Course Description

Course Syllabus

Set Texts:

Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). [ISBN: 0-521-43971-X.]

Feinberg, Joel, and Gross, Hyman (eds.), Philosophy of Law (5th ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995). [ISBN: 0-534-23988-9.]

You will need to have your own copy of each title mentioned above.  Supplementary extracts will be distributed during the course.
Some important and useful general texts and articles are:
Applied Ethics:
Baird, M., and Rosenbaum, S. (eds.), Animal Experimentation.
Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
Brody, B., Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life.
Clark, S., The Moral Status of Animals.
Clausewitz, K., On War.
Cohen, M., et al. (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility.
Feinberg, J. (ed.), The Problem of Abortion.
Foot, P., (ed.), Theories of Ethics.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives.
Hanfling, O. (ed.), Life and Meaning: A Reader.
Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine.
Nagel, T., Mortal Questions.
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean?
Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems.
Regan, T., and Singer, P., Animal Rights and Human Obligations.
Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.
Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics.
Singer, P. (ed.), Ethics.
Singer, P., Animal Liberation.
Taylor, P. (ed.), Problems of Moral Philosophy.
Taylor, P., Principles of Ethics.
Thomson, J., and Dworkin, G. (eds.), Ethics.
Thomson, J. J., The Realm of Rights.
Urmson, J. O. (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers.
Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars.
Wasserstrom, R. (ed.), War and Morality.
Philosophy of Law:
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously.
Dworkin, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Law.
Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire.
Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.
Gavison, R. (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy.
Golding, M., The Philosophy of Law.
Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law Morality and Society.
Harris, J. W., Legal Philosophies.
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law.
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality.
Hart, H. L. A. (ed.), Punishment and Responsibility.
Honderich, T., Punishment; The Supposed Justifications.
Hook, S. (ed.), Law and Philosophy.
Kelly, J. M., The Idea of Law.
Lyons D., Ethics and the Rule of Law.
Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty.
Mill, J. S., Essay on Bentham.
Morris, H. (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility.
Murphy, J. G., and Coleman, J. L., Philosophy of Law.
Posner, R. A., The Problems of Jurisprudence.
Riddall, J. G., Jurisprudence.
Summers, R. S. (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Summers, R. S. (ed.), More Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Thomson, J. J., and Dworkin, R. (eds.), Ethics.
Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.

Course Outline and Reading List:
Part I: Applied Ethics

1.- Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism
Although in the first part of the course we shall be discussing primarily applied ethics, we must note that ethics, or moral philosophy, includes investigations of very different kinds, which it is important to separate. In the initial discussions, we shall be examining Normative Ethics, Metaethics, and Relativism.
Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 1.

Other Sources:
Metaethics:
Foot, P. (ed.), Theories of Ethics, ‘Introduction’ and essays by Stevenson, Moore, Frankena, and Foot.
Hare, R. M., ‘Ethics’.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 1-4.

Normative Ethics:
Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Ch. 2.
Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, ‘Introduction’.
Mackie, J. L., Ethics, Chs. 5-9.

Ethical Relativism:
Harrison, G., ‘Relativism and Tolerance’.
Mayo, B., The Philosophy of Right and Wrong, Ch. 6.
McNaughton, D. Moral Vision, Ch. 10.
Meiland, J. W., ‘Bernard Williams’ Relativism’.
Stace, W., ‘Cultural Relativism: Pros and Cons’.
Taylor, P., The Principles of Ethics, Ch. 2.
Unwin, N., ‘Relativism and Moral Complacency’.
Wellman, C., ‘The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity’.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Truth in Relativism’.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Ch. 9.
Williams, B. A. O., Moral Luck.
Williams, B. A. O., Morality, pp. 28-51.

Indicative Questions:  Metaethics. (a) What is metaethics? What kinds of metaethical theories are there? Are the distinctions between such theories clear? What are the virtues and problems associated with subjectivism, naturalism, emotivism, intuitionism, descriptivism, and prescriptivism? (b) Outline the major rival views on the nature of ethical language. How are we to assess answers to questions about the nature of ethical language? Are moral judgements descriptive? Are they prescriptive? Are they universalizable? (c) What makes a judgement, a decision, or a course of action the ‘right’ one? Is it up to us to decide what ‘right’ or ‘good’ mean, or is it in some sense independent of us? Do other meanings of the word ‘good’ help us to appeal to objective standards to make ethical judgements? Is appeal to the ‘goals of human existence’ of any use?
Normative Ethics: Distinguish between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics. Explain the difference between ‘consequentialist’ and ‘deontological’ theories. Where does Utilitarianism fit in?
Ethical Relativism: What exactly is Ethical Relativism? What is being asserted relative to be relative to what? What is it for something to be relative to something else? What arguments are there for ethical relativism? Are they cogent? What kinds of moral divergence would provide arguments for moral relativism? Is there a connection, or a conflict, between relativism and tolerance? Detail any objections that might be made to ethical relativism.

Essay Title:  What is Ethical Relativism? Is Ethical relativism true?

2.- Equality and Discrimination
What distinguishes moral considerations from other kinds of considerations? What tells us whether someone is living in accordance with any set of ethical standards? In these discussions, we shall be examining such questions and along the way, the concepts of equality, discrimination, and partiality.
Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 2.
 

