John Jay College of Criminal Justice

The City University of New York

Department of Art, Music, and Philosophy

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo, BSc, BSc, MA, PhD

Philosophy 231

Knowing, Being and Doing:

Philosophical Method and Its Application

Course Description
Course Syllabus
Course Guidelines
Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy

Course Description

The present course, entitled ‘Knowing, Being, and Doing: Philosophical Method and Its Application’, is divided into three parts, each of which focuses on one major figure in the history of philosophy: the first part deals with the Ancient Greek thinker Plato; the second part focuses on the seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes; and the last part covers the nineteenth-century English savant John Stuart Mill. The Plato component includes discussions on three of his seminal dialogues, Protagoras, Meno, and The Republic, which deal with topics such as: virtue, the contrast between truth and opinion, Plato’s aims and methods of argument, the linking of knowledge to right opinion, and the Forms. The part on Descartes includes discussions on his key philosophical writings, the Discourse on the Method, Meditations on First Philosophy and ‘Selections from the Meditation’s "Objections and Replies"’, which consider issues such as: doubt and certainty, the existence of God, the self, and the relation between the soul and the body. Finally, the Mill module includes discussions on his treatises Utilitarianism and On Liberty -- which include topics such as: the nature of morally right action, happiness, pleasure, and justice. The course as a whole discusses canonical philosophical problems, namely, the nature of knowledge (e.g., whether one can know anything for certain), existence (e.g., whether God exists) and ethics (e.g., how one ought to act toward other beings).

Course Syllabus

Set Texts:

The following three texts, which include some of the most important works in the history of philosophy, will be the main basis for discussion:

Plato, Protagoras and Meno (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1956). Translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. Recent impressions available. (ISBN 0-14-044068-2.)

Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings (Wordsworth: Ware, England, 1997). Edited with an introduction by Enrique Chávez-Arvizo. (ISBN 1-85326-470-9.)

Mill, Utilitarianism (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1963). Recent impressions available. (ISBN 0-45-200970-7 or 0-14-043272-8).

You will need to have your own copy of each title mentioned above. Supplementary extracts will be distributed during the course.

Some Important and Useful General Texts
Socrates and Plato
Coopleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 1.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine.
Gosling, J. C. B., Plato.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4.
Hare, R. M., Plato.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought.
Kidd, I. G., ‘Socrates’.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Melling, D. J., Understanding Plato.
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?
Ryle, G., ‘Plato’.
Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work.
Descartes
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes Life and the Evolution of his Philosophy’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych on the Soul, Ch. 3.
Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 4.
Cottingham, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.
Cottingham, John, A Descartes Dictionary.
Cottingham, John, Descartes.
Kenny, A., Descartes.
Rée, Jonathan, Descartes.
Sorell, T., Descartes.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘Descartes’.
Williams, B., Descartes.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes.
Mill
Britton, K., John Stuart Mill.
Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 8.
Cowling, M., Mill and Liberalism.
McCloskey, H. J., John Stuart Mill.
Ryan, A., J. S. Mill.
Scheewind, J. B., ‘Mill, John Stuart’.
Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Skorupski, J. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Mill.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill.
Sprigge, T. L. S., ‘Utilitarianism’.
Thomas, W., Mill.

Course Outline and Reading List

Part I: Plato

1.- Plato: The Emergence of Philosophy
Socrates, one of the earliest and greatest philosophers, famously declared that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’, thus epitomizing the impelling force behind philosophical enquiry: wonder. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions our most fundamental beliefs and assumptions. In the initial discussions we shall talk about the meaning of philosophy, its main characteristics and branches, its emergence, as well as some of the earliest philosophers.

Essential Reading:
Guthrie, W. K. C., ‘Introduction’ to Protagoras and Meno, pp. 7ff.

Other Sources:
Cornford, F. M., Before and After Socrates.
Irwin, T. H., ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought, Chs. 2-6, esp. pp. 104-118.
Kraut, R., ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’.
Parkinson, G. H. R., ‘What is Philosophy’.
Passmore, J. ‘Philosophy’.
Penner, T. ‘Socrates and the Early Dialogues’.
Russell, B., Problems of Philosophy, pp. 7-11 and Ch. 15.
Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moralist, Chs. 2-3.
NB: Additionally, feel free to consult any good introductory book to philosophy.

Indicative Questions: What is Philosophy? How did it emerge? What distinguishes Socrates’ enquiry from that of the Ionian naturalists, Eleactic Ontologists, and the Sophists? Who are the sophists? Who are the Presocratics? What exactly is the meaning of Socrates’ maxim ‘The unexamined life is not worth living?’. How does it relate to philosophy? What is the relationship between the protagonist of Plato’s Dialogues and the historical Socrates? Why is Socrates labelled ‘the father of philosophy’?

Essay Question: What is philosophy? In what ways do Socrates’ life and views exemplify the meaning of philosophy? (NB: Do NOT write your term paper on this topic.)

2.- Plato: The Search for Definition and the Elenchos
Socrates systematically questioned the conventional beliefs and assumptions of his contemporaries. By continual philosophical ‘cross-examination’ he would challenge and destroy a person’s knowledge claims, beliefs, and assumptions exposing their ignorance. In these discussions, we shall expound and critically examine this systematic method of questioning which is known as the Socratic elenchos.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 70-79e.

Other Sources:
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’.
Hare, R. M., Plato, Ch. 6.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Phillips, B., ‘The Significance of Meno’s Paradox’.
Robinson, R., ‘Socratic Definitions’.
Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moralist, Chs. 4-5.
White, N. P., ‘Inquiry’.

