John Jay College of Criminal Justice

The City University of New York

Department of Art, Music, and Philosophy

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo, BSc, BSc, MA, PhD

Philosophy 231

Knowing, Being and Doing:

Philosophical Method and Its Application

Course Description
Course Syllabus
Course Guidelines
Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy

Course Description

The present course, entitled ‘Knowing, Being, and Doing: Philosophical Method and Its Application’, is divided into three parts, each of which focuses on one major figure in the history of philosophy: the first part deals with the Ancient Greek thinker Plato; the second part focuses on the seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes; and the last part covers the nineteenth-century English savant John Stuart Mill. The Plato component includes discussions on three of his seminal dialogues, Protagoras, Meno, and The Republic, which deal with topics such as: virtue, the contrast between truth and opinion, Plato’s aims and methods of argument, the linking of knowledge to right opinion, and the Forms. The part on Descartes includes discussions on his key philosophical writings, the Discourse on the Method, Meditations on First Philosophy and ‘Selections from the Meditation’s "Objections and Replies"’, which consider issues such as: doubt and certainty, the existence of God, the self, and the relation between the soul and the body. Finally, the Mill module includes discussions on his treatises Utilitarianism and On Liberty -- which include topics such as: the nature of morally right action, happiness, pleasure, and justice. The course as a whole discusses canonical philosophical problems, namely, the nature of knowledge (e.g., whether one can know anything for certain), existence (e.g., whether God exists) and ethics (e.g., how one ought to act toward other beings).

Course Syllabus

Set Texts:

The following three texts, which include some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, will be the main basis for discussion:

Plato, Protagoras and Meno (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1956). Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. Recent impressions available. (ISBN 0-14-044068-2.)

Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings (Wordsworth: Ware, England, 1997). Edited with an introduction by Enrique Chávez-Arvizo. (ISBN 1-85326-470-9.)

Mill, Utilitarianism (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1963). Recent impressions available. (ISBN 0-45-200970-7 or 0-14-043272-8).

You will need to have your own copy of each title mentioned above. Supplementary extracts will be distributed during the course.

Some Important and Useful General Texts
Socrates and Plato
Coopleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 1.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine.
Gosling, J. C. B., Plato.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4.
Hare, R. M., Plato.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought.
Kidd, I. G., ‘Socrates’.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Melling, D. J., Understanding Plato.
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?
Ryle, G., ‘Plato’.
Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work.
Descartes
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes Life and the Evolution of his Philosophy’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych on the Soul, Ch. 3.
Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 4.
Cottingham, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.
Cottingham, John, A Descartes Dictionary.
Cottingham, John, Descartes.
Kenny, A., Descartes.
Rée, Jonathan, Descartes.
Sorell, T., Descartes.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘Descartes’.
Williams, B., Descartes.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes.
Mill
Britton, K., John Stuart Mill.
Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 8.
Cowling, M., Mill and Liberalism.
McCloskey, H. J., John Stuart Mill.
Ryan, A., J. S. Mill.
Scheewind, J. B., ‘Mill, John Stuart’.
Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Skorupski, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill.
Sprigge, T. L. S., ‘Utilitarianism’.
Thomas, W., Mill.

Course Outline and Reading List

Part I: Plato

1.- Plato: The Emergence of Philosophy
Socrates, one of the earliest and greatest philosophers, famously declared that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’, thus epitomizing the impelling force behind philosophical enquiry: wonder. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions our most fundamental beliefs and assumptions. In the initial discussions we shall talk about the meaning of philosophy, its main characteristics and branches, its emergence, as well as some of the earliest philosophers.

Essential Reading:
Guthrie, W. K. C., ‘Introduction’ to Protagoras and Meno, pp. 7ff.

Other Sources:
Cornford, F. M., Before and After Socrates.
Irwin, T. H., ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought, Chs. 2-6, esp. pp. 104-118.
Kraut, R., ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’.
Parkinson, G. H. R., ‘What is Philosophy’.
Passmore, J. ‘Philosophy’.
Penner, T. ‘Socrates and the Early Dialogues’.
Russell, B., Problems of Philosophy, pp. 7-11 and Ch. 15.
Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moralist, Chs. 2-3.
NB: Additionally, feel free to consult any good introductory book to philosophy.

Indicative Questions: What is Philosophy? How did it emerge? What distinguishes Socrates’ enquiry from that of the Ionian naturalists, Eleactic Ontologists, and the Sophists? Who are the sophists? Who are the Presocratics? What exactly is the meaning of Socrates’ maxim ‘The unexamined life is not worth living?’. How does it relate to philosophy? What is the relationship between the protagonist of Plato’s Dialogues and the historical Socrates? Why is Socrates labelled ‘the father of philosophy’?

Essay Question: What is philosophy? In what ways do Socrates’ life and views exemplify the meaning of philosophy? (NB: Do NOT write your term paper on this topic.)

2.- Plato: The Search for Definition and the Elenchos
Socrates systematically questioned the conventional beliefs and assumptions of his contemporaries. By continual philosophical ‘cross-examination’ he would challenge and destroy a person’s knowledge claims, beliefs, and assumptions exposing their ignorance. In these discussions, we shall expound and critically examine this systematic method of questioning which is known as the Socratic elenchos.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 70-79e.

Other Sources:
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’.
Hare, R. M., Plato, Ch. 6.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Phillips, B., ‘The Significance of Meno’s Paradox’.
Robinson, R., ‘Socratic Definitions’.
Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moralist, Chs. 4-5.
White, N. P., ‘Inquiry’.

Indicative Questions: Is Socrates as ignorant as he claims to be? Is Socrates a sceptic? If so, what kind of sceptic is he? Is Socrates’ aim to define virtue in the Meno? Do we need to know the definition of virtue in order to know anything about virtue? What form does Socrates demands that a successful definition ought to take? What types of definitions are there? Can all words be defined by means of other words? What are ostensive definitions? What kind of definitions of virtue does Meno offer Socrates? Does a successful definition of virtue emerge from the Meno? Explain the Socratic elenchos (‘cross-examination’). What are its limitations? Is it a purely destructive method? If not, what are then its ultimate aims?

Essay Question: Do we need to know the definition of virtue in order to know anything about virtue? Explain the Socratic elenchos. What are its limitations?

3.- Plato: Virtue and Knowledge
Does virtue come from teaching? So asks young Meno at the beginning of the famous Platonic dialogue which bears his name. In these discussions we shall Meno’s question and different answers which are offered to it in the Meno.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 70-79e and 86c-96d.

Other Sources:
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno, pp. 17ff.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine, vol. 1, pp. 217ff.
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, §1.
Gulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 83ff. and 91ff.
Guthrie, W. K. C., ‘The Geometrical Experiment with Meno’s Slave’, in his ed. Protagoras and Meno, pp. 107ff.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 425-42; and vol. 4, pp. 242ff. and 246ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Mueller, I., ‘Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth’, §3.
Nakhnikian, G., ‘The First Socratic Paradox’.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Santas, G., ‘The Socratic Paradoxes’.
Santas, G., Socrates, Ch. 6.
Sesonke, A., and Fleming, N. (eds.), Plato’s Meno.
Taylor, A. E, Plato, Ch. 3., pp. 130ff.

Indicative Questions: How should one interpret Socrates’ confession of ignorance? Describe Socrates’ hypothetical method. Can we be taught to be good? Is all wrongdoing due to ignorance? Is virtue knowledge? If not, can virtue be successfully defined? What would count, for Socrates, as an adequate definition of virtue? Is Socrates correct in rejecting ostensive definitions? What is the first Socratic paradox? Is it true? At the end of the Meno Socrates seems to arrive at a puzzling conclusion; how are we to interpret it?

Essay Question: Can we be taught to be good? Is all wrongdoing due to ignorance?

4.- Plato: Knowledge -- Innate or Acquired
Philosophers’ appeals to innate ideas -- i.e., ideas in the mind prior to and independent of sense experience -- have a long ancestry which goes back at least to Plato. In these lectures we shall be discussing Plato’s views on innate knowledge and his theory of anamnesis (recollection).

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 79e-86c.

Other Sources:
Cornford, F. M., Principium Sapientiae, Ch. 4.
Edgley, R., ‘Innate Ideas’, in Vesey, G. N. A. (ed.), Knowledge and Necessity.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, esp. §2-4.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 249.
Irwin, T. H., Plato’s Moral Theory, Ch. 6., pp. 138ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Moravcsik, J., ‘Learning as Recollection’.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Sesonke A., and Fleming, N., ‘Knowing and Saying: The Structure of Plato’s Meno’.
Stich, S. P. (ed.), Innate Ideas.
Taylor, A. E., Plato. Ch. 3., pp. 136ff.
Vlastos, G., ‘Anamnesis in the Meno’.

