In the early years of the Communist regime in Russia, one of the dilemmas facing the leadership of the Soviet Union was the problem of establishing socialism in a country that, compared to the West, was industrially underdeveloped and agriculturally backward. The main requirement for industrial advance, however, was the revenue that could finance the importation of much-needed machinery and other industrial goods until such time as these could be produced within the country. But such revenue could only come from agricultural production, mainly from grain of which pre-revolutionary Russia had been a primary exporter. Unfortunately, the devastation in agriculture wrought by the civil war (1918-21) contributed to the much-reduced grain production thereafter. This derived in part from the disappearance, under socialist reconstruction, of the pre-revolutionary estates and large private farms. For post-1917 Russia had become a country of small, poorly managed farms with no more than about 5% of peasant households classed as the better-off farmers or “kulaks.” Now there were more farms and some 80% of their grain production was being consumed by the peasants themselves, leaving less for export.

The regime was aware of the country’s industrial needs, Trotsky being the foremost proponent of the need for rapid industrial growth, which he believed would be secured if a policy of what he called “permanent revolution” were followed—the so-called Left Deviation. According to this thesis, the victory of socialism in Russia depended on the assumption to power of the proletariat in the more advanced countries, thus ending Russia’s isolation and vulnerability to capitalist power. At this time (1924) Stalin, perhaps as much out of personal dislike of Trotsky than as a matter of principle, plumped for the opposite policy of going-it- alone (so-called ‘socialism in one country’) based on a cooperative alliance of the urban proletariat and the peasantry. Of course, this was to ignore the basic contradiction between the overriding needs of the socialist economy that sought government control of the means of production and the preference of the independent-minded peasants, committed as they were to the free-market NEP and distrustful of state intervention.

It became apparent by 1928 that this alliance (the ‘smychka’) had failed to emerge. NEP, while favorable to the peasants, had not worked in the interests of the State, beset as it was by peasant reluctance to sell their grain at the low prices offered by the State at a time when the private market economy was more favorable to them. Therefore, in this dangerous situation, Stalin made an about-turn, now opting for all-out industrialization and renewed pressure on the peasants who (minus the kulaks, of course) were supposed to benefit ultimately from the modernization of agriculture once collective farms were established on a mass scale. This tactic signaled the doom of NEP and exacerbated the bitter struggle that had been brewing between Stalin and his pro-NEP opponents in the party such as Bukharin—the so-called Right Deviation.

The following is an extract from the speech given by Stalin to the party Central Committee in Nov. 1928.

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production [i.e., the creation of industrial machinery such as machine-tools] in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialization of the country . . . and the key to the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development. But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. . .

We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of modern achievements. At the same time we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall. . . .

. . . The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically. . . . The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. . . . The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialism which has established its proletarian dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country. . . .And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. . . [As Lenin said] " . . .either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well .... Perish or drive full-steam ahead." . . .

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the only country but one of the countries of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say. If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But . . we are still the only country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically. That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

. . . it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of export reserves essential in order to import machinery for the needs of our national economy. . . .
Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production [i.e., machinery such as tractors, etc.] essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. . . .

We cannot go on . . for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two different foundations; the foundation of the most large- scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small-commodity economy of the peasants. . . Either we accomplish this task, in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it--[As Lenin said] . . ."Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."

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