Indicative Questions: Is Socrates as ignorant as he claims to be? Is Socrates a sceptic? If so, what kind of sceptic is he? Is Socrates’ aim to define virtue in the Meno? Do we need to know the definition of virtue in order to know anything about virtue? What form does Socrates demands that a successful definition ought to take? What types of definitions are there? Can all words be defined by means of other words? What are ostensive definitions? What kind of definitions of virtue does Meno offer Socrates? Does a successful definition of virtue emerge from the Meno? Explain the Socratic elenchos (‘cross-examination’). What are its limitations? Is it a purely destructive method? If not, what are then its ultimate aims?

Essay Question: Do we need to know the definition of virtue in order to know anything about virtue? Explain the Socratic elenchos. What are its limitations?

3.- Plato: Virtue and Knowledge
Does virtue come from teaching? So asks young Meno at the beginning of the famous Platonic dialogue which bears his name. In these discussions we shall Meno’s question and different answers which are offered to it in the Meno.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 70-79e and 86c-96d.

Other Sources:
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno, pp. 17ff.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine, vol. 1, pp. 217ff.
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, §1.
Gulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 83ff. and 91ff.
Guthrie, W. K. C., ‘The Geometrical Experiment with Meno’s Slave’, in his ed. Protagoras and Meno, pp. 107ff.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 3, pp. 425-42; and vol. 4, pp. 242ff. and 246ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Mueller, I., ‘Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth’, §3.
Nakhnikian, G., ‘The First Socratic Paradox’.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Santas, G., ‘The Socratic Paradoxes’.
Santas, G., Socrates, Ch. 6.
Sesonke, A., and Fleming, N. (eds.), Plato’s Meno.
Taylor, A. E, Plato, Ch. 3., pp. 130ff.

Indicative Questions: How should one interpret Socrates’ confession of ignorance? Describe Socrates’ hypothetical method. Can we be taught to be good? Is all wrongdoing due to ignorance? Is virtue knowledge? If not, can virtue be successfully defined? What would count, for Socrates, as an adequate definition of virtue? Is Socrates correct in rejecting ostensive definitions? What is the first Socratic paradox? Is it true? At the end of the Meno Socrates seems to arrive at a puzzling conclusion; how are we to interpret it?

Essay Question: Can we be taught to be good? Is all wrongdoing due to ignorance?

4.- Plato: Knowledge -- Innate or Acquired
Philosophers’ appeals to innate ideas -- i.e., ideas in the mind prior to and independent of sense experience -- have a long ancestry which goes back at least to Plato. In these lectures we shall be discussing Plato’s views on innate knowledge and his theory of anamnesis (recollection).

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 79e-86c.

Other Sources:
Cornford, F. M., Principium Sapientiae, Ch. 4.
Edgley, R., ‘Innate Ideas’, in Vesey, G. N. A. (ed.), Knowledge and Necessity.
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, esp. §2-4.
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 249.
Irwin, T. H., Plato’s Moral Theory, Ch. 6., pp. 138ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Moravcsik, J., ‘Learning as Recollection’.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’.
Sesonke A., and Fleming, N., ‘Knowing and Saying: The Structure of Plato’s Meno’.
Stich, S. P. (ed.), Innate Ideas.
Taylor, A. E., Plato. Ch. 3., pp. 136ff.
Vlastos, G., ‘Anamnesis in the Meno’.

Indicative Questions: What is Meno’s paradox? Does Socrates successfully refute it? What is anamnesis? Is it coherent? Is true? Do we have innate knowledge? What is Socrates’ aim in the slave-boy geometrical experiment? Is the experiment successful? Is it a fair criticism to say that Socrates is ‘handing over’ answers to the slave-boy?

Essay Question: Do we have innate knowledge? Why does Plato compare learning with a kind of remembering (Gr. anamnesis)?

5.- Plato: Knowledge and Opinion
One of the most fruitful problems in modern epistemology is to answer the perennial question ‘What is knowledge?’, a question first raised, it is said, by Plato. For the most part it consists of attempts to specify the (necessary and sufficient) conditions under which a subject could be correctly said to know something. In these discussions we shall examine his attempts to specify the truth-conditions of knowledge, and along the way, we shall examine the linking of knowledge to right opinion.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Meno, paragraphs 97-9.

Other Sources:
Plato, The Republic, Book V, paragraphs 474b-483e; Book X, paragraphs 601b-602b.
Plato, Theaetetus, paragraphs 201c-201d
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Ch. 8., pp. 192ff.
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno, pp. 30ff.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine, vol. 2., pp. 50ff.
Guthrie, W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4., pp. 256ff. and 261ff.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno.
Matthews, G., Plato’s Epistemology and Related Logical Problems, Introduction.

Indicative Questions: Are Plato’s conditions for ‘X knows that P’ necessary? Are they sufficient? What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why does Plato believe that knowledge is more valuable than right opinion? Is knowledge right opinion plus adequate justification? Should we be concerned about what knowledge is? Should we be concerned about what the conditions for knowledge are? What is Socrates’ aim in the ‘road to Larissa’ example? Is he contradicting his views on knowledge?

Essay Question: What is the difference between knowledge and opinion? Why does Plato believe that knowledge is more valuable than right opinion?
6.- Plato: Knowledge as ‘Justified True Belief’
The most ancient and venerable view of knowledge is, supposedly, that knowledge differs from true opinion in that it is based upon some form of justification, and that therefore knowledge is justified true belief. This is the so-called ‘Classical’ conception of knowledge discussed by Plato (e.g., Theaetetus 201c-201d). However, Edmund L. Gettier III published a paper in 1963 which aims to demolish the proposed analysis. In these discussions we shall expound and critically assess Gettier’s arguments.