Indicative Questions: What is Meno’s paradox? Does Socrates successfully refute it? What is anamnesis? Is it coherent? Is true? Do we have innate knowledge? What is Socrates’ aim in the slave-boy geometrical experiment? Is the experiment successful? Is it a fair criticism to say that Socrates is ‘handing over’ answers to the slave-boy?

Essay Question: Do we have innate knowledge? Why does Plato compare learning with a kind of remembering (Gr. anamnesis)?

5.- Plato: Knowledge and Opinion
One of the most fruitful problems in modern epistemology is to answer the perennial question ‘What is knowledge?’, a question first raised, it is said, by Plato. For the most part it consists of attempts to specify the (necessary and sufficient) conditions under which a subject could be correctly said to know something. In these discussions we shall examine his attempts to specify the truth-conditions of knowledge, and along the way, we shall examine the linking of knowledge to right opinion.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 97-9.

Other Sources:
Plato, The Republic, Book V, paragraphs 474b-483e; Book X, paragraphs 601b-602b.
Plato, Theaetetus, paragraphs 201c-201d
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Ch. 8., pp. 192ff.
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno, pp. 30ff.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine, vol. 2., pp. 50ff.
Guthrie, W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4., pp. 256ff. and 261ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Matthews, G., Plato’s Epistemology and Related Logical Problems, Introduction.

Indicative Questions: Are Plato’s conditions for ‘X knows that P’ necessary? Are they sufficient? What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why does Plato believe that knowledge is more valuable than right opinion? Is knowledge right opinion plus adequate justification? Should we be concerned about what knowledge is? Should we be concerned about what the conditions for knowledge are? What is Socrates’ aim in the ‘road to Larissa’ example? Is he contradicting his views on knowledge?

Essay Question: What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why does Plato believe that knowledge is more valuable than right opinion?
6.- Plato: Knowledge as ‘Justified True Belief’
The most ancient and venerable view of knowledge is, supposedly, that knowledge differs from true opinion in that it is based upon some form of justification, and that therefore knowledge is justified true belief. This is the so-called ‘Classical’ conception of knowledge discussed by Plato (e.g., Theaetetus 201c-201d). However, Edmund L. Gettier III published a paper in 1963 which aims to demolish the proposed analysis. In these discussions we shall expound and critically assess Gettier’s arguments.

Essential Reading:
Gettier, E., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ [HANDOUT].

Other Sources:
Plato, Theaetetus, paragraphs 201c-201d.
Armstrong, D. M., ‘Does Knowledge Entail Belief?’.
Ayer, A. J., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Evidence’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 1.
Chisholm, R. M., ‘Knowledge as Justified True Belief’.
Dancy, J., An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology.
Lehrer, K., Theory of Knowledge, Chs.1 and 2.
Lehrer, L., Knowledge., Chs.1-3, and 9.
Malcolm, N., ‘Knowledge and Belief’.
O’Hear, A., What Philosophy Is.
Pappas, G. and Swain, M. (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification, essays by Lehrer and Paxson, Dretske, Harman, and Sosa.
Radford, C., ‘Knowledge - By Examples’.
Russell, B., Human Knowledge, Part 2, §11.
White, A. R., ‘Knowledge Without Conviction’.
Woozley, A. D., ‘Knowing and Not Knowing’.

Is knowledge justified true belief? Why does the belief have to be true for it to count as knowledge? Why can’t one know something that is false? Must one believe what one knows, or would some other kind of attitude suffice?
Why must the belief be justified? What kinds of justification do we ordinarily count as securing knowledge? Is justification equivalent to evidence? Or can one be justified in believing something without having evidence for it? What counts as evidence?
Does Edmund Gettier successfully show that there are cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge? What is to be learnt from such a demonstration? Could the concept of justification be explicated in such a way as to overcome the objections?

Essay title: Is knowledge justified true belief? If not, what is it?
7.- Plato: Knowledge and the Forms
The most fundamental contribution Plato made to philosophy was the distinction he drew between the changing physical objects we perceive with our senses and the unchanging ‘ideas’ we can ‘know’ with our minds. To these ideas Plato gave the name ‘Forms’. In these discussions we shall examine the Platonic theory of Forms.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Republic, paragraphs 471c-487a and 506-520. (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Chs. 8, 9, and 10.
Cross, P. C., and Woozley, A., Plato’s Republic, Chs. 8 and 9.
Flew, A., An Introduction to Western Philosophy, Ch. 2.
Nettleship, R. L., Lectures on the Republic of Plato, Ch. 9.
Vlastos, G., ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’.
White, N. P., ‘Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology’.

Indicative Questions: Mathematicians often make statements such as ‘There exist two prime numbers between x and y’. What kind of existence are they talking about? How does Plato explain this kind of existence? What is the source of ideas we have about ideals that are not ‘encountered’ in our ‘physical’ world (such as Virtue, Justice, Goodness)? What are the Forms? Is Plato right in maintaining that true knowledge is restricted to the forms? Critically examine Plato’s distinction between the objects of knowledge and the objects of belief. Examine and explain the similes of the Sun, Divided Line, and Cave.

Essay Question: Critically examine Plato’s Theory of the Forms.
Part II: Descartes
1.- René Descartes: Method of Doubt
In Plato’s search for eternal, unchanging objects of knowledge we can see the idea that what qualifies as knowledge must have a certain stability. Many centuries later, at the start of what is known as the ‘early modern’ period, this theme was taken up, though in a very different way, by ‘the father of modern philosophy’ René Descartes, whose writings had a profound effect on the subsequent development of philosophy in general and epistemology (the theory of knowledge) in particular. Descartes became struck by the instability and unreliability of many of the accepted doctrines he had been taught as a student. In these discussions we shall examine Descartes’ attempt to sweep away all previously accepted opinions open to doubt, and start afresh, his project of the reconstruction of knowledge from the foundations upwards.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, First Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 134ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV, first paragraph. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91f.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 191ff.)

Other Sources:
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge.
Bouwsma, O. K., ‘Descartes’ Evil Genius’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 2.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 2.
Malcolm, N. Dreaming, (passim).
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 2.
Ryle, G., Dilemmas, Ch. 7.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 2
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: (a) Discuss: ‘From time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once’. Is Descartes’ recommendation ‘disbelieve all evidence which originate from the senses’ or is it ‘withhold assent when confronted by all such evidence’? What are doxastic attitudes? What is the scope of the argument from the senses?
(b) Why does Descartes resorts to the dreaming argument in order to demolish the principle about the senses? Why does not it suffice to use the argument from the senses? Does the supposition that I might be dreaming make sense? Can 2 + 2 = 5 in a dream? If not, why is this? What is the scope of the dreaming argument?
(c) Why does Descartes introduce the argument from dreaming at all, and not resort immediately to the evil genius argument? Comment on whether the following is a fair criticism of Descartes: ‘Even an omnipotent deceiver could not make a square have three sides’. What is the scope of the evil genius argument?
Is Descartes a sceptic? If so, what kind of scepticism does he practices and prescribes? What is the scope of the Cartesian method of doubt?

Essay Question: Expound and critically assess Descartes’ method of doubt.
2.- René Descartes: Cogito Ergo Sum
In these discussions, we find Descartes continuing his search for a solid epistemological footing: just as Archimedes used to demand only one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire planet, so too Descartes hopes to find at least one truth claim, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable in order to built on it a comprehensive system of knowledge. This he is able to find (at last) in the Cogito – cogito ergo sum or I am thinking, therefore I exist. Even if there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me, the demon will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV, first three paragraphs. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91f.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 196ff.)

Other Sources:
Ayer, A. J., ‘I Think therefore I am’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 2.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, pp. 35ff.
Hintikka, J., ‘Cogito, Ergo Sum’.
Kenny, A. Descartes, Ch. 3.
Markie, P., ‘The Cogito and Its Importance’.
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind, Ch. 1.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Certainty of the Cogito’.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 3.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: Is Descartes right in maintaining that the proposition ‘I exist’ has a special kind of certainty? What is a syllogism? Does Descartes deduce his existence from his thinking by means of a syllogism? Is the Cogito a time-relative certainty or a proposition which is timelessly true and certain? Does ‘ambulo ergo sum’ (I am walking therefore I am) effectively serve in place of the Cogito? How about ‘dubito ergo sum’ (I am doubting therefore I am)? Does the Cogito defeat scepticism?