Other Sources:
Beitz, C., Political Equality.
Boxil, B., ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Preferential Treatment’.
Dworkin, R., ‘In Defense of Equality’.
Dworkin, R., ‘What is Equality?’, Parts I and II.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Chs. 6 and 12, esp. pp. 272-8.
Hill, T. E., ‘The Message of Affirmative Action’.
Honderich, T., Violence for Equality.
Nagel, T., ‘Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination’.
Nagel, T., ‘Equality’.
Nagel, T., Equality and Partiality.
Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness’.
Rwals, J., A Theory of Justice, Chs. 2 and 3.
Scheppele, K. L., ‘The Reasonable Woman’.
State v. Rusk.
Temkin, 000, ‘Inequality’.
Williams, B., ‘The Idea of Equality’.

Indicative Questions: What distinguishes moral considerations from other kinds of considerations? What tells us whether someone is living in accordance with any set of ethical standards? Does morality necessarily demands universality or impartiality? Is there a single conception of equality? What, if any, implications for distributive justice has the requirement of ‘equal respect’? What is Preference Utilitarianism? What is Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests? Is it defensible? Is the concept of Equal Basic Rights a viable alternative to Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests?

Essay Title: Give a critical assessment of Peter Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests.

3.- Our Treatment of Animals
In these discusions, we shall be focusing on our treatment of non-human animals including the moral implications of using animals as food and in experiments. We shall also be raising the issues of extending equality to animals and whether animals have rights.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 3.

Other Sources:
Baird, M., and Rosenbaum, S. (eds.), Animal Experimentation.
Clark, S., The Moral Status of Animals.
Fox, M., The Case for Animal Experimentation.
Frey, R. G., Rights, Killing, and Suffering.
Frey, R. G., Interests and Rights.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 5
Gruen, L., ‘Animals’.
Harrison, P., ‘Theodicy and Animal Pain’.
Midgley, M., Animals and Why they Matter.(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).
Regan, T., The Case for Animal Rights.
Regan, T., and Singer, P., Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Parts III and IV.
Rollin, B., Animal Rights and Human Morality.
Schwarz, R., ‘Animal Research: A Position Statement’.
Singer, P. (ed.), In Defence of Animals.
Singer, P., Animal Liberation, Chs. 1 and 6.

Indicative Questions: Is making animals suffer for human purposes morally defensible? Is suffering itself the ground for concern?
If animals were raised in pleasant conditions, allowed to live a normal lifespan, and killed in a painless way, would there still be moral objections to eating them?
Is ‘speciesism’ as morally indefensible as racism? Are there features which humans have but which non-human animals don’t have which justify us in treating them differently? What kinds of difference in treatment might thereby be justified? Do animals have rights? If so, what rights do they have?

Essay Title: Outline and critically assess the view that ‘if we think that all human beings deserve equal concern and respect despite the many important differences between them, the we are committed to the view that animals also deserve the same concern and respect in spite of the differences between them and us’.

4.- Killing, and Killing Animals
In these discussions, we shall continue our examination of animal ethics concentrating on the issue of animal killing. But first, we shall examine some views about the value of life and the wrongness of taking life in general.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Chs. 4 and 5.

Other Sources:
Clark, S. The Moral Status of Animals.
Fox, M., The Case for Animal Experimentation.
Frey, R. G., Interests and Rights.
Frey, R. G., Rights, Killing, and Suffering.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 5
Harrison, P., ‘Theodicy and Animal Pain’.
McCloskey, H. M., ‘The Right to Life’.
Midgley, M., Animals and Why they Matter.
Regan, T., The Case for Animal Rights.
Regan, T. and Singer, P., Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Parts III and IV.
Rodman, J., ‘The Liberation of Nature’.
Rollin, B. Animal Rights and Human Morality.
Schwarz, R., ‘Animal Research: A Position Statement’.
Singer, P. (ed.), In Defence of Animals.
Singer, P. Animal Liberation, Chs. 1 and 6.

Indicative Questions: What kinds of justification might there be for killing animals? Is killing animals, or making them suffer, for human ends morally defensible? What is a ‘person’? Are animals ‘persons’? Are animals replaceable? If so, what are the moral consequences, if any? If animals were raised in pleasant conditions, allowed to live a normal lifespan, and killed in a painless way, would there still be moral objections to eating them? Is ‘speciesism’ as morally indefensible as racism? Are there features which humans have but which non-human animals don’t have which justify us in treating them differently? What kinds of difference in treatment might thereby be justified? Do animals have rights? If so, what rights do they have?

Essay Title: Is killing animals, or making them suffer, for human ends morally defensible?

5.- Abortion
Few issues in moral philosophy are (and have been) as hotly debated as the taking of foetal life. The aim of these discussions is to shed some light on the abortion controversy.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 6.
Roe v. Wade.

Other Sources:
Brody, B., Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View.
Feinberg, J. (ed.), The Problem of Abortion.
Finnis, J., ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion’.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Chs. 9-12.
Goldstein, R. D., Mother-Love and Abortion: A Legal Interpretation.
Hare, R. M., ‘Abortion and the Golden Rule’.
Lockwood, M., ‘When Does a Life Begin?’.
Regan, T., The Case for Animal Rights.
Singer, P. Animal Liberation.
Thomson, J. J., ‘A Defense of Abortion’.
Thomson, J. J., The Realm of Rights, esp. pp. 288-293.
Tooley, M., Abortion and Infanticide.
Warren, M. A., ‘Abortion’ in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion To Ethics.

Indicative Questions: When does human life begins? Are there humans who are not persons? When does a person’s life begins? Since foetuses grow into people, when do they stop being foetuses and start being people? Or are they already people? Where do we draw the line and how do we judge that the line is drawn accurately? Must there be right answers to these questions?
Does a foetus have moral rights? (If you do not think it counts as a person, try asking yourself whether animals, children, tumours, or the grossly mentally impaired have rights). Are there rights of the unborn covered by such principles as: there ought to be as few unwanted children as possible? Will such a principle work in practice? Could being unwanted affect the rights of the foetus? Can a foetus be said to have preferences?
What rights do persons have over their own bodies? What are the women’s rights arguments for abortion? Is it both permissible and rational to weigh up the rights of the mother against those of the foetus?
Under what circumstances, if any, can abortion be justified? Are there cases where not aborting is wrong? Should the notion of a ‘worth-while’ life affect our judgements?