Essential Reading:
Gettier, E., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ [HANDOUT].

Other Sources:
Plato, Theaetetus, paragraphs 201c-201d.
Armstrong, D. M., ‘Does Knowledge Entail Belief?’.
Ayer, A. J., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Evidence’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 1.
Chisholm, R. M., ‘Knowledge as Justified True Belief’.
Dancy, J., An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology.
Lehrer, K., Theory of Knowledge, Chs.1 and 2.
Lehrer, L., Knowledge., Chs.1-3, and 9.
Malcolm, N., ‘Knowledge and Belief’.
O’Hear, A., What Philosophy Is.
Pappas, G. and Swain, M. (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification, essays by Lehrer and Paxson, Dretske, Harman, and Sosa.
Radford, C., ‘Knowledge - By Examples’.
Russell, B., Human Knowledge, Part 2, §11.
White, A. R., ‘Knowledge Without Conviction’.
Woozley, A. D., ‘Knowing and Not Knowing’.

Is knowledge justified true belief? Why does the belief have to be true for it to count as knowledge? Why can’t one know something that is false? Must one believe what one knows, or would some other kind of attitude suffice?
Why must the belief be justified? What kinds of justification do we ordinarily count as securing knowledge? Is justification equivalent to evidence? Or can one be justified in believing something without having evidence for it? What counts as evidence?
Does Edmund Gettier successfully show that there are cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge? What is to be learnt from such a demonstration? Could the concept of justification be explicated in such a way as to overcome the objections?

Essay title: Is knowledge justified true belief? If not, what is it?
7.- Plato: Knowledge and the Forms
The most fundamental contribution Plato made to philosophy was the distinction he drew between the changing physical objects we perceive with our senses and the unchanging ‘ideas’ we can ‘know’ with our minds. To these ideas Plato gave the name ‘Forms’. In these discussions we shall examine the Platonic theory of Forms.

Essential Reading:
Plato, Republic, paragraphs 471c-487a and 506-520. (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Chs. 8, 9, and 10.
Cross, P. C., and Woozley, A., Plato’s Republic, Chs. 8 and 9.
Flew, A., An Introduction to Western Philosophy, Ch. 2.
Nettleship, R. L., Lectures on the Republic of Plato, Ch. 9.
Vlastos, G., ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’.
White, N. P., ‘Plato’s Metaphysical Epistemology’.

Indicative Questions: Mathematicians often make statements such as ‘There exist two prime numbers between x and y’. What kind of existence are they talking about? How does Plato explain this kind of existence? What is the source of ideas we have about ideals that are not ‘encountered’ in our ‘physical’ world (such as Virtue, Justice, Goodness)? What are the Forms? Is Plato right in maintaining that true knowledge is restricted to the forms? Critically examine Plato’s distinction between the objects of knowledge and the objects of belief. Examine and explain the similes of the Sun, Divided Line, and Cave.

Essay Question: Critically examine Plato’s Theory of the Forms.
Part II: Descartes
1.- René Descartes: Method of Doubt
In Plato’s search for eternal, unchanging objects of knowledge we can see the idea that what qualifies as knowledge must have a certain stability. Many centuries later, at the start of what is known as the ‘early modern’ period, this theme was taken up, though in a very different way, by ‘the father of modern philosophy’ René Descartes, whose writings had a profound effect on the subsequent development of philosophy in general and epistemology (the theory of knowledge) in particular. Descartes became struck by the instability and unreliability of many of the accepted doctrines he had been taught as a student. In these discussions we shall examine Descartes’ attempt to sweep away all previously accepted opinions open to doubt, and start afresh, his project of the reconstruction of knowledge from the foundations upwards.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, First Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 134ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV, first paragraph. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91f.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 191ff.)

Other Sources:
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge.
Bouwsma, O. K., ‘Descartes’ Evil Genius’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 2.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 2.
Malcolm, N. Dreaming, (passim).
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 2.
Ryle, G., Dilemmas, Ch. 7.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 2
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: (a) Discuss: ‘From time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once’. Is Descartes’ recommendation ‘disbelieve all evidence which originate from the senses’ or is it ‘withhold assent when confronted by all such evidence’? What are doxastic attitudes? What is the scope of the argument from the senses?
(b) Why does Descartes resorts to the dreaming argument in order to demolish the principle about the senses? Why does not it suffice to use the argument from the senses? Does the supposition that I might be dreaming make sense? Can 2 + 2 = 5 in a dream? If not, why is this? What is the scope of the dreaming argument?
(c) Why does Descartes introduce the argument from dreaming at all, and not resort immediately to the evil genius argument? Comment on whether the following is a fair criticism of Descartes: ‘Even an omnipotent deceiver could not make a square have three sides’. What is the scope of the evil genius argument?
Is Descartes a sceptic? If so, what kind of scepticism does he practices and prescribes? What is the scope of the Cartesian method of doubt?

Essay Question: Expound and critically assess Descartes’ method of doubt.
2.- René Descartes: Cogito Ergo Sum
In these discussions, we find Descartes continuing his search for a solid epistemological footing: just as Archimedes used to demand only one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire planet, so too Descartes hopes to find at least one truth claim, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable in order to built on it a comprehensive system of knowledge. This he is able to find (at last) in the Cogito – cogito ergo sum or I am thinking, therefore I exist. Even if there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me, the demon will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV, first three paragraphs. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91f.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 196ff.)