Essay Question: Is Descartes right in maintaining that the proposition ‘I exist’ has a special kind of certainty? Is the Cogito an inference or a performance?
3.- René Descartes: Clear and Distinct Ideas
The term ‘idea’ is a very evasive philosophical term. It derives from the Greek **** and was later rendered as forma in the Latin of the Middle Ages. In Plato, it stands for the Form, an eternal unchanging ideal object of understanding which exists over and above the worldly instances which instantiate it. Philosophers in the Midle Ages, such as Augustine and (even) Aquinas, are very Platonic in regards to ideas; they believed that ideas have independent existence in the mind of God. Descartes is said to have ‘psychologized’ the concept of idea (i.e., it transforms the concept from a Platonic sort of Form into a modification of consciousness). In these discussions, we shall examine Descartes’ account of this concept.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff., 162ff., and 170ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 191ff.)

Other Sources:
Alanen, Lilli, ‘Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity’.
Ashworth, E. J., ‘Descartes’ Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 1.
Curley, E. M., ‘Analysis in the Meditations’.
Gewirth, A., ‘Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes’.
Kenny, A., ‘Descartes on Ideas’.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: Expound and evaluate Descartes doctrine of ideas. What does Descartes mean by: (i) a ‘clear perception’?; (ii) a ‘distinct perception’?; and (ii) ‘a clear and distinct perception’? Discuss Descartes’ threefold-classification of ideas.

Essay Question: Discuss: ‘Whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’.
4.- René Descartes: The Trademark Argument
In the Third Meditation Descartes conducts the first of two major attempts to prove God’s existence, usually labelled the ‘trademark argument’, for it cashes in an analogy claiming that God has placed the idea of Himself in one’s mind just as the mark of the craftsman is stamped on his work. Descartes reasons along the following lines. I am not perfect (i.e., there is more perfection in knowledge than in doubt and since I doubt many matters I am an imperfect being) yet I have in me the idea of supreme perfection (i.e., the idea of a supremely perfect being -- God). Yet -- at this point in the argument the meditator uses two hermetic standard scholastic metaphysical principles, ‘nothing comes from nothing’ and ‘there must be as much reality in the cause as in the effect of that cause’ -- this idea cannot come from myself (for I am not perfect), thus it must come from outside myself. Descartes then reasons that the idea must come from God Himself therefore he concludes that He exists. In these lectures we shall expound and assess the Trademark Argument.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Third Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 147ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 206ff.)

Other Sources:
Baier, A., ‘The Idea of the True God in Descartes’.
Beyssade, J.-M., ‘The idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, pp. 48ff. and 55ff.
Doney, W., ‘The Cartesian Circle’.
Frankfurt, H. G., ‘Descartes’ Validation of Reason’.
Frankfurt, H. G., ‘Memory and the Cartesian Circle’.
Loeb, L. E., ‘The Cartesian Circle’.
Tweyman, S., ‘Deus ex Cartesio’.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 5 (esp. pp. 130-52).
Wilson, M. D. Descartes, Ch. 3.

Indicative Questions: (a) In the Third Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between ideas, considered as images, and ideas considered as something else. Explain what distinction he has in mind here. He claims that ideas-as-‘possessors’-of-representational content (can) differ widely. In respect of what exactly are images different from one another?
(b) In classifying ideas, Descartes makes a celebrated distinction between those ideas that are innate, those that are acquired or ‘adventitious’, and those that are invented or constructed by the mind. Expound the Cartesian three-fold classification of ideas.
(c) Can something come from nothing? Does every effect necessarily has a cause? What is Descartes’ general principle of causality (which he presents in the Third Meditation) and how are we to interpret it?
(d) Are there innate ideas? Is the idea of God innate? Does the trademark argument work?
(e) What is the ‘Cartesian Circle’. Is Descartes’ attempt to validate reason vitiated by circularity?

Essay Question: Discuss Descartes’ version of the trademark argument for God’s existence. Is such argument valid?
5.- René Descartes: The Ontological Argument
The Fifth Meditation offers a second proof of the existence of God known as the ‘ontological argument’ -- a phrase first coined in the eighteenth century by the eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to refer to a particular kind of reasoning which attempts to prove the existence of God abstracted from all experience inferring His existence a priori exclusively from concepts. Briefly, the argument can be stated as follows: God is supremely perfect; existence is part of supreme perfection; therefore, God exists. In these lectures we shall examine both Descartes’ ontological argument and Kant’s criticism of it.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Fifth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 170ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.).
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’ (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 218ff.).

Other Sources:
Alston, W. P., ‘The Ontological Argument Revisited’.
Anselm, Proslogion, Chs. 1-5.
Barnes, J., The Ontological Argument.
Bennett, J., Kant’s Dialectic, §72-4.
Beyssade, J.-M., ‘The idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes. pp. 57ff.
Flew, A., God and Philosophy, 82-98.
Gaunilo, ‘Reply on Behalf of the Fool’.
Hick, J., and McGill, A. C. (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument.
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Impossibility of the Ontological Proof’, A592ff.: B620ff. (HANDOUT)
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 7.
Mackie, J. L., The Miracle of Theism.
Plantinga, A., ‘Alston on the Ontological Argument’.
Plantinga, A. (ed.), The Ontological Argument.
Strawson, P. F., ‘Is Existence Never a Predicate’?
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, pp. 172ff.

Indicative Questions: (a) Describe Anselm’s version of the ontological argument for God’s existence. What do you make of Gaunilo’s criticism? Is Gaunilo’s criticism plausible, or does something unique about God’s nature elude the analogy? Could an argument similar to Anselm’s be used to prove that a perfectly powerful devil exists?
(b) Some philosophers have objected that Anselm and Descartes misunderstand the concept of ‘being’. Being is not an ordinary concept like ‘red’ or ‘horse’, but a concept that asserts that these other concepts are exemplified (e.g., for example, the concept ‘unicorn’ is not exemplified but the concept ‘horse’ is). It makes no sense, they contend, to say that being is exemplified. Are they correct? Why or why not?
(c) Describe Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God. Is it an improvement over St. Anselm’s? Is it tenable?
(d) Does Kant dispose of the ontological argument? Is existence a predicate?

Essay Question: Explain Descartes’ argument for God’s existence, showing how it depends on the premise that existence is part of perfection. Is the premise acceptable? Discuss Kant’s objection to the ontological argument.
6.- René Descartes: Mind and Body Dualism
The seventeenth century saw a radical change in our understanding of the universe and our place in it. That ‘revolution in thought’ has left a profound mark on our current understanding (or lack thereof) of the relation between the ‘mind’ to the rest of nature. Descartes is widely credited with having set the agenda for this problem; in these discussions we will examine some of his reasons for thinking that the mind and the body are utterly distinct substances. We shall consider, also, the well known problem of interactionism which assails Descartes’ ‘dualist’ position.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second and Sixth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff. and 176ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 228ff.)
Descartes, René. ‘Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth’.

Other Sources:
Alanen, Lilli, ‘Descartes’ Dualism and the Philosophy of Mind’.
Campbell, K., Body and Mind, Ch. 3.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Concept of Sense-Perception’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych On the Soul, Ch. 1.
Churchland, P. M., Matter and Consciousness, Ch. 1, and Ch. 2, §1.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Dualism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Trialism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Descartes on "Thought"’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Cottingham, J., The Rationalists, Ch. 4.
Henry, M., ‘The Soul According to Descartes’.
Jolley, N., The Light of the Soul, Ch. 6.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Chs. 4 and 10.
Malcolm, N., ‘Descartes Proof that His Essence is Thinking’.
Radner, D., ‘Descartes’s Notion of the Union of Mind and Body’.
Richardson, R. C., ‘The "Scandal" of Cartesian Interactionism’.
Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Ch. 1.
Ryle, Gilbert. Concept of Mind, Ch. 1. Reprinted in Doney as ‘Descartes’ Myth’.
Smith, P., and Jones, O. R., The Philosophy of Mind, Part I.
Teichman, J., Philosophy and the Mind, Ch. 8.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 10.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes,. Ch. 6.

Modern versions of Dualism:
Foster, J., The Immaterial Self.
Swinburne, R.G., The Evolution of the Soul.