Essay Title: Under what circumstances, if any, can abortion be justified?

6.- Euthanasia
One of the main practical problems in twentieth-century ethics is the view that there are cases in which it could be justifiable to kill a person out of concern for the person’s own well-being. In these discussions we shall focus on the euthanasia debate.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 7.

Other Sources:
Bennet, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’.
Foot, P., ‘Euthanasia’.
Foot, P., The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Chs. 14, 15 and 13.
Goldman, H., ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia’.
Hooker, B., ‘Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia’.
Humphry, D., and Wickett, A., The right to Die: Understanding Euthanasia.
Kuhse, H. ‘Euthanaisa’ in Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Rachels, J., ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’.
Rachels, J., The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality.
Steinbock, B. (ed.), Killing and Letting Die.
Williams, B., ‘Which Slopes are Slippery?’

Indicative Questions: What distinctions are there to be made between the various types of euthanasia? How are they best characterised? Is there a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die? Are there types of euthanasia where the distinction is blurred?
What kind of justification could there be for euthanasia? How do we assess the request for euthanasia? What kind of objections will be raised? How should the debate be resolved?
In what ways are doctors held to be responsible for acts of euthanasia? Is there a clear divide between cases where the patient is deemed competent and those in which he or she is deemed incompetent to decide his or her fate? Does a decision on the competence or sanity of the patient (or victim) result in increased or diminished responsibility for the doctor?
If we concede that there are grounds for euthanasia, do we encounter a slippery-slope problem? Where does it lead, and can we stop sliding there?

Essay Title: Distinguish between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Is either ever justified?

7.- Our Obligations to the Needy
Large numbers of people live in absolute poverty, ‘the principal cause of human misery today’. Set over against this is absolute affluence, the standard that the majority in our society achieve. Some argue that absolute poverty exists because resources are distributed unequally. It would be possible to feed, house and clothe everyone if affluent countries transferred resources to poor ones. In these discussions, we shall be expounding and critically assessing this claim.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 8.

Other Sources:
Aiken, W., and LaFollette, H. (eds.), World Hunger and Moral Obligation.
Bennett, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’.
Cohen, L., ‘Who is Starving Whom?’.
Dower, N., ‘World Poverty’.
Dower, N., World Poverty Challenge and Response.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, see index under ‘Acts and Omissions’.
Hardin, G., ‘Lifeboat Ethics’.
Hardin, G., ‘On Not Feeding the Starving’.
Honderich, T., Violence for Equality.
Hooker, B., ‘Our Obligations to the Needy’.
O’Neill, O., The Faces of Hunger.
Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy.
Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’.
Singer, P., ‘Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument’.

Indicative Questions: Is the failure of affluent Westerners to alleviate famine in poor countries the moral equivalent of murder?
Do starving people have a right to part of one’s income? Or does one have a right to all of it? Does it make any difference that the starving people might be far away? Does their form of government matter? Do we still have an obligation to give aid if we have reason to believe that most of it will be intercepted by the wrong people? Are there other causes (e.g., family planning advice) which it would be better to support? Could a government policy of triage be justified, and if so, on what grounds?

Essay question: Is the failure of affluent Westerners to alleviate famine in poor countries the moral equivalent of murder?

8.- War
People usually find the taking of human life, with both violent means and intend to kill, morally abhorrent. However, when considering this situation in war, some people find it justifiable. In these discussions, we shall be dealing the morality of killing in war and waging war.

Essential Reading:
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 19. [HANDOUT.]

Other Sources:
Beitz, C., et al. (eds.), International Ethics.
Clausewitz, K., On War.
Cohen, M., et al. (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility.
Johnson, J., Can Modern War be Just?
Kavka G., Moral Paradoxes and Deterrence.
Kenny, A., The Logic of Deterrence.
Lackey, D., Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons.
McMahan, J., ‘War and Peace’.
Nagel, T., ‘War and Massacre’.
Narveson, J., ‘Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis’.
Teichman, J., Pacificism and the Just War.
Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars.

Indicative Questions: What counts as a just war? Can it be permissible to fight a war in self-defense even if one knows at the outset that defeat is inevitable and thus that resistance will be futile?
Is there a class of person who are morally immune from attack in war? If so, what is it about these people that makes it illegitimate to attack them?
Is it ever permissible to intend to kill an enemy soldier?
Do soldiers fighting in an unjust cause have the right to kill enemy soldiers fighting in a defensive cause? In other words, do soldiers fighting in an unjust cause retain their right to self-defense, even against those whom they are attacking unjustly?

Essay question: Under what conditions is it morally permissible to go to war? Distinguish between ‘absolute pacifism’ and ‘contingent pacifism’. Is either a justified position on the morality of war?

9.- Why be Moral?
It is common enough today to hear that we must be moral. But why be moral?

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 8.

Other Sources:
Toulmin, S. E., The Place of Reason in Ethics.
Hospers, J., Human Conduct.
Singer, M. G., Generalization in Ethics.
Hobbes, T., ‘The Natural Condition of Mankind and the Laws of Nature’.
Bradley, F. H., ‘Why Should I be Moral?’.
Prichard, H. A., ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’.
Baier, K., The Moral Point of View, Ch.7.
Gert, B., The Moral Rules, Ch. 10.
Gauthier, D. P., ‘Morality and Advantage’.