Other Sources:
Ayer, A. J., ‘I Think therefore I am’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 2.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, pp. 35ff.
Hintikka, J., ‘Cogito, Ergo Sum’.
Kenny, A. Descartes, Ch. 3.
Markie, P., ‘The Cogito and Its Importance’.
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind, Ch. 1.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Certainty of the Cogito’.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 3.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: Is Descartes right in maintaining that the proposition ‘I exist’ has a special kind of certainty? What is a syllogism? Does Descartes deduce his existence from his thinking by means of a syllogism? Is the Cogito a time-relative certainty or a proposition which is timelessly true and certain? Does ‘ambulo ergo sum’ (I am walking therefore I am) effectively serve in place of the Cogito? How about ‘dubito ergo sum’ (I am doubting therefore I am)? Does the Cogito defeat scepticism?

Essay Question: Is Descartes right in maintaining that the proposition ‘I exist’ has a special kind of certainty? Is the Cogito an inference or a performance?
3.- René Descartes: Clear and Distinct Ideas
The term ‘idea’ is a very evasive philosophical term. It derives from the Greek **** and was later rendered as forma in the Latin of the Middle Ages. In Plato, it stands for the Form, an eternal unchanging ideal object of understanding which exists over and above the worldly instances which instantiate it. Philosophers in the Midle Ages, such as Augustine and (even) Aquinas, are very Platonic in regards to ideas; they believed that ideas have independent existence in the mind of God. Descartes is said to have ‘psychologized’ the concept of idea (i.e., it transforms the concept from a Platonic sort of Form into a modification of consciousness). In these discussions, we shall examine Descartes’ account of this concept.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff., 162ff., and 170ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 191ff.)

Other Sources:
Alanen, Lilli, ‘Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity’.
Ashworth, E. J., ‘Descartes’ Theory of Clear and Distinct Ideas’.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge, Ch. 1.
Curley, E. M., ‘Analysis in the Meditations’.
Gewirth, A., ‘Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes’.
Kenny, A., ‘Descartes on Ideas’.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: Expound and evaluate Descartes doctrine of ideas. What does Descartes mean by: (i) a ‘clear perception’?; (ii) a ‘distinct perception’?; and (ii) ‘a clear and distinct perception’? Discuss Descartes’ threefold-classification of ideas.

Essay Question: Discuss: ‘Whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’.
4.- René Descartes: The Trademark Argument
In the Third Meditation Descartes conducts the first of two major attempts to prove God’s existence, usually labelled the ‘trademark argument’, for it cashes in an analogy claiming that God has placed the idea of Himself in one’s mind just as the mark of the craftsman is stamped on his work. Descartes reasons along the following lines. I am not perfect (i.e., there is more perfection in knowledge than in doubt and since I doubt many matters I am an imperfect being) yet I have in me the idea of supreme perfection (i.e., the idea of a supremely perfect being -- God). Yet -- at this point in the argument the meditator uses two hermetic standard scholastic metaphysical principles, ‘nothing comes from nothing’ and ‘there must be as much reality in the cause as in the effect of that cause’ -- this idea cannot come from myself (for I am not perfect), thus it must come from outside myself. Descartes then reasons that the idea must come from God Himself therefore he concludes that He exists. In these lectures we shall expound and assess the Trademark Argument.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Third Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 147ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 206ff.)

Other Sources:
Baier, A., ‘The Idea of the True God in Descartes’.
Beyssade, J.-M., ‘The idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, pp. 48ff. and 55ff.
Doney, W., ‘The Cartesian Circle’.
Frankfurt, H. G., ‘Descartes’ Validation of Reason’.
Frankfurt, H. G., ‘Memory and the Cartesian Circle’.
Loeb, L. E., ‘The Cartesian Circle’.
Tweyman, S., ‘Deus ex Cartesio’.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 5 (esp. pp. 130-52).
Wilson, M. D. Descartes, Ch. 3.

Indicative Questions: (a) In the Third Meditation, Descartes distinguishes between ideas, considered as images, and ideas considered as something else. Explain what distinction he has in mind here. He claims that ideas-as-‘possessors’-of-representational content (can) differ widely. In respect of what exactly are images different from one another?
(b) In classifying ideas, Descartes makes a celebrated distinction between those ideas that are innate, those that are acquired or ‘adventitious’, and those that are invented or constructed by the mind. Expound the Cartesian three-fold classification of ideas.
(c) Can something come from nothing? Does every effect necessarily has a cause? What is Descartes’ general principle of causality (which he presents in the Third Meditation) and how are we to interpret it?
(d) Are there innate ideas? Is the idea of God innate? Does the trademark argument work?
(e) What is the ‘Cartesian Circle’. Is Descartes’ attempt to validate reason vitiated by circularity?

Essay Question: Discuss Descartes’ version of the trademark argument for God’s existence. Is such argument valid?
5.- René Descartes: The Ontological Argument
The Fifth Meditation offers a second proof of the existence of God known as the ‘ontological argument’ -- a phrase first coined in the eighteenth century by the eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to refer to a particular kind of reasoning which attempts to prove the existence of God abstracted from all experience inferring His existence a priori exclusively from concepts. Briefly, the argument can be stated as follows: God is supremely perfect; existence is part of supreme perfection; therefore, God exists. In these lectures we shall examine both Descartes’ ontological argument and Kant’s criticism of it.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Fifth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 170ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.).
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’ (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 218ff.).