Indicative Questions: What is Descartes’ concept of substance? What is Cartesian Dualism? Is it tenable? Should we embrace the distinction between the mind and the body? Can Descartes explain how an unextended indivisible mind causally interacts with a physical body? What are Descartes’ arguments in favour of the claim that the mind and the body are utterly distinct substances? Are his arguments sound?

Essay Question: Does Descartes succeed in showing that he is essentially a mind? Can Descartes explain how an unextended indivisible mind causally interacts with a physical body?
7.- René Descartes: Mind-Body Union
Is Descartes really a ‘Cartesian Dualist’? For nearly 400 years, most commentators have argued that he indeed is. Thus, Kenny, Williams, Wilson, and Grene, to name but a few, would generally agree with Gilbert Ryle’s celebrated portrayal of Descartes’ doctrine of human beings as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’. I too used to subscribe to the standard interpretation of Descartes’ views on the mental (e.g., in my Triptich on the Soul). My own view now, (which shall appear in my forthcoming Descartes on the Substantial Union of Mind and Body) however, is that Descartes is not a ‘Cartesian Dualist’, and that the efforts to classify him as such turn out to be simplistic or inconsistent. Either the definition of ‘Cartesian Dualism’ is too loose to be of any real help in identifying Descartes’ conception of human nature as suggested by his metaphysics, or else the various elements of his philosophy are made to exhibit an unacceptable lack of coherence when forced into a ‘Cartesian Dualistic’ mould. Descartes’ views on the nature of human beings, I shall argue, involves a blending of different elements. However, rather than characterise his efforts with an ‘ism’, it is, I think, best to see it for what it is in itself, not ‘Cartesian Dualism’, but an effort to establish on theoretical grounds the applicability of metaphysics to the phenomenon of our unified nature. In these discussions we shall evaluate both the standard account of and my revisionist alternative to it.

Other Sources:
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych On the Soul, Ch. 1.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Concept of Sense-Perception’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Trialism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Descartes on "Thought"’
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Kenny, A. Descartes. Ch. 10.
Radner, D. ‘Descartes’s Notion of the Union of Mind and Body’.
Ryle, G., Concept of Mind, Ch. 1.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 10.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 6.

Indicative Questions: Is Descartes a dualist? Is he a ‘Trialist’? Examine and explain the Sixth Meditation disanalogy between mind and body (in a living human being) and a sailor and his or her ship. Expound and critically assess Descartes’ doctrine of the substantial union of mind and body. Discuss Descartes’ doctrine of the three primitive notions. Given that both mind and body are primitive notions is it coherent to claim that the mind-body union is itself too a primitive notion? To which primitive notion does Descartes ascribe phenomena such as imagination, pain, and hunger? According to Descartes, can an angel inside a living body feel pain?

Essay Question: Discuss: ‘Nature teaches me by these feelings of pain, hunger and so on, that I am not only lodge in my body like a pilot in his ship, but that I am very closely joined to it’. Examine Descartes’ views on Mind-Body Interaction and Mind-Body Union. Does the latter shed light on the former?
Part III: John Stuart Mill
1.- John Stuart Mill: About Ethics
Although in this part of the course we shall be discussing primarily John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian theory of ethics, since our interests are strictly philosophical ones, we must begin by examining ethics or morality itself. It is common enough today to hear that a certain action is ethical(ly right). But what is ethics? Before tackling Mill head-on, we shall discuss what ethics is and what ethics is not.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 1. (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:
Brandt, R. B., Ethical Theory.
Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason.
Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking.
Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals.
Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, §2.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics.
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 7.
Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals.
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations.
Plato, Euthyphro.
Plato, Protagoras and Meno.
Rachels, J., The Elements of Moral Philosophy.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice.
Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism.

Indicative Questions: What is morality? Is it a set of prohibitions particularly concerned with sex? Is it a set of rules intended to stop people having fun? Is it what politicians tell us it is? Is it something good ‘only in theory but not in practice?’ Is it a system of rules? Is it a system of goals? Is it something intelligible only in the context of religion? Is it a divine command? Is it something relative to a particular society or individual? Is it just custom? Is it self-interest? Is it just expressions of emotions? Is it something that must necessarily be universalizable? Is it something that must necessarily be rational?

Essay Question: What is morality?
2.- John Stuart Mill: Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism
Although in this part of the course we shall be discussing primarily John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian theory of ethics, we must note that ethics, or moral philosophy, includes investigations of very different kinds, which it is important to separate. In these lectures, we shall be discussing Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism.
Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 1, (esp. pp. 4ff.). (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:

Metaethics:
Foot, P. (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Introduction and essays by Stevenson, Moore, Frankena, and Foot.
Hare, R. M., ‘Ethics’.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 1-4.

Normative Ethics:
Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Ch. 2.
Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, Introduction.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 5-9.

Ethical Relativism:
Harrison, G., ‘Relativism and Tolerance’.
Mayo, B., The Philosophy of Right and Wrong, Ch. 6.
McNaughton, D. Moral Vision, Ch. 10.
Meiland, J. W., ‘Bernard Williams’ Relativism’.
Stace, W., ‘Cultural Relativism: Pros and Cons’.
Taylor, P., The Principles of Ethics, Ch. 2.
Unwin, N., ‘Relativism and Moral Complacency’.
Wellman, C., ‘The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity’.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Truth in Relativism’.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Ch. 9.
Williams, B. A. O., Moral Luck.
Williams, B. A. O., Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, pp. 28-51.

Indicative Questions: Metaethics: What is metaethics? What kinds of metaethical theories are there? Are the distinctions between such theories clear? What are the virtues and problems associated with subjectivism, naturalism, emotivism, intuitionism, descriptivism, and prescriptivism?
Outline the major rival views on the nature of ethical language. How are we to assess answers to questions about the nature of ethical language? Are moral judgements descriptive? Are they prescriptive? Are they universalizable?
What makes a judgement, a decision, or a course of action the ‘right’ one? Is it up to us to decide what ‘right’ or ‘good’ mean, or is it in some sense independent of us? Do other meanings of the word ‘good’ help us to appeal to objective standards to make ethical judgements? Is appeal to the ‘goals of human existence’ of any use?
Normative Ethics: Distinguish between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics. Explain the difference between ‘consequentialist’ and ‘deontological’ theories. Where does Utilitarianism fit in?
Ethical Relativism: What exactly is Ethical Relativism? What is being asserted relative to be relative to what? What is it for something to be relative to something else? What arguments are there for ethical relativism? Are they cogent? What kinds of moral divergence would provide arguments for moral relativism? Is there a connection, or a conflict, between relativism and tolerance? Detail any objections that might be made to ethical relativism.

Essay Question: What is Ethical Relativism? Is Ethical relativism true?
3.- John Stuart Mill: The Utility Principle
Theories of morality are nowadays often classified as either (a) consequentialist or (b) deontological, depending on whether they assess the moral worth of actions or classes of action (a) in terms of their results or consequences, or (b) on the basis of their conformity to some principle or principles of duty (the term ‘deontological’ comes from the Greek deon, which means obligatory). The Judaeo-Christian ethical view, for example, is firmly deontological in character, while that espoused by John Stuart Mill belongs squarely in the consequentialist tradition. Mill argues that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends not on obedience, per se, of ethical commandments, but on the results it produces, or tends to produce. The standard of goodness which Mill employs for assessing those results is Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle: actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. In these discussions we shall evaluate Mill’s arguments for his Utility Principle.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Ch. 4. (Though you should read Ch. 2 as background.)

Other Sources:
Hall, E. W., ‘The ‘Proof’ of Utility in Bentham and Mill’.
Mendelbaum, M., ‘Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Ch. 3.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §2.
Warnock, M., Ethics Since 1900, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: What does Mill set out to do in the first few paragraphs of the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism? Is he successful? What is the ‘fallacy of composition’? Does Mill commit the fallacy of equivocation in his attempt to prove the principle of utility? What is the ‘naturalistic fallacy’? Is it a fallacy? Does Mill commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in his attempt to prove the principle of utility?