Indicative Questions: Why be moral? Should we reject the question as nonsensical?
Does the question suffer from circularity? What is moral scepticism? Is it a tenable position? Is morality a requirement for rationality? Can morality be justified in terms of desires, in terms of prudence or self-interest? Critically assess Singer’s answer to ‘Why should I be moral?’

Essay Question: Why be moral?
10.- The Meaning of Life
Philosophical questions about the meaning of life seem to be the sort of questions that give philosophy a bad name. Is this view justified or can philosopher meaningfully ponder on life’s meaning?

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 12 (Ch. 10 of 1st ed.).

Other Sources:
Britton, K., Philosophy and the Meaning of Life.
Taylor, R., Good and Evil, Ch 18.
Wiggins, D., ‘Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life’.
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations, Ch. 6.
Hanfling, O. (ed.), Life and Meaning.

Indicative Questions: Is it sensible to ask ‘What is the meaning of Life?’ Is it a philosophical question? What kinds of things could be candidates for being the meaning of life? Does being a good person have anything to do with life’s having a meaning? Discus: ‘Death . . . is . . . of no concern to us; for while we exist death is not present, and when death is present we no longer exist’ (Epicurus). Assuming that further life would always be worth living, is it always worse to die earlier rather than later? Would immortality be desirable? Assuming that you will die at some particular fixed time, do you have as much reason to regret that you were not born ten years earlier as you do to regret that you will not die in ten years time? Can one harm or benefit the death?

Essay title: Does life has a meaning?

Part II: Philosophy of Law
So far, we’ve discussed issues in what I called ‘applied normative ethics’. We’ve asked, ‘Under what conditions is it morally permissible to do so-and-so’, where ‘so-and-so’ might be: making animals suffer, or killing them, or having an abortion, or administering euthanasia. But there is another set of questions about all these issues, practical questions about what we can and should do once we are armed with our moral conclusions. Some of these questions pertain to what laws we ought to have, rather than what is morally right or wrong. It’s this class of questions we shall deal with in this part of the course.
1.- Law and Morality
What is the interrelationship between law and morality? This question shall be the main focus of these discussions.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 11.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, esp. Ch. 1.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and Contemporary Social Reality’.
Wolfenden, J., et al., Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution.

Other Sources:
Brown, D. G., ‘Mill on Liberty and Morality’.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and Contemporary Social Reality’.
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals, esp. Chs. 1, 6, and 7.
Dworkin, R., ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Ch. 10.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch. 10.
Feinberg, J., ‘Legal Moralism and Free-Floating Evils’.
Feinberg, J., Social Philosophy, Chs. 2-3.
Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.
Feinberg, J.,’Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate’.
Golding, 000, Philosophy of Law, Ch. 3.
Gray, J., Mill on Liberty.
Harris, Legal Philosophies,Ch. 10.
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Immorality and Treason’.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality’.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘The Enforcement of Morality’.
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1963), Chs. 1-2.
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, Chs. 8 and 9.
Hart, H. L. A., The Legal Enforcement of Morality.
Hughes, G., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’.
Lloyd, D., The Idea of Law, Ch. 3.
Mitchell, B., Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society, Chs. 1 and 2, and passim.
Neu, J., ‘What is Wrong with Incest?’.
Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems.
Raz, J., ‘Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle’.
Rees, J., J. S. Mill’s ‘On Liberty’.
Singer, P., Democracy and Disobedience.
Ten, C. L., Mill on Liberty.
Wolfenden, J., et al., Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution.

Indicative Questions: Does the criminal law of contemporary Western societies embody Mill’s ‘harm principle’? What is that principle? Are there any justifications for curtailing people’s liberty that go beyond the simple private harm principle? (In what ways do contemporary legal systems go beyond this principle?) The position known as ‘Legal Moralism’ has it that one such justification is exemplified in a society’s right to protect itself, particularly against actions which are inherently immoral, even if those actions cause no harm to non-consenting parties. Is this plausible? Another doctrine is that such intervention is justified when the act in question is such as is likely to cause offence to others. Is this a sufficient reason? Can it ever be right for the state to curtail the liberty of its citizens paternalistically, that is, for their own good?

Essay Question: Should the state enforce conformity with the prevailing moral code? Or is there a realm of morality which is ‘not the law’s business’?
2.- Civil Disobedience, Law and Political Obligation
One of the most important applications of moral philosophy to practical issues has to do with the way society deals, or ought to deal, with those who do not conform to its rules. There is, first of all, the question of how much of the prevailing moral code may legitimately be enforced – an issue which concerns the proper limits of the law (and it is usually discuss in the domain of political theory). In these discussions we shall examine the interrelationship between law and political obligation, paying particular attention to the problem of civil disobedience.

Essential Reading:
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, Ch. 11.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, esp. Ch. 1.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and Contemporary Social Reality’.
Wolfenden, J., et al., Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution.