Other Sources:
Alston, W. P., ‘The Ontological Argument Revisited’.
Anselm, Proslogion, Chs. 1-5.
Barnes, J., The Ontological Argument.
Bennett, J., Kant’s Dialectic, §72-4.
Beyssade, J.-M., ‘The idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes. pp. 57ff.
Flew, A., God and Philosophy, 82-98.
Gaunilo, ‘Reply on Behalf of the Fool’.
Hick, J., and McGill, A. C. (eds.), The Many-Faced Argument.
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘Impossibility of the Ontological Proof’, A592ff.: B620ff. (HANDOUT)
Kenny, A., Descartes, Ch. 7.
Mackie, J. L., The Miracle of Theism.
Plantinga, A., ‘Alston on the Ontological Argument’.
Plantinga, A. (ed.), The Ontological Argument.
Strawson, P. F., ‘Is Existence Never a Predicate’?
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, pp. 172ff.

Indicative Questions: (a) Describe Anselm’s version of the ontological argument for God’s existence. What do you make of Gaunilo’s criticism? Is Gaunilo’s criticism plausible, or does something unique about God’s nature elude the analogy? Could an argument similar to Anselm’s be used to prove that a perfectly powerful devil exists?
(b) Some philosophers have objected that Anselm and Descartes misunderstand the concept of ‘being’. Being is not an ordinary concept like ‘red’ or ‘horse’, but a concept that asserts that these other concepts are exemplified (e.g., for example, the concept ‘unicorn’ is not exemplified but the concept ‘horse’ is). It makes no sense, they contend, to say that being is exemplified. Are they correct? Why or why not?
(c) Describe Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God. Is it an improvement over St. Anselm’s? Is it tenable?
(d) Does Kant dispose of the ontological argument? Is existence a predicate?

Essay Question: Explain Descartes’ argument for God’s existence, showing how it depends on the premise that existence is part of perfection. Is the premise acceptable? Discuss Kant’s objection to the ontological argument.
6.- René Descartes: Mind and Body Dualism
The seventeenth century saw a radical change in our understanding of the universe and our place in it. That ‘revolution in thought’ has left a profound mark on our current understanding (or lack thereof) of the relation between the ‘mind’ to the rest of nature. Descartes is widely credited with having set the agenda for this problem; in these discussions we will examine some of his reasons for thinking that the mind and the body are utterly distinct substances. We shall consider, also, the well known problem of interactionism which assails Descartes’ ‘dualist’ position.

Essential Reading:
Descartes, René, Meditations on First Philosophy, Second and Sixth Meditation. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 139ff. and 176ff.)
Descartes, René, Discourse on the Method, Part IV. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, pp. 91ff.)
Descartes, René, ‘Objections and Replies’. (Chávez-Arvizo, E. (ed.), Descartes, p. 228ff.)
Descartes, René. ‘Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth’.

Other Sources:
Alanen, Lilli, ‘Descartes’ Dualism and the Philosophy of Mind’.
Campbell, K., Body and Mind, Ch. 3.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Concept of Sense-Perception’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych On the Soul, Ch. 1.
Churchland, P. M., Matter and Consciousness, Ch. 1, and Ch. 2, §1.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Dualism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Trialism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Descartes on "Thought"’.
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Cottingham, J., The Rationalists, Ch. 4.
Henry, M., ‘The Soul According to Descartes’.
Jolley, N., The Light of the Soul, Ch. 6.
Kenny, A., Descartes, Chs. 4 and 10.
Malcolm, N., ‘Descartes Proof that His Essence is Thinking’.
Radner, D., ‘Descartes’s Notion of the Union of Mind and Body’.
Richardson, R. C., ‘The "Scandal" of Cartesian Interactionism’.
Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Ch. 1.
Ryle, Gilbert. Concept of Mind, Ch. 1. Reprinted in Doney as ‘Descartes’ Myth’.
Smith, P., and Jones, O. R., The Philosophy of Mind, Part I.
Teichman, J., Philosophy and the Mind, Ch. 8.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 10.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes,. Ch. 6.

Modern versions of Dualism:
Foster, J., The Immaterial Self.
Swinburne, R.G., The Evolution of the Soul.

Indicative Questions: What is Descartes’ concept of substance? What is Cartesian Dualism? Is it tenable? Should we embrace the distinction between the mind and the body? Can Descartes explain how an unextended indivisible mind causally interacts with a physical body? What are Descartes’ arguments in favour of the claim that the mind and the body are utterly distinct substances? Are his arguments sound?

Essay Question: Does Descartes succeed in showing that he is essentially a mind? Can Descartes explain how an unextended indivisible mind causally interacts with a physical body?
7.- René Descartes: Mind-Body Union
Is Descartes really a ‘Cartesian Dualist’? For nearly 400 years, most commentators have argued that he indeed is. Thus, Kenny, Williams, Wilson, and Grene, to name but a few, would generally agree with Gilbert Ryle’s celebrated portrayal of Descartes’ doctrine of human beings as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’. I too used to subscribe to the standard interpretation of Descartes’ views on the mental (e.g., in my Triptich on the Soul). My own view now, (which shall appear in my forthcoming Descartes on the Substantial Union of Mind and Body) however, is that Descartes is not a ‘Cartesian Dualist’, and that the efforts to classify him as such turn out to be simplistic or inconsistent. Either the definition of ‘Cartesian Dualism’ is too loose to be of any real help in identifying Descartes’ conception of human nature as suggested by his metaphysics, or else the various elements of his philosophy are made to exhibit an unacceptable lack of coherence when forced into a ‘Cartesian Dualistic’ mould. Descartes’ views on the nature of human beings, I shall argue, involves a blending of different elements. However, rather than characterise his efforts with an ‘ism’, it is, I think, best to see it for what it is in itself, not ‘Cartesian Dualism’, but an effort to establish on theoretical grounds the applicability of metaphysics to the phenomenon of our unified nature. In these discussions we shall evaluate both the standard account of and my revisionist alternative to it.