Essay Question: What does Mill set out to do in the first few paragraphs of the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism? Is he successful?
4.- John Stuart Mill: Act and Rule Utilitarianism
One problem faced by utilitarianism is the worry that a consequentialist system of ethics may lead us to break important rules of conduct: if the overall balance of pleasure is the only moral standard, why should I not tell lies, for example, whenever I can maximize pleasure by doing so? Mill’s reply to this objection seems to be that utilitarians would like to instil a sense of veracity in the population, since truth-telling is generally productive of happiness. He goes on to argue, apparently, that utilitarians will not try to make each individual decision by direct reference to the greatest happiness principle, but instead will stick to rules or guidelines based on our experience of the kind of conduct that tends to maximize happiness. The resulting version of utilitarianism , now known as Rule Utilitarianism, has strongly influenced the subsequent development of moral philosophy. In these discussions, we shall analyse the distinction between Act and Rule utilitarianism, and the question of whether Mill subscribed to the later.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism. esp. Ch. 2.

Other Sources:
Foot, P. Theories of Ethics.
Mabbott, J. D., ‘Interpretations of Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Mendelbaum, M., ‘Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Smart, J. J. C., ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’.
Urmson, J. C., ‘The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill’.

Indicative Questions: What is Rule Utilitarianism? What is Act Utilitarianism? Is Rule Utilitarianism a distinct alternative to Act Utilitarianism? If so, is Rule Utilitarianism more tenable than Act Utilitarianism? Discuss arguments both for and against Rule Utilitarianism.
Can it be rational for a utilitarian to follow a rule which in general leads to happiness, even when, on a particular occasion, following it would lead to misery?
‘What if everyone did that’? Is this a genuine challange to utilitarian theories?
Was Mill an Act Utilitarian? Was Mill a Rule Utilitarian?

Essay Question: Can it be rational for a utilitarian to follow a rule which in general leads to happiness, even when, on a particular occasion, following it would lead to misery?
5.- John Stuart Mill: Utility and Pleasure
Mill did not invent utilitarianism. The notion that pleasure might provide a standard for the moral evaluation of action had been widely canvassed in ancient Greek philosophy (notably by Epicurus, 341-270 BC), and Mill’s more immediate predecessor, Jeremy Bentham, had declared that pleasure and pain were the ‘sovereign masters’ determining what an individual ought to do. While supporting Bentham’s general approach, mill was sensitive to the worry that such a doctrine might appear to advocate gross physical indulgence, and so be represented as a ‘doctrine worthy of swine’. To counter this, he distinguishes ‘higher’ from ‘lower’ pleasures. In these discussions we shall critically assess this controversial distinction.

Essential Reading:
Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, esp. Ch. 2 and second half of Ch. 4.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chs. 1-5, esp. Ch. 4. Reprinted in Warnock, M (ed.), of Mills’ Utilitarianism.

Other Sources:
Mabbott, J. D., An Introduction to Ethics, Ch. 1.
McCloskey, H. J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 3.
Quinton, A. M., Utilitarian Ethics, Ch. 3, §2.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §5-7.

Indicative Questions: Is happiness all that really matters? Discuss: ‘We can only desire pleasure’. Discuss: ‘Pleasure is the only good’. Can amounts of pleasure be measures? Critically examine Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

Essay Question: Is happiness all that really matters?
6.- John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, Rights and Justice
One of the major objections to utilitarianism is that it fails to accord with our intuitive convictions about justice. These convictions are often more certain and self-evident than the principle of utility itself. This incompatibility, between justice and utility, Mill attempts to address in Utilitarianism. In these discussion we shall deal with Mill’s account of justice and his attempts to reconcile justice and utility.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Ch. 5.

Other Sources:
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 8.
Narveson, J., ‘Rights and Utilitarianism’.
Quinton, A. M., Utilitarian Ethics, Ch. 3, §5.
Rescher, N., Distributive Justice, Chs. 1 and 2.
Ryan, A., The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Ch. 12.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §13.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism, Part 1, Ch. 10.

Indicative Questions: Can the claims of justice be subsumed under the utility principle? Can utilitarianism account for the notion of a right?

Essay Question: Can the claims of justice be subsumed under the utility principle? Can utilitarianism account for the notion of a right?
7.- John Stuart Mill: General Objections and Defences
Throughout this final part of the course, we have examined some of the advantages and disadvantages of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, for example, has at least three advantages: simplicity, naturalism, and balance. And, it has at least three disadvantages: it can lead to injustice, it can be too demanding, and it is difficult to apply. In these concluding discussions we shall critically assess some arguments in favour and some objections against utilitarianism.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chs. 1 and 2.

Other Sources:
Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons.
Quinton, A., Utilitarian Ethics.
Railton, P., ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’.
Scheffler, S., The Rejection of Consequentialism.
Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics.
Singer, P., Practical Ethics.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism.
Sprigge, T. L. S., ‘Utilitarianism’.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.

Indicative Questions: Is Utilitarianism tenable? What are some of utilitarianism’s advantages and disadvantages? Utilitarianism, for example, has at least three advantages: simplicity, naturalism, and balance. Are these necessarily advantages or can they be turned against utilitarianism itself? Is utilitarianism too demanding? Is it impractical? Is it unjust? Is there a viable alternative to utilitarianism?

Essay Question: Critically assess utilitarianism.

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo
Indicative Bibliography
Socrates and Plato
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1981).
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Ayer, A. J., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Evidence’, in his Metaphysics and Common Sense.
Ayer, A. J., Metaphysics and Common Sense (London: Macmillan, 1969).
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1956).
Bambrough, R. (ed.), New Essays in Plato and Aristotle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
Burnet, J., Platonis Opera (5 vols., Oxford Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1900-7. (OCT)
Chisholm, R. M., ‘Knowledge as Justified True Belief’, in his The Foundations of Knowing. Repr. in Moser, P. K., and Van der Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge.
Chisholm, R. M., The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
Coopleston, F., A History of Philosophy (9 vols., New York: Doubleday, 1962).
Cornford, F. M., Before and After Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).
Cornford, F. M., Principium Sapientiae (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’, Paideia 5 (Special Plato Issue, 1976). Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine (2 vols., London: 1962-1963).
Cross, P. C., and Woozley, A., Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: MacMillan, 1964).
Dancy, J., An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus (London: Routledge, 1995).
Edwards, P. (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (8 vols., London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967.)
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Flew, A., An Introduction to Western Philosophy: Ideas and Argument from Plato to Popper (rev. ed., London: Thames and Hudson, 1989).
Gettier, E. L., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, vol.23, 1963.
Gosling, J. C. B., Plato (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
Griffiths, A. P. (ed.), Knowledge and Belief (Oxford University Press, 1967).
Gulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates ().
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy (6 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-1981).
Guthrie, W. K. C. (ed. and trans.), Plato’s Protagoras and Meno (Penguin: Harmondsworth: 1956).
Hall, R. W., Plato (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).
Hare, R. M., Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Honderich, T. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Irwin, T. H., ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Irwin, T. H., Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Kidd, I. G., ‘Socrates’, in Edwards, P. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965; repr. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Kraut, R., ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, in his The Cambridge Companion to Plato
Lehrer, K., Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
Lehrer, K., Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1990).
MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
Malcolm, N., ‘Knowledge and Belief’, Mind 51 (1952). Repr. in Griffiths, A. P. (ed.), Knowledge and Belief.
Matthews, G., Plato’s Epistemology and Related Logical Problems (London: 1972).
Melling, D. J., Understanding Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Moser, P. K., and Van der Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987),
Mueller, I., ‘Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Nakhnikian, G., ‘The First Socratic Paradox’, Journal of the History of philosophy 11 (1973), pp. 1-17. Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985). Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Nettleship, R. L., Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London: MacMillan, 1901).
Nussbaum, M., The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
O’Hear, A., What Philosophy Is (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).
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Descartes
Adam, Charles, and Tannery, Paul (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes (rev. edn., 12 vols., Paris: J. Vrin in association with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1964-76). [Usually referred to as ‘AT’.]
Alanen, L., ‘Descartes’ Dualism and the Philosophy of Mind’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94 (1989), 391-414.
Alanen, L., ‘Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity’, in John Cottingham (ed.), Reason, Will, and Sensation.
Aldrich, V., ‘The Pineal Gland Updated’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 700-10; repr. in Moyal, G. J. D. (ed.), René Descartes: Critical Assessments, vol. 4.
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Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, ed. by Warnock, M. (Fontana Press, 1960).
Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Narveson, J., ‘Rights and Utilitarianism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 5 (19?0).
Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. and trans. by Kaufman, W. (New York: Vintage, 1967).
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Parkinson, G. H. R. (ed.), An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1988).
Patton, H. J. (trans.), Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (London: Hutchinson, 1949).
Plato, Euthyphro (Penguin: Harmondsworth).
Pojman, L. P. (ed.), Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989).
Quinton, A. M., Utilitarian Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1973).
Rachels, J., The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986).
Railton, P., ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-171. Repr. in Pojman, L. P. (ed.), Ethical Theory.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Rescher, N., Distributive Justice (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
Ryan, A., J. S. Mill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1974).
Ryan, A., The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (London: Macmillan, 1970).
Scheewind, J. B., ‘Mill, John Stuart’, in Edwards, P. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scheffler, S., The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1982).
Schneewind, J. B. (ed.), Mill (London: MacMillan, 1968).
Sen, A. K., and Williams, B. A. O. (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics (7th ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
Singer, P., Practical Ethics (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Skorupski, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1998).
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge, 1989).
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
Smart, J. J. C., ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956). Reprinted in Foot, P. (ed.), Theories of Ethics.
Sprigge, T. L. S., ‘Utilitarianism’, in Parkinson, G. H. R. (ed.), An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Stace, W., ‘Cultural Relativism: Pros and Cons’, in Taylor, P. (ed.), Problems of Moral Philosophy.
Taylor, P., Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Belmont, CA: Dickenson, 1975).
Taylor, P. (ed.), Problems of Moral Philosophy ().
Thomas, W., Mill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Unwin, N., ‘Relativism and Moral Complacency’, Philosophy, vol. 60, 1985.
Urmson, J. O. (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
Urmson, J.C., ‘The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill’, Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953). Reprinted in Schneewind, J. B. (ed.), Mill.
Warnock, M. (ed.) John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism (Fontana Press, 1960).
Warnock, M. Ethics Since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960).
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Williams, B. A. O., and Smart, J. J. C., Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
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Williams, B. A. O., Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