Other Sources:
Barry, B., The Liberal Theory of Justice, Ch. 4.
Bedau, H. A. (ed.), Civil Disobediece.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and Contemporary Social Reality’.
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals, Chs. 1 and 6.
Dworkin, R. ‘On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience’.
Dworkin, R. M., Taking Rights Seriously, esp. Ch. 10.
Feinberg, J., ‘Civil Disobedience in the Modern World’.
Harris, Legal Philosophies, Ch. 16.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Immorality and Treason’.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Legal and Moral Obligation’.
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality, Chs. 1-2.
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Chs. 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21.
King, Martin Luther Jr., ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’.
Locke, J., Second Treatise on Civil Government, Sections 1-6, 19, 27, 31, 47-55, 95-99, 119, 123-41, 149.
Macfarlane, L. J., Political Disobedience.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, Ch. 1.
Mitchell, B., Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society, Chs. 1 and 2.
Murphy, J. G., Civil Disobedience and Violence, Paper No. 5 (pp. 64 ff.)
Nozick, R., Anarchy State and Utopia, Ch. 5.
Pennock, J. R., and Chapman, J. W. (eds.), Political and Legal Obligation.
Plato, Crito, esp. 50b-54e.
Rawls, J., ‘Civil Disobedience’.
Rawls, J., ‘A Theory of Civil Disobedience’.
Rawls, J., ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’.
Rawls, J., Theory of Justice, Ch. 6.
Singer, P., Democracy and Disobedience.
Soper, P., ‘The Obligation to Obey the Law’.
Thoreau, H. D., ‘On The Duty of Civil Disobedience’.

Indicative Questions: Under what circumstances is one justified in breaking an existing law? Why have laws at all? Do we have an obligation to obey the law not only when we agree with it, but even when we disagree with it? What are the forms of political action, and which of them are morally acceptable? Discuss: ‘Civil disobedience in a democracy is an attempt by a minority to coerce the majority’.

Essay title: Do we have an obligation to obey the law not only when we agree with it, but even when we disagree with it? What are the forms of political action, and which of them are morally acceptable?
3.- Punishment
In these discussions we continue to examine the way society deals, or ought to deal, with those who do not conform to its rules. In the previous meetings we dealt with the question of how much of the prevailing moral code may legitimately be enforced. In the present discussions we shall prove the more immediate issue of how we treat, or ought to treat, legal offenders, and what morally justifiable aims (if any) we are pursuing through the operation of the penal system.

Essential Reading:
Feinberg, J., ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, ‘The Genealogy of Morals’.

Other Sources:
Acton, H. B. (ed.), The Philosophy of Punishment (esp. ‘Introduction’ and Papers 2, 3, 5, and 7.)
Cottingham, J. G., ‘Varieties of Retribution’.
Cottingham, J. G., ‘Just Punishment’.
Cottingham, J. G., ‘Punishment’.
Duff, A., Trials and Punishments.
Ezorsky, G. (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment.
Primoratz, I., ‘Punishment as Language’.
Feinberg, J., ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’.
Golding, M. P., Philosophy of Law, Chs. 4 and 5.
Harris, Legal Philosophies, Ch 5.
Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility, Chs. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 9.
Honderich, T., Punishment.
Lacey, N., State Punishment.
Mackie, J. L., Persons and Values, Ch. 15.
Mill, J. S., ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment’.
Morris, H., ‘Punishment for Thoughts’.
Murphy, J. G., Retribution, Justice and Therapy, Part II.
Murphy, 000., and Coleman, 000., Philosophy of Law, Ch. 3.
Norrie, A. W., Law, Ideology and Punishment.
Nozick, R., ‘Retributive Punishment’.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Ch.4.
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations, Ch 4.
Primoratz, I., Justifying Legal Punishment.
Skillen, A., Ruling Illusions, Ch. 3 (pp. 109-121).
Ten, C. L., ‘Fantastic Counterexamples and the Utilitarian Theory’.
Ten, C. L. , Crime, Guilt and Punishment, Chs. 2 and 3.
Walker, N., Why Punish?

Indicative Questions: Why do ‘we’ punish people? Can the institution of punishment be justified at all? What are the main philosophical theories of punishment? Can any one of these theories be defended against objections, or do we need to take some mixture of them? Who has the right to punish? The state alone? How did it come by this right? Can it ever be right to sentence someone to death? Can punishment be right in the absence of responsibility? Does retributivism provide a sufficient reason for inflicting punishment? Discuss: ‘To punish only for the sake of reform or deterrence, without regard to desert, violates the principle that men should be treated as ends, rather than means’. Expound and critically assess Friedrich Nietzsche’s views on punishement.

Essay Question: What is punishment? On what grounds can punishment of lawbreakers be justified?
4.- The Beginnings of Modern Jurisprudence: Early Legal Positivism
Some philosophers and legal theorists, known as Legal Positivists, argue that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. In these discussions we shall focus on the origins of this radical view.

Essential Reading:
Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.

Other Sources:
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Introduction’, to Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.
Wollheim, R., ‘The Nature of Law’.
Morison, W. L., ‘Some Myths about Positivism’.
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, Chs. 1-5.
Postema, G. J., ‘Bentham and Dworkin on Positivism and Adjudication’.
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory. passim.
Morison, W. L., John Austin.
Harrison, R., Bentham.
Postema, G. J., Bentham and the Common Law Tradition.

Indicative Questions: What was the early positivist theory of law? How is it related to Utilitarianism? Are Bentham and Austin fairly represented by H.L.A.Hart and Ronald Dworkin? Could their doctrines be re-interpreted in a more charitable and plausible way? In what directions do their analyses need to be modified?

Essay Question:
5.- Legal Positivism and the Nature of Law
In these discussions we shall continue our examination of the separation of ethics and law in Legal Positivism.

Essential Reading:
Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘A More Recent Positivist Conception of the Law’.

Other Sources:
Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’.
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, passim.
Fuller, L. L., ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law’.
Fuller, L. L., ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’.
Fuller, L. L., The Morality of Law.
Summers, R. S., ‘Prof. H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law’.
Sartorius, R., ‘Hart’s Concept of Law’.
Summers (ed.), R. S., More Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Hacker, P. M. S., ‘Hart’s Philosophy of Law’.
Skillen, A., Ruling Illusions, Ch. 3 (pp. 91-109).
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Chs. 2 and 3.
Twining, W. L., ‘Academic Law and Legal Philosophy’.
MacCormick, N., H. L. A. Hart, Chs. 2-4.
Summers, R. S., Lon L. Fuller, Chs. 2-4.
Moles, R., Definition and Rule in Legal Theory.

