there could be no possible disagreement. There had been an effective reoccupation of the demilitarized zone, not by symbolic detachments, but in considerable force. What had taken place was a complete reoccupation. The French Government therefore considered that what had occurred was not merely an attempt at remilitarization, but actual and complete remilitarization. . . . This meant that Germany probably intended to go on and construct fortifications, in regard to which there were separate stipulations in the treaties of peace.
It was true that the Chancellor had proposed the negotiation of a double demilitarized zone, but this proposal was purely fallacious. In face of the German menace, France had established a line of fortifications along the German frontier. His proposal amounted, in fact, to a proposal for the demolition of these fortifications.
It was not merely upon the ground of its violation that the French Government took position. France had drawn attention in the past to many violations of the treaties of peace, but never to a violation so deliberate as the present one or a violation committed in such conditions.
. . . what had been violated was a treaty into which Germany had freely entered. It was a violation of a territorial character, a violation following upon repeated assurances by the German Chancellor [Hitler] that he would respect the Locarno Treaty and the demilitarized zone on condition that the other parties did the same. It was a violation committed in the very middle of negotiations . . .
If such violations were tolerated by members of the League as a whole, and in particular by the Locarno Powers, there was no basis for the establishment of international order, and no chance for the organization of peace through a system of collective security under the Covenant (of the League of Nations).
France would therefore ask the Council of the League to declare that there had been a breach of articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles [decreeing demilitarization of the Rhineland]. As to the fact of this breach, there could be no possibility of doubt.
Once the breach had been declared by the Council, the French Government would put at the disposal of the Council all their moral and material resources (including military, naval and air forces) in order to repress what they regarded as an attempt upon international peace. The French Government expected that the Locarno Powers, in virtue of their formal obligations to render assistance, and the other members of the League . . . would act with the French Government in exercising pressure upon the author of this action.
The French Government did not by this mean to indicate that they would refuse in the future to pursue negotiations with Germany on questions interesting Germany and the Locarno Powers; but that such negotiations would only be possible when international law had been re-established in its full value . . .
M., Flandin said that his object during the present preparatory meeting of the Locarno Powers was to secure unity of action. His own conviction . . . was that if the Locarno Powers were agreed in asking that (measures of a financial, economic and, if necessary, military character) should be taken, it was very probable that the Powers represented on the Council would agree to recommend them to the other members of the League. On the other hand, if the Locarno Powers went to the Council divided, it was much less probable that the Council would enter so firmly upon the proposed measures.
His view was that the Powers who had special obligations under Locarno should take up a common position at the Council. In that event the Council would probably recommend progressive measures in order to secure evacuation. The Powers concerned would then have to concert as to those measures most likely to be adopted by the greatest possible number of members of the League . . . (but) there was a clear obligation to render military assistance resting upon the Locarno Powers themselves.
Mr. Eden (British Foreign Secretary) asked whether the French Government contemplated
that the Locarno Powers should take military measures alone.
M. Flandin replied: "Yes."
M. Flandin's further remarks of March 13:
. . . Monsieur Flandin emphasized that the next challenge would not be an attack upon France or Belgium, but very likely an attack upon Czechoslovakia or Austria. If we failed to meet the present challenge, who could possibly say that Germany would be stopped in her next venture?
[Ref.: W.N. Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919- 1939, XVI (H.M.S.O.), pp.84-9, 110]
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