Course Guidelines

1.- General Advice; Assessment Criteria
Each week you are expected to attend two classes. I have given out, at the beginning of the term, a Course Syllabus (or Course Outline and Reading List). You will be asked to choose one essay question from the syllabus to write a term paper which will be marked and commented upon; the term paper counts for 20% of your final grade. Weekly paragraphs on indicative questions from the syllabus, which will be a routine class activity, count for 20% of your final mark. You will be asked to write two short yet formal essays on topics to be assigned; the short essays count for 20% of your final grade. (Each essay counts for 10% of your final grade). The remainder 40% of your final mark will be assessed by both a ‘midterm’ and a final essay-type examinations. (Each examination counts for 20% of your final mark.) Please note that in order to pass the course you must timely and satisfactorily submit all the required written work and satisfactorily seat the two examinations.
Please note that this is a one semester course: all coursework must be completed before the end of the semester. Students with incomplete work at the end of the semester, will be assigned an F grade – they will not receive automatically a grade of IN. The grade of IN will be assigned in exceptional justifiable circumstances only and when students discuss explicitly with me such circumstances and are able to document satisfactorily their case.

2.- Course Writing Tutor
To assist in the development of student’s writing abilities, a Writing Tutor is assigned to this course. My colleague, Ms. Chryssoula Gitsoulis will confer with students, individually, outside class to discuss writing assignments, go over first-drafts and papers, and so on. I strongly encourage you to meet regularly with your outstanding Writing Tutor, who will assist you at every stage of the writing process -- pre-writing: overcoming writing block, generating material, formulating a thesis, doing research; writing: organizing, paragraphing, supporting your points, expressing your self clearly; post-writing: revising, reorganizing, proofreading. I strongly encourage you to submit to your tutor first drafts and practise hypothetical examination answers in advance of deadlines and examination dates. Your tutor will provide written feedback on all preliminary work you produce. If you visit your tutor during her scheduled office hours you do not have to make an appointment. If you cannot stop by her office during her scheduled office hours please call her (or e-mail her) to make an appointment. If you reach her voice mail be sure to leave her a number where you can be reached so that she can return your call.
Your writing tutor will respond to and evaluate all your written assignments. Student enquiries about grades assigned for course work must begin with the tutor.

Tutor’s Office: Tenth Avenue Building, Room 325.
Tutor’s Office Hours: Tuesdays & Thursdays, from 12:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. (4th period).
Tutor’s e-mail: CGitsoulis@gc.cuny.edu
Tutor’s direct extension number to follow. In the meantime, she can be contacted through the Philosophy Department’s extension number: 8325.

3.- Assessed Essays and Term Paper
Written work serves three functions: it aids learning, enables you to practice the skills of written communication, and helps me in the assessment of your abilities and progress. You will be asked to do one term paper of a length between 1,600 to 2,500 words – 8 to 10 double-spaced word-processed pages -- (lengths exclusive of reference and footnotes) during the course. Additionally you will be asked to write two short but formal essays – on topics to be assigned -- each of a length between 600 to 800 words – 3 to 4 double-spaced word processed pages -- (lengths exclusive of reference and footnotes) during the course. These pieces must show evidence of individual thought and must both be properly documented and have a complete bibliography. Information on the essay questions appears in the Syllabus (or Course Outline and Reading List). These works should be handed in to me on or before the deadlines which are announced in this Course Guidelines (see §3, below).
Since philosophy, and writing philosophy papers, may be new to you, here are some hints on how to approach essay writing, outlining the goals you should set yourself.
Each member of the class will be required to do two essays and one term paper on topics chosen from the list. The list includes suggestions for questions you might address within the scope of the topic. Don’t just mechanically answer them in the order in which they are asked, and don’t limit yourself to answering just those questions. Answer them by incorporating your answers into an essay that you have organised.
In your work you should try to identify the central philosophical issues and arguments raised by the text(s). What is the author’s position? What arguments does he or she give for that position? What are the premises of each argument? Are the premises true? Is it a valid argument, that is, does the conclusion actually follow from the premises?
In an essay (or paper) your aim should be to show that you understand the topic and that you can give a reasoned defence of your conclusions. You will be judged on the quality (especially the intelligibility) of your arguments. Make sure that you know what you are talking about, and can give an account of it without referring to the written material.
Remember you have a reader. Always consider whether I will understand what you are writing. Take care that other readers, reading ideas for the first time, can follow. In particular, resist the temptation to race through your essay thinking ‘There is no need for me to explain this for the Professor knows what I mean, surely?’. I will not understand or enjoy reading your piece if what you actually expect me to do is to attempt to read your mind!
Don’t be afraid to admit that you haven’t made up your mind about some important point, or even that you haven’t been able to understand some crucial point in a text or lecture. Asking for help (in a prepared and structured manner) can be a very good way of revealing the depth of your thought and of your research too. If you are confused, don’t write a confused essay. Give an organized essay that explains clearly just what you find confusing.
I need not take it that any view you put forward is your own personal view. It can be useful to play the ‘devil’s advocate’, defending a view you don’t hold, or one that is unpopular.
Here are some rules of thumb for essays and papers:
* Write a clear and well-structured essay.
* Use mainly simple, direct sentences.
* Use examples to help make your points clearer.
* Emphasize important points.
* Try to make good use of link paragraphs.
* Don’t be afraid to use the word ‘I’, as in ‘I think...’.
* Make sure that your essay has a theme that can be summed up briefly.
* Start your essay with a clear statement of your theme and an outline of your plan of attack.
* Although you might partition and classify your subject into clearly distinguishable sections, do not do your final work in unconnected parts; write an essay well-structured and flowing from one point in the argument to the other.
* Conclude with a brief but clear summing up of your main points.
* Generally use the active voice (e.g., ‘Smith says that...’, not ‘It is said (written, asserted) by Smith that . . .’).
* Try to avoid unfamiliar words.
* When you must use unusual terms or terms that have a technical meaning, pause to define and explain them and to make sure that your reader will understand you.
You will be judged on the quality of your ideas (as reflected in your essay), and on how effective your essay was as a vehicle for these ideas. (Please see my ‘Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy’ – which was distributed at the beginning of the term -- for further guidance on philosophy essay-writing.)
In the event that you are not able to meet with your writing tutor or you require help with your writing from other courses, the Writing Center, located in room 2307 North Hall, is a service that provides free tutoring in writing to students of John Jay College. The Center has a staff of trained tutors who work with students to help them become more effective writers.
The Center is open to the entire student community at John Jay. Any student of any level of ability from any department or discipline may come to the Center for help.
Students may come to the Center at any time on their own; they do not need a faculty referral. To apply for tutoring, students should simply drop in to the Center and speak to the secretary. For more information, please call The Writing Center, at (212) 237-8569.