Other Sources:
Chávez-Arvizo, E., Triptych On the Soul, Ch. 1.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Interactionism and his Principle of Causality’.
Chávez-Arvizo, E., ‘Descartes’ Concept of Sense-Perception’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Cartesian Trialism’.
Cottingham, J., ‘Descartes on "Thought"’
Cottingham, J., Descartes, Ch. 5.
Kenny, A. Descartes. Ch. 10.
Radner, D. ‘Descartes’s Notion of the Union of Mind and Body’.
Ryle, G., Concept of Mind, Ch. 1.
Williams, B. A. O., Descartes, Ch. 10.
Wilson, M. D., Descartes, Ch. 6.

Indicative Questions: Is Descartes a dualist? Is he a ‘Trialist’? Examine and explain the Sixth Meditation disanalogy between mind and body (in a living human being) and a sailor and his or her ship. Expound and critically assess Descartes’ doctrine of the substantial union of mind and body. Discuss Descartes’ doctrine of the three primitive notions. Given that both mind and body are primitive notions is it coherent to claim that the mind-body union is itself too a primitive notion? To which primitive notion does Descartes ascribe phenomena such as imagination, pain, and hunger? According to Descartes, can an angel inside a living body feel pain?

Essay Question: Discuss: ‘Nature teaches me by these feelings of pain, hunger and so on, that I am not only lodge in my body like a pilot in his ship, but that I am very closely joined to it’. Examine Descartes’ views on Mind-Body Interaction and Mind-Body Union. Does the latter shed light on the former?
Part III: John Stuart Mill
1.- John Stuart Mill: About Ethics
Although in this part of the course we shall be discussing primarily John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian theory of ethics, since our interests are strictly philosophical ones, we must begin by examining ethics or morality itself. It is common enough today to hear that a certain action is ethical(ly right). But what is ethics? Before tackling Mill head-on, we shall discuss what ethics is and what ethics is not.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 1. (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:
Brandt, R. B., Ethical Theory.
Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason.
Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking.
Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals.
Kant, I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, §2.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics.
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 7.
Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals.
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations.
Plato, Euthyphro.
Plato, Protagoras and Meno.
Rachels, J., The Elements of Moral Philosophy.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice.
Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism.

Indicative Questions: What is morality? Is it a set of prohibitions particularly concerned with sex? Is it a set of rules intended to stop people having fun? Is it what politicians tell us it is? Is it something good ‘only in theory but not in practice?’ Is it a system of rules? Is it a system of goals? Is it something intelligible only in the context of religion? Is it a divine command? Is it something relative to a particular society or individual? Is it just custom? Is it self-interest? Is it just expressions of emotions? Is it something that must necessarily be universalizable? Is it something that must necessarily be rational?

Essay Question: What is morality?
2.- John Stuart Mill: Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism
Although in this part of the course we shall be discussing primarily John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarian theory of ethics, we must note that ethics, or moral philosophy, includes investigations of very different kinds, which it is important to separate. In these lectures, we shall be discussing Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism.
Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 1, (esp. pp. 4ff.). (HANDOUT)

Other Sources:

Metaethics:
Foot, P. (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Introduction and essays by Stevenson, Moore, Frankena, and Foot.
Hare, R. M., ‘Ethics’.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 1-4.

Normative Ethics:
Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Ch. 2.
Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, Introduction.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 5-9.

Ethical Relativism:
Harrison, G., ‘Relativism and Tolerance’.
Mayo, B., The Philosophy of Right and Wrong, Ch. 6.
McNaughton, D. Moral Vision, Ch. 10.
Meiland, J. W., ‘Bernard Williams’ Relativism’.
Stace, W., ‘Cultural Relativism: Pros and Cons’.
Taylor, P., The Principles of Ethics, Ch. 2.
Unwin, N., ‘Relativism and Moral Complacency’.
Wellman, C., ‘The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity’.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Truth in Relativism’.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Ch. 9.
Williams, B. A. O., Moral Luck.
Williams, B. A. O., Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, pp. 28-51.

Indicative Questions: Metaethics: What is metaethics? What kinds of metaethical theories are there? Are the distinctions between such theories clear? What are the virtues and problems associated with subjectivism, naturalism, emotivism, intuitionism, descriptivism, and prescriptivism?
Outline the major rival views on the nature of ethical language. How are we to assess answers to questions about the nature of ethical language? Are moral judgements descriptive? Are they prescriptive? Are they universalizable?
What makes a judgement, a decision, or a course of action the ‘right’ one? Is it up to us to decide what ‘right’ or ‘good’ mean, or is it in some sense independent of us? Do other meanings of the word ‘good’ help us to appeal to objective standards to make ethical judgements? Is appeal to the ‘goals of human existence’ of any use?
Normative Ethics: Distinguish between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics. Explain the difference between ‘consequentialist’ and ‘deontological’ theories. Where does Utilitarianism fit in?
Ethical Relativism: What exactly is Ethical Relativism? What is being asserted relative to be relative to what? What is it for something to be relative to something else? What arguments are there for ethical relativism? Are they cogent? What kinds of moral divergence would provide arguments for moral relativism? Is there a connection, or a conflict, between relativism and tolerance? Detail any objections that might be made to ethical relativism.