Indicative Questions: Is law profitably characterised as a system of rules? In what ways does Hart’s conception of law mark an advance over that of the earlier legal positivists? Are his objections to their theories unanswerable?
Evaluate Ronald Dworkin’s objections to Hart’s theory, and to positivism in general.

Essay Question: What is Legal positivism? Is it tenable?
6.- The Natural Law Tradition
In stark opposition to Legal Positivism, natural law theory – a position which dates back to Plato – argues that moral standards can justify and guide the law. In these discussions we shall evaluate this account of the interrelationship between morality and law.

Essential Reading:
Aquinas, St. Thomas, ‘The Nature and Validity of Law’. [HANDOUT.]
Kretzman, N., ‘Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquina’s Court of Conscience’.

Other Sources:
Cartwright, J. P. W., ‘Law, Morality and Excuses’.
D’Entreves, A. P., Natural Law, passim.
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, passim.
Fuller, L. L., ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law’.
Fuller, L. L., ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’.
Fuller, L. L., The Morality of Law.
Golding, M., The Philosophy of Law, Ch. 2, pp. 24-36.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’.
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, Ch. 9.
Hook, S. (ed.), Law and Philosophy, Section 2.
MacCormick, N., ‘Natural Law Reconsidered’.
MacCormick, N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Ch. 11.
MacDonald, M., ‘Natural Rights’, repr in Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.
Nagel, E., ‘On Three Arguments for Natural Law’.
Nielsen, K., ‘The Myth of Natural Law’.
O’Connor, D.J., Aquinas and Natural Law.
Strauss, L., Natural Right and History.
Summers, R. S., Lon L.Fuller, Ch.5.
Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.

Indicative Questions: Does the Natural Law tradition have anything distinctive to offer us in the understanding of the nature of law? How far is the maxim Lex injusta non est Lex implicated in that tradition? Can the Natural Law theorist explain how the moral rules which we use to guide our conduct are connected with the allegedly self-evident principles of Natural Law? Does Fuller succeed in establishing that there must be a determinate and substantial moral content to any system of law?

Essay Question: Does the Natural Law tradition succeed in establishing that any viable system of human law should have a particular aim and moral content?).
7.- Action and Purpose in Law
Intention plays a significant role in both ethics and law. (For example, ‘he or she did it intentionally or he or she acted with intent to X’.) In these discussions, we shall examine intention in moral and legal theory.

Essential Reading:
Singer, P., Practical Ethics, pp. 206-13, 224, 226-8, and 308-10.
Hart, H. L. A., and Honoré, M., ‘Causation and Responsibility’.

Other Sources:
Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘Intention’.
Bennett, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. 8.
Duff, A., Intentions, Agency and Criminal Liability.
Duff, A., ‘Intentions, Responsibility and Double Effect’.
Gavison, 000 (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, Ch. 6.
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives, Ch. 6.
Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility, Ch. 5.
Kenny, A., ‘Intention and Mens Rea in Murder’.

Indicative Questions: Expound and critically evaluate the ‘acts and omissions’ doctrine. Under what circumstances ought omissions be punished? Discuss the following account of a basis for legal responsibility: ‘Whether or not a person intends all the foreseen consequences of his or her intentional actions, he or she is at any rate responsible for them all’. Is this view plausible?

Essay Question: To what extent should we be held legally responsible for the unforeseen consequences of our actions?
OR
Discuss the importance in law of the distinction between acts and omissions. Under what circumstances should omissions be punishable?
8.- Rights
Many legal systems (most obviously that of the U.S.A.) are founded on the notion of rights. However, according to some philosophers, rights are not indispensable ( e.g., one philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, the idea of rights ‘nonsense on stilts’). In these discussions we shall examine the concept of rights, and some of their ontological, moral, legal, and political implications.

Essential Reading:
Thomson, J. J., ‘A Defence of Abortion’. [HANDOUT.]

Other Sources:
Arnold, C., ‘Analyses of Rights’.
Bentham, J., The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined.
Buchanan, A., ‘What’s So Special about Rights?’.
Cranston, M., What are Human Rights?
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, Chs. 4, 6ff.
Dworkin, R., ‘Rights as Trumps’.
Feinberg, J., Social Philosophy, Ch. 6.
Feinberg, J., ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’.
Frey, R. G., Interests and Rights.
Frey, R. G. (ed.), Utility and Rights.
Gewirth, A., Human Rights.
Gewirth, A., ‘Why there are Human Rights’.
Gewirth, A., ‘Why Rights are Indispensable’.
Harris, J. W., Legal Philosophies, Ch. 7.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence’.
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Jurisprudence and Philosophy.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Legal Rights’.
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Bentham.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Between Utility and Rights’.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Bentham’.
MacCormick, D. N., ‘Rights in Legislation’.
Regis, E. (ed.), Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism.
Ryan, A. (ed.), The Idea of Freedom.
Waldron, J., Theories of Rights, ‘Introduction’ and Chs. 7 and 8.
Waldron, J. (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts.
White, A., Rights.
Williams, G., ‘The Concept of Legal Liberty’.

Indicative Questions: Many legal systems (most obviously that of the U.S.A.) are founded on the notion of rights. Bentham, however, called the idea of rights ‘nonsense on stilts’. Is the notion of rights truly indispensable? Can rights be wholly ‘reduced’ to some other moral notion (e.g., duties)? Would that show that rights are indeed dispensable? Are rights metaphysically objectionable? Politically objectionable? What is it for a being to have a particular claim-right? Must rights be recognised in order to exist at all? What kinds of legal rights are there? Are any of them inalienable? Is utilitarianism compatible with the existence of rights? Can there be a rights-based morality? Do rights entail duties? Do duties entail rights? Is there a right to life? Do animals have rights? Who is capable of being a bearer of rights? Is there a right to property? Are there natural rights? How are rights related to interests? ‘To have a right is . . . to have something which society ought to defend in the possession of’ (Mill). Is this an adequate account of what it is to have a right?

Essay Question: Are rights indispensable? Where, if they exist, do they arise from?

9.- The Legal Philosophy of Ronald Dworkin
The contemporary philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who is Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, puts forward an influential explicitly liberal theory of law. In these closing discussions, we shall expound and critically assess his views.

Essential Reading:
Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’.
Dworkin, R., Natural Law Revisited’.

Other Sources:
Cohen, M. (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence.
Dworkin, R., ‘No Right Answer?’.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, passim.
Dworkin, R., ‘A Reply to Critics’.
Dworkin, R., A Matter of Principle, passim.
Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire.
‘Taking Dworkin Seriously’, articles by Alexan-der, and Bayles, Johns-on, Levenbook, Pos-tema, Colem-an, Smith, Haslett, and Richards.
Ten, C. L., ‘The Soundest Theory of Law’.

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo.
 Indicative Bibliography
I.- Applied Ethics
Aiken, W., and LaFollette, H. (eds.), World Hunger and Moral Obligation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
Baier, K., The Moral Point of View (New York: Random House, 1965).
Baird, M. and Rosenbaum, S. (eds.), Animal Experimentation (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991).
Beauchamp, T. L., and Childress, J. F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics (3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Bedau, H. A. (ed.) Justice and Equality (000).
Beitz, C., et al. (eds.), International Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)
Bennet, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’ in Steinbock, B. (ed.), Killing and Letting Die.
Bennett, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’, Analysis, vol 26, 1965-6, pp. 83-102. Repr. in Thomsom, J. and Dworkin, G. (eds.), Ethics.
Boxil, B., ‘Equality, Discrimination, and Preferential Treatment’ in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.
Bradley, F. H., ‘Why Should I be Moral?’, in his Ethical Studies (Oxford University Press, 1876).
Bradley, F. H., Ethical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1876).
Britton, K., Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
Brody, B., Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975).
Clark, S., The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Clausewitz, K., On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Cohen, L., ‘Who is Starving Whom?’, Theoria, vol. 47, 1981.
Cohen, M., et al. (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
Dower, N., ‘World Poverty’, in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.
Dower, N., World Poverty Challenge and Response (York: Ebor Press, 1983).
Dworkin, G., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978).
Dworkin, R., ‘In Defense of Equality’, Social philosophy and Policy (1983).
Dworkin, R., ‘What is Equality? - Part I: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981).
Dworkin, R., ‘What is Equality? - Part II: Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981).
Feinberg, J. (ed.), The Problem of Abortion (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1984).
Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law (5th ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995).
Finnis, J., ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2, 1972-3.
Foot, P., (ed.), Theories of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).
Foot, P., ‘Euthanasia’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 6, 1976-7.
Foot, P., The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’, in Steinbock, B. (ed.), Killing and Letting Die.
Fox, M., The Case for Animal Experimentation (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1986).
Frey, R. G., Rights, Killing, and Suffering (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
Frey, R.G., Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1985).
Gauthier, D. P., ‘Morality and Advantage’, Philosophical Review 76 (1967). Repr. in his Morality and Rational Self-Interest.
Gauthier, D. P. (ed.), Morality and Rational Self-Interest (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
Gert, B., The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
Glover, J., Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
Goldman, H., ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia’, Analysis 40 (1980).
Goldstein, R. D., Mother-Love and Abortion: A Legal Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
Gruen, L., ‘Animals’ in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion To Ethics.
Hanfling, O. (ed.), Life and Meaning: A Reader (Oxford: .Basil Blackwell, 1987).
Hardin, G., ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’ in Rachels, J., (ed.), Moral Problems.
Hardin, G., ‘On Not Feeding the Starving’, in Rachels, J. (ed.), The Right to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy.
Hare, R. M., ‘Abortion and the Golden Rule’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 4, 1975. Repr. in Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems.
Hare, R. M., ‘Ethics’, in Urmson, J. O. (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers.
Harrison, G., ‘Relativism and Tolerance’, Ethics, vol. 86, 1976.
Harrison, P. ‘Theodicy and Animal Pain’, Philosophy, vol. 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 79-92. Repr. in Baird, M. and Rosenbaum, S. (eds.), Animal Experimentation.
Hill, T. E., ‘The Message of Affirmative Action’, 000. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Hobbes, T., ‘The Natural Condition of Mankind and the Laws of Nature’, in Gauthier, D. P. (ed.), Morality and Rational Self-Interest.
Honderich, T., Violence for Equality (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1976).
Hooker, B., ‘Our Obligations to the Needy’ paper presented at The University of Reading, November, 1990.
Hooker, B., ‘Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia’, in LaFollette, H. (ed.), Ethics in Practice.
Hospers, J., An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (3rd ed., London: Routledge, 1988).
Hospers, J., Human Conduct (London: 1963).
Humphry, D., and Wickett, A., The right to Die: Understanding Euthanasia (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
Jacobs, J. A., Virtue and Self-Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice-Hall, 1989).
Johnson, J., Can Modern War be Just? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
Kavka, G., Moral Paradoxes and Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Kenny, A., The Logic of Deterrence (London: Firethorn Press, 1985).
Kuhse, H. ‘Euthanaisa’ in Singer, P., A Companion to Ethics.
Lackey, D., Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984).
LaFollette, H., (ed.), Ethics in Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford University Press, 1985).
Lockwood, M. ‘When Does a Life Begin?’ in Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine.
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd. ed., London: Duckworth, 1985).
MacIntyre, A., Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977).
Mayo, B. The Philosophy of Right and Wrong: An Introduction to Ethical Theory (London: Routledge, 1986).
McCloskey, H. M., ‘The Right to Life’, Mind (1975).
McMahan, J., ‘War and Peace’, in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.
McNaughton, D. Moral Vision: An introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
Meiland, J. W., ‘Bernard Williams’ Relativism’, Mind, vol. 88, 1979.
Midgley, M., Animals and Why they Matter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).
Mill, J. S., ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment’. Repr. in Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics. Repr. in countless editions.
Mill, J. S., Essay on Bentham, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions. Excerpts from Chs. 1, 2, and 4 repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions.
Nagel, T., ‘Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:4 (1973). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Nagel, T., ‘Equality’ in his Mortal Questions.
Nagel, T., ‘War and Massacre’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972). Repr. in his Mortal Questions.
Nagel, T., Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Nagel, T., Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
Nagel, T., What Does It All Mean? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Narveson, J., ‘Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis’. In Wasserstrom, R. (ed.), War and Morality.
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
O’Neill, O., The Faces of Hunger (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
Pojman, L. P., Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1989).
Prichard, H. A., ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, in his Moral Obligation.
Prichard, H. A., Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949).
Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems (3rd ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1979).
Rachels, J. (ed.), The Right to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy ().
Rachels, J., ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’, in Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics
Rachels, J., The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Raphael, D. D., Moral Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Rawls, J., ‘Justice as Fairness’, Philosophical Review (1958). Reprinted in Bedau, H. A. (ed.) Justice and Equality.
Regan, T. and Singer, P., Animal Rights and Human Obligations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
Regan, T., The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
Rodman, J., ‘The Liberation of Nature’, Inquiry, vol.20, 1977.
Rollin, B. Animal Rights and Human Morality (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981).
Schwarz, R., ‘Animal Research: A Position Statement’, Science, Letter to the Editor, 244 (June 9, 1989): 1128. Repr. in M. Baird and S. Rosenbaum (eds.), Animal Experimentation, Ch. 13.
Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
Singer, M. G., Generalization in Ethics (London: 1963).
Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Singer, P. (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972).
Singer, P., ‘Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument’, in Brown, Peter, and Shue, Henry (eds.), Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices (New York, The Free Press, 1977).
Singer, P., Animal Liberation (New York: 1975; 2nd ed., New York: Random House, 1990).
Singer, P., Practical Ethics (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Stace, W. ‘Cultural Relativism: Pros and Cons’, in Taylor, P. (ed), Problems of Moral Philosophy.
Steinbock, B. (ed.), Killing and Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentince-Hall, 1980).
Taylor, P. (ed). Problems of Moral Philosophy ().
Taylor, P., Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Belmont, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975).
Teichman, J., Pacificism and the Just War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Thomsom, J., and Dworkin, G. (eds.), Ethics ().
Thomson, J. J. ‘A Defense of Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, 1971-2.
Thomson, J. J., The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
Tooley, M., Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
Toulmin, S. E., The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
Unwin, N., ‘Relativism and Moral Complacency’, Philosophy, vol. 60, 1985.
Urmson, J. O. (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (London: Hutchinson, 1960).
Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1980).
Warren, M. A., ‘Abortion’ in Singer, P. (ed.), A Companion To Ethics.
Wasserstrom, R. (ed.), War and Morality (Belmont, CA; Wadsworth, 1970).
Wellman, C. ‘The Ethical implications of Cultural Relativity’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 7 (1963), pp. 169-184. Repr. in Problems of Moral Philosophy, Taylor, P. (ed).
Wickett, A., and Humphry, D., The right to Die: Understanding Euthanasia (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
Wiggins, D. ‘Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1976.
Williams, B. A. O., ‘The Truth in Relativism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 75, 1974-5. Repr. in his Moral Luck.
Williams, B. A. O., Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (London: Fontana/Collins, 1985; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Williams, B. A. O., Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Williams, B. A. O., Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
Williams, B., ‘The Idea of Equality’ in his Problems of the Self.
Williams, B., ‘Which Slopes are Slippery?’, in Lockwood, M. (ed.), Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine.
Williams, B., Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
II.- Philosophy of Law
Acton, H. B. (ed.), The Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan, 19000).
Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘Intention’., in White, A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Action. Repr. in Morris, H., (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, ‘The Nature and Validity of Law’, excerpts from his Summa Theologica. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law(4th ed.). Also repr. in countless editions.
Arnold, C., ‘Analyses of Rights’, in Kamenka, E., and Ehr-Soon Tay, A. (eds.), Human Rights.
Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence [1832], ed. by -Hart, H. L. A. (London: 1954). Excerpts repr. as ‘A Positivist Conception of Law’ in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Barry, B., The Liberal Theory of Justice 000
Bedau, H. A. (ed.), Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice (?000, 1969).
Bennett, J., ‘Whatever the Consequences’, Analysis (1966). Rpr, in Dworkin, R., and Thomson, J. J., (eds.), Ethics.
Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. by Burns, J. H., and Hart, H. L. A. (London: Methuen, 1970).
Bentham, J., The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined.000
Brown, D