4.- Deadlines
The first short essay is due on Thursday September 30th. The second short essay is due on Thursday October 28th. The term paper is due on Tuesday November 30th. No deadline extensions will be given. (Warning: Dates on calendars are closer than they appear!) Papers must be handed to me in person at the beginning (i.e., within the first fifteen minutes) of class. Do not hand work directly into my mail box. NB: Students failing to submit coursework will be dismissed from the course and will receive an F mark as their final course grade.
Please note that you are required to keep both a hard copy of your paper as well as back-ups of its corresponding computer file(s). Hardware/software failures will not be considered justifiable reasons for belated submissions of work.

5.- Use of Literature: Reading
A good place to start reading for any philosophy essay is the appropriate article in the eight-volume Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (ed. by P. Edwards, New York & London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967). Although this is now rather old, it will usually provide a concise summary of opposing perspectives on any major topic in philosophy. It also provides references to ‘classic’ books and journal articles.
A more recent source from my own former university in England is An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (ed. G. H. R. Parkinson et al., London: Routledge, 1988). The articles here are longer and more discursive than in the Edwards encyclopaedia, but are very useful for getting perspective on a topic. This also provides further references.
The latest authoritative reference works are The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. by Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. By Robert Audi), and The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
Always use the literature recommended, but don’t be dismayed if you can’t get hold of all the recommended readings; a selection will suffice. You may use lecture notes, where relevant, to inform the essay, but don’t simply insert transcribed lecture notes into an essay. Always express them in your own words.
When taking courses in philosophy you will encounter two major different sorts of reading, which require different degrees of concentration and effort in order to derive from them what is intended and sought after. To carry out your assignments effectively, you should be able to distinguish between them and bring to bear the proper approach to each.
Encountering Primary Works, classics of philosophy, is at the core of a philosophy course. Unlike textbooks, their meaning is not necessarily self-evident, since they are often translated from foreign or ancient languages and frequently reflect the assumptions of cultures or ages very different from our own. Even those produced by writers of our own time and place may contain a richness of thought and imagination which takes several careful readings to begin to uncover. They are not, in short, to be memorized verbatim and taken at face value; rather, they need to be approached slowly and carefully, and may be full of surprises.
Secondary Works include works of scholarship which present original research and interpretations of the subject you are studying. They are usually written by and for academics, and may be at a level of sophistication which you haven’t generally encountered. I have tried to recommend works which may challenge you, since they require an active effort to comprehend. They are to be read for the major points, and especially for the arguments which lead to those points. Remember that articles from philosophy journals are likely to be very focused. This means that they will not necessarily give a general overall view of the subject, or take pains to introduce the subject properly, but they will often contain the depth of material you require after having introduced the topic. It is better to have read a few articles thoroughly than to have read many superficially.
Remember also that effective reading is active reading. While reading you should not regard yourself as a passive receptacle into which information is being poured. Rather, you are an active and intelligent agent who has to make an effort to make contact with the thoughts of the author. Active reading is alert reading. The words should not simply drift by your eyes, but should impress themselves on your mind so that you are aware of their meaning. If you find yourself having to ask what the text means, try paraphrasing it, repeating its meaning or argument in other words. Taking notes is a good way of following an argument, since it requires acting, condensing and paraphrasing. If you find passages which you simply cannot understand, you should mark them and ask me about them in or after the class. You should approach your reading in the context of the ideas developed in the lectures, to see how the texts complement or contradict what I say there. Seminar discussion provides you with a forum in which to test the accuracy of your understanding of what you have read, and you should present interpretations in order to get the reactions of your teacher and fellow students. Don’t be afraid of making mistakes, since texts sometimes are not clear and several conflicting readings are possible. Out of such disagreement, good discussion is often generated.

6.- Use of Literature: Quotations
You are encouraged to make extensive use of source materials, both primary and secondary, when writing philosophy essays, but you should be aware that all quotations should be acknowledged. A very good rule is to never use a quotation to make a point, but rather to use quotations to illustrate what you have already said in your own words. When you do quote from another author, principles of honesty, as well as of sound scholarship, require that you put such material between quotation marks and indicate the source (either in brackets, or in a footnote). When you use someone else’s idea, or point, you should always acknowledge its source. A separate bibliography at the end of the essay is also required, as well as being good practice for writing in any subject.
It is perfectly acceptable to make full use of quotations in your work; but to attempt to pass off someone else’s words as your own is plagiarism -- a serious offence. Plagiarism could result in an essay being awarded a fail mark. (Please see the John Jay College of Criminal Justice document, entitled ‘Plagiarism Policy’, which is attached at the end of the present Guidelines).

7.- Timing, Planning, and Structure
Start the reading soon after having decided upon an essay title. Leave some time for reflection between finishing the reading and starting to write the essay. Write a first draft. Leave ample time for revising and rewriting your essay before the deadline.
All written work needs structure. At the highest level, this means that an essay should normally have an introduction, a body and a conclusion. Each of these parts in turn should be structured.
Make a general plan of the essay first. Structure matters most in the middle section, which comprises the bulk of the essay. If you have problems structuring essays, get into the habit of dividing them into sections, and putting in section headings.
Make at least one rough draft before writing the essay. (Believe it or not, it’s easy for a teacher to tell whether essays have been drafted beforehand or not).
Feel free to discuss your essay plans with fellow students, or to let someone else read the essay before you hand it in. Always read the essay after you have written the final draft, in order to correct silly errors and prepare for your presentation. A few minutes spent just reading your own essay can pay substantial dividends in terms of marks.

8.- Style and Presentation
Writing philosophy is a matter of finding a balance between reporting other people’s views and expressing your own. An essay should never be just an account of what someone else thought, without any indication of your opinions. Try to present your own ideas and draw your own conclusions. Personal reflection is central to philosophy. But remember that it’s argument we’re interested in, not autobiography, so opinions must be reasoned reflections on the material, not just your ‘reactions’.
Doing a draft means that you have the opportunity to tidy up a badly presented essay. Essays should be presented in double-spaced form or with wide margins, on standard paper. This leaves ample room for me to make comments on the work. Forcing me to write my comments in a small corner of the last page does nothing to raise your mark!
Always write legibly, or type. But do not think that just because you use a typewriter or word-processor you are absolved from demands of tidiness or correct spelling. If you do use a word-processor, use a spell checker.
Be sure to follow the APA documentation format and include a Bibliography page with each essay. The APA format is the official citation style for the College. You will find explanatory handouts on the APA style near the reference desk in the College Library.
Please note that a handed-in hard-copy (i.e., a printed copy) is the only acceptable format for the paper (E.g., Computer discs are not acceptable formats; nor are submissions via fax or e-mail deemed acceptable). Please do not use report covers, folders, or paperclips; simply staple the pages together.

9.- The ‘Mid Term’ Examination
You are required to take a one-hour essay-style examination (no open books nor open notes are allowed during the examination) at ‘mid-term’ on the subjects covered in the lectures erstwhile. The format of the examination is as follows: you will be given two questions out of which you must answer any ONE question. The ‘midterm’ examination will be marked and commented upon. This exam is aimed at advancing your knowledge of the subject and in helping you develop rather different skills than those cultivated in the writing of outside-class essays. Both these goals are extremely important specially so in light of the fact that you must seat a comprehensive essay-style final examination. The mid-term examination is on Tuesday November 2nd. NB: Students failing to sit the mid-term examination will be dismissed from the course and will receive an F mark as their final course grade. Please see my ‘Advice on Philosophy Examinations’ for further guidance on examinations.

10.- The Final Examination
You are required to take a 2-hour comprehensive essay-style examination (no open books nor open notes allowed during the examination) at final examinations week. The format of the examination is as follows: you will be given nine questions out of which you must answer THREE questions. NB: Students failing to sit the final examination receive an F mark as their final course grade. Please see my ‘Advice on Philosophy Examinations’ for further guidance on examinations.
NB: Please take note, at once, of the final examination date by consulting the Final Examination Schedule which is printed in the current semester’s College Directory of Classes. You must seat the final examination on the date corresponding to your class period and section. No alternative examination dates will be given. Avoid vacation and other types of travel before the last day of final examinations week.