Essay Question: What is Ethical Relativism? Is Ethical relativism true?
3.- John Stuart Mill: The Utility Principle
Theories of morality are nowadays often classified as either (a) consequentialist or (b) deontological, depending on whether they assess the moral worth of actions or classes of action (a) in terms of their results or consequences, or (b) on the basis of their conformity to some principle or principles of duty (the term ‘deontological’ comes from the Greek deon, which means obligatory). The Judaeo-Christian ethical view, for example, is firmly deontological in character, while that espoused by John Stuart Mill belongs squarely in the consequentialist tradition. Mill argues that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends not on obedience, per se, of ethical commandments, but on the results it produces, or tends to produce. The standard of goodness which Mill employs for assessing those results is Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle: actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. In these discussions we shall evaluate Mill’s arguments for his Utility Principle.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Ch. 4. (Though you should read Ch. 2 as background.)

Other Sources:
Hall, E. W., ‘The ‘Proof’ of Utility in Bentham and Mill’.
Mendelbaum, M., ‘Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Ch. 3.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §2.
Warnock, M., Ethics Since 1900, Ch. 2.

Indicative Questions: What does Mill set out to do in the first few paragraphs of the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism? Is he successful? What is the ‘fallacy of composition’? Does Mill commit the fallacy of equivocation in his attempt to prove the principle of utility? What is the ‘naturalistic fallacy’? Is it a fallacy? Does Mill commits the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in his attempt to prove the principle of utility?

Essay Question: What does Mill set out to do in the first few paragraphs of the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism? Is he successful?
4.- John Stuart Mill: Act and Rule Utilitarianism
One problem faced by utilitarianism is the worry that a consequentialist system of ethics may lead us to break important rules of conduct: if the overall balance of pleasure is the only moral standard, why should I not tell lies, for example, whenever I can maximize pleasure by doing so? Mill’s reply to this objection seems to be that utilitarians would like to instil a sense of veracity in the population, since truth-telling is generally productive of happiness. He goes on to argue, apparently, that utilitarians will not try to make each individual decision by direct reference to the greatest happiness principle, but instead will stick to rules or guidelines based on our experience of the kind of conduct that tends to maximize happiness. The resulting version of utilitarianism , now known as Rule Utilitarianism, has strongly influenced the subsequent development of moral philosophy. In these discussions, we shall analyse the distinction between Act and Rule utilitarianism, and the question of whether Mill subscribed to the later.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism. esp. Ch. 2.

Other Sources:
Foot, P. Theories of Ethics.
Mabbott, J. D., ‘Interpretations of Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Mendelbaum, M., ‘Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism’.
Smart, J. J. C., ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’.
Urmson, J. C., ‘The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill’.

Indicative Questions: What is Rule Utilitarianism? What is Act Utilitarianism? Is Rule Utilitarianism a distinct alternative to Act Utilitarianism? If so, is Rule Utilitarianism more tenable than Act Utilitarianism? Discuss arguments both for and against Rule Utilitarianism.
Can it be rational for a utilitarian to follow a rule which in general leads to happiness, even when, on a particular occasion, following it would lead to misery?
‘What if everyone did that’? Is this a genuine challange to utilitarian theories?
Was Mill an Act Utilitarian? Was Mill a Rule Utilitarian?

Essay Question: Can it be rational for a utilitarian to follow a rule which in general leads to happiness, even when, on a particular occasion, following it would lead to misery?
5.- John Stuart Mill: Utility and Pleasure
Mill did not invent utilitarianism. The notion that pleasure might provide a standard for the moral evaluation of action had been widely canvassed in ancient Greek philosophy (notably by Epicurus, 341-270 BC), and Mill’s more immediate predecessor, Jeremy Bentham, had declared that pleasure and pain were the ‘sovereign masters’ determining what an individual ought to do. While supporting Bentham’s general approach, mill was sensitive to the worry that such a doctrine might appear to advocate gross physical indulgence, and so be represented as a ‘doctrine worthy of swine’. To counter this, he distinguishes ‘higher’ from ‘lower’ pleasures. In these discussions we shall critically assess this controversial distinction.

Essential Reading:
Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, esp. Ch. 2 and second half of Ch. 4.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chs. 1-5, esp. Ch. 4. Reprinted in Warnock, M (ed.), of Mills’ Utilitarianism.

Other Sources:
Mabbott, J. D., An Introduction to Ethics, Ch. 1.
McCloskey, H. J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 3.
Quinton, A. M., Utilitarian Ethics, Ch. 3, §2.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §5-7.

Indicative Questions: Is happiness all that really matters? Discuss: ‘We can only desire pleasure’. Discuss: ‘Pleasure is the only good’. Can amounts of pleasure be measures? Critically examine Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

Essay Question: Is happiness all that really matters?
6.- John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, Rights and Justice
One of the major objections to utilitarianism is that it fails to accord with our intuitive convictions about justice. These convictions are often more certain and self-evident than the principle of utility itself. This incompatibility, between justice and utility, Mill attempts to address in Utilitarianism. In these discussion we shall deal with Mill’s account of justice and his attempts to reconcile justice and utility.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, Ch. 5.

Other Sources:
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?, Ch. 8.
Narveson, J., ‘Rights and Utilitarianism’.
Quinton, A. M., Utilitarian Ethics, Ch. 3, §5.
Rescher, N., Distributive Justice, Chs. 1 and 2.
Ryan, A., The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Ch. 12.
Skorupski, J., John Stuart Mill, Ch. 9, §13.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism, Part 1, Ch. 10.

Indicative Questions: Can the claims of justice be subsumed under the utility principle? Can utilitarianism account for the notion of a right?

Essay Question: Can the claims of justice be subsumed under the utility principle? Can utilitarianism account for the notion of a right?
7.- John Stuart Mill: General Objections and Defences
Throughout this final part of the course, we have examined some of the advantages and disadvantages of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, for example, has at least three advantages: simplicity, naturalism, and balance. And, it has at least three disadvantages: it can lead to injustice, it can be too demanding, and it is difficult to apply. In these concluding discussions we shall critically assess some arguments in favour and some objections against utilitarianism.

Essential Reading:
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chs. 1 and 2.

Other Sources:
Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons.
Quinton, A., Utilitarian Ethics.
Railton, P., ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’.
Scheffler, S., The Rejection of Consequentialism.
Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics.
Singer, P., Practical Ethics.
Smart, J. J. C., and Williams, B. A. O., Utilitarianism.
Sprigge, T. L. S., ‘Utilitarianism’.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.

Indicative Questions: Is Utilitarianism tenable? What are some of utilitarianism’s advantages and disadvantages? Utilitarianism, for example, has at least three advantages: simplicity, naturalism, and balance. Are these necessarily advantages or can they be turned against utilitarianism itself? Is utilitarianism too demanding? Is it impractical? Is it unjust? Is there a viable alternative to utilitarianism?

Essay Question: Critically assess utilitarianism.

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo
Indicative Bibliography
Socrates and Plato
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1981).
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Ayer, A. J., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Evidence’, in his Metaphysics and Common Sense.
Ayer, A. J., Metaphysics and Common Sense (London: Macmillan, 1969).
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1956).
Bambrough, R. (ed.), New Essays in Plato and Aristotle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).
Bluck, R. S., Plato’s Meno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
Burnet, J., Platonis Opera (5 vols., Oxford Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1900-7. (OCT)
Chisholm, R. M., ‘Knowledge as Justified True Belief’, in his The Foundations of Knowing. Repr. in Moser, P. K., and Van der Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge.
Chisholm, R. M., The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
Coopleston, F., A History of Philosophy (9 vols., New York: Doubleday, 1962).
Cornford, F. M., Before and After Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).
Cornford, F. M., Principium Sapientiae (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952).
Crombie, I. M., ‘Socratic Definition’, Paideia 5 (Special Plato Issue, 1976). Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato’s Doctrine (2 vols., London: 1962-1963).
Cross, P. C., and Woozley, A., Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: MacMillan, 1964).
Dancy, J., An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus (London: Routledge, 1995).
Edwards, P. (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (8 vols., London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1967.)
Fine, G., ‘Inquiry in the Meno’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Flew, A., An Introduction to Western Philosophy: Ideas and Argument from Plato to Popper (rev. ed., London: Thames and Hudson, 1989).
Gettier, E. L., ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, vol.23, 1963.
Gosling, J. C. B., Plato (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
Griffiths, A. P. (ed.), Knowledge and Belief (Oxford University Press, 1967).
Gulley, N., The Philosophy of Socrates ().
Guthrie W. C. K., A History of Greek Philosophy (6 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-1981).
Guthrie, W. K. C. (ed. and trans.), Plato’s Protagoras and Meno (Penguin: Harmondsworth: 1956).
Hall, R. W., Plato (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).
Hare, R. M., Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Honderich, T. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Irwin, T. H., ‘Plato: The Intellectual Background’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Irwin, T. H., Classical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Irwin, T. H., Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Kidd, I. G., ‘Socrates’, in Edwards, P. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Klein, J., A Commentary on Plato’s Meno (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965; repr. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Kraut, R., ‘Introduction to the Study of Plato’, in his The Cambridge Companion to Plato
Lehrer, K., Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
Lehrer, K., Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1990).
MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
Malcolm, N., ‘Knowledge and Belief’, Mind 51 (1952). Repr. in Griffiths, A. P. (ed.), Knowledge and Belief.
Matthews, G., Plato’s Epistemology and Related Logical Problems (London: 1972).
Melling, D. J., Understanding Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Moser, P. K., and Van der Nat, A. (eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987),
Mueller, I., ‘Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato.
Nakhnikian, G., ‘The First Socratic Paradox’, Journal of the History of philosophy 11 (1973), pp. 1-17. Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Nehemas, A., ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985). Repr. in Day, J. M. (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus.
Nettleship, R. L., Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London: MacMillan, 1901).
Nussbaum, M., The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
O’Hear, A., What Philosophy Is (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).
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Descartes
Adam, Charles, and Tannery, Paul (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes (rev. edn., 12 vols., Paris: J. Vrin in association with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1964-76). [Usually referred to as ‘AT’.]
Alanen, L., ‘Descartes’ Dualism and the Philosophy of Mind’, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94 (1989), 391-414.
Alanen, L., ‘Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity’, in John Cottingham (ed.), Reason, Will, and Sensation.
Aldrich, V., ‘The Pineal Gland Updated’, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 700-10; repr. in Moyal, G. J. D. (ed.), René Descartes: Critical Assessments, vol. 4.
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Course Guidelines

1.- General Advice; Assessment Criteria
Each week you are expected to attend two classes. I have given out, at the beginning of the term, a Course Syllabus (or Course Outline and Reading List). You will be asked to choose one essay question from the syllabus to write a term paper which will be marked and commented upon; the term paper counts for 20% of your final grade. Weekly paragraphs on indicative questions from the syllabus, which will be a routine class activity, count for 20% of your final mark. You will be asked to write two short yet formal essays on topics to be assigned; the short essays