11.- The Weekly Paragraph
Starting the second week of term, you are required to hand in a substantial paragraph on an indicative question to be assigned on the week’s topic. The maximum length for this is one letter-size page. Doing this makes for better discussions and puts you in a stronger position to learn from the classes; it also helps me to see how well you understand the material. Students themselves have repeatedly stressed the benefits of performing this task. The paragraphs will be read, written comments will be made on them, and they will be marked. They are not mini-essays, but statements of your own (tentative) argued views. They must be legible, clear and cogent. Failure to turn them in will count against you, since they will be taken into account when giving you an overall grade for your academic semester’s work. Weekly paragraphs are due every Thursday at the start of class. Late paragraphs will not be accepted. When averaging your net weekly paragraph grade, the lowest two paragraph grades will not be taken into account.

12.- Class Notes Handouts
At the end of every class each student will receive a substantial handout containing class notes. These handouts are not substitutes for doing the essential readings or for attending the lectures. These handouts are only aide memoires to the lectures and presuppose that you have done the essential readings. The handouts do not, on the main, contain complete and self-sufficient arguments. You cannot successfully write an essay (or prepare for the ‘midterm’ and Final examinations) just from these notes; wider reading is essential to give you a broader grasp of the topic and help you develop your own ideas and critical reactions.
These notes are simply intended as a supplement to and not a substitute for in-class note taking. Students ought to take their own notes.
Although I shall make every effort to deliver these notes both in class and free of charge, circumstances beyond my control (e.g., college budget constraints, policy or processes) might force me to seek alternative arrangements for their distribution. In the event of this occurring, students obviously will be notified.

13.- Attendance
You are expected to attend every class (remember, they take place two times a week) on time. Bring the relevant book or books. It’s good to get in the habit of referring to the text during discussion. Missing two classes will be regarded as a cause for concern and missing four classes will result in the student being unable to submit coursework or take the examinations.
Justified late arrivals within the first fifteen minutes of class are counted as half absences; late arrivals after the first fifteen minutes of class are registered as full absences.
Please note that all absences (e.g., justified and unjustified absences, absences due to late registration, etc.) are counted toward the total allowable absences in the course.

14.- Classroom Rules and Regulations
CUNY’s rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order obviously apply at all times. Additionally, eating and drinking in the classroom, walking in and out of the classroom during classes, leaving the classroom before my explicit dismissal of the class, persistent tardiness, as well as in-class use of tape recorders, video cameras, cellular phones, beepers, and other electronic devices which are likely to cause disruption or nuisance, is categorically and absolutely prohibited. Any student engaging in any manner of conduct prohibited under this section shall be subject to the following range of sanctions: absent mark, warning, expulsion from class, over-all grade deduction, suspension from course.
The above prohibitions do not apply to students who due to disability, illness, or extreme hardships are forced or required to violate the said prohibitions. Such students nonetheless must in advance request an explicit waiver from me.

15.- Ideal Goals and Practical Realities
The above advice represents a set of goals for you to aim at. But do not get discouraged if, in a particular week, you do not meet all the suggested standards. A short or weak essay is generally better than no essay at all, and it is nearly always better to produce something than to risk falling behind with your work program. Try to plan your time and keep up to date; experience shows that it is hard to catch up later if you fall behind. Above all, if you do get into difficulties don’t just let things slide; it’s always better to have a talk with me, and discuss any problems that may arise. Members of the faculty are here to help you, and we can only do that job if you keep the lines of communication open.

16.- Office Hours
Office: Tenth Avenue Building, Room 325.
Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, from 12:35 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.; and from 4:35 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Please ring extension 8347 or send me an e-mail (to the following address: EChavezArvizo@jjay.cuny.edu) to make an appointment if you must see me outside these times.

Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy

1.- Answer the precise question set in the title of the essay. If the question asked seems to you not to be precise, i.e., it could be taken in more than one way, then get clear about the various ways you think it could be taken, and let your essay relate to these.

2.- Bear in mind that the question asked is important for the actual writing of the essay. The question is also important for the preparatory reading; that is, you do the reading with particular questions in mind, trying to find material to help you answer these, rather than (for example) reading vaguely and generally ‘around’ the topic.

3.- One of the hardest and most important stages is sorting out the material you have compiled -- from e.g., lecture notes, reading -- for use in your essay. There is no easy way here, but note the point that the sorting out has to be governed by the plan/argument/framework you develop for the essay, so that material (e.g., ‘good points’, quotations, etc.) is selected for inclusion for a reason -- that relates to the argument of your essay -- and not simply because you’ve done a lot of work and it seems a shame to leave it out!

4.- The point about structure is important in its own right. An essay should be a developing sequence of thought, one step leading to the next.

5.- Note that it is likely to be mainly here that your own originality emerges. I imagine that most ideas, etc. you will derive from others -- e.g., lectures, books, handouts, etc.. You make these your own to the extent that you assent to them and maybe use them in your essay. What is undeniable original is the framework, the argument, the sequence of thought you come up with.

6.- A possible way of structuring your essay would be to indicate at the start, in broad outline, what you’re going to do; to make sure that each new step in the structure/argument is given a new paragraph; to make sure that the links between each step are clear to you -- in as far as you can make them clear to the reader! -- and to conclude by reviewing where you have got to and, (if you can) drawing out any final thoughts from what has preceded.

7.- Do not plunge into writing the essay without first having got clear in broad outline what the structure is going to be!

8.- There are of course many ways of starting an essay. I think one full-proof way is to state what you consider to be involved in an answer to the question asked, what in your view is necessary to a satisfactory discussion of the topic set, with probably a brief indication of how you intent to go about it.

9.- It may be helpful to know the existence of a whole category of cliché phrases which can help you get into the essay for example:
· ‘Any discussion of the question . . . must pay attention to the following points . . .’
· ‘In examining this question/the question whether . . . I propose to/it is necessary to discuss . . .’
· ‘This question . . . raises four main issues which I propose to examine in turn . . .’
· ‘The statement that . . . (title of the essay) . . . is in some ways ambiguous and a first step must be to attempt to clarify what it involves . . .’.

10.- Points (8) and (9) above, obviously, indicate only possibilities; but however you decide to start your essay I think it should be clear, concise, and ‘businesslike’!

11.- In a number of disciplines (perhaps those that are centrally concerned with research findings) the convention maybe not to use the first person singular -- ‘I think’, ‘It seems to me’, etc. In philosophy, what you think is important and it is entirely appropriate, desirable even, that you should use the first person singular.

12.- It is very important though also to note that it is not sufficient to record what you think, equally, probably more, important, is that you should give reasons supporting your views, and that you should have thought carefully as to whether, and why, they are good reasons!

13.- Philosophy essays will involve references to factual matters, which it is possible to be straightforwardly right or wrong about. For example, Descartes was influenced by 16th and 17th century discoveries and ideas in astronomy and physics; Plato did draw a distinction between knowledge and right opinion.

14.- However much of philosophy is concerned with questions of value and opinion, for example, ‘should animals be used in medical research? ‘Is a foetus a person?’ Hence, much of the time, there is no straightforward right or wrong answer; often there are different possible answer, each supported by reasons; and sometimes it may be difficult to come to a fair conclusion as to what you think is the best answer.

15.- Hence philosophy essays will typically be a matter of examining different possibilities, trying to do justice to different views, trying to adjudicate between them. It is not necessarily a matter of thinking you must end up with the ‘right’ answer.

16.- N.B. If you decide to use material from books word-for-word, you should include it as a quotation and acknowledge your source.

17.- Putting things clearly --emphasised above in the reference to structure and to a step-by-step developing argument/discussion -- is also furthered by careful use of punctuation; by not having vastly long paragraphs -- do not be afraid of using paragraphs of possibly no more than one sentence if appropriate (if, for example, you want to make a link between one step and the next); it is not a bad principle to make only one main point per paragraph! It is probably a good idea to re-read to make sure you have expressed yourself clearly. Also, essays are clearer in another sense, i.e., visually, if you use paper with wide spaces allow a reasonable width of margin, and leave one line blank between paragraphs.

18.- Essays are, among other things for assessment, for you to learn something , and for you to achieve something. Also, good essays are not easy to produce! for all these reasons, you should not assume that I am unwilling or unable to help sort out any problems that may arise!

19.- In the light of all this, you can see that the criteria used in assessing your essay will be:
· did he/she answer the question?
· was the answer clearly set out, clearly structured, with a progressing, step-by-step line of thought?
· how far has she/he given carefully thought out reasons for views and opinions expressed?
· did he/she get straightforwardly factual points right?
· was she/he aware of/was justice done to different points of view?

20.- Read the Course Guidelines for further information and thoughts on essay-writing in philosophy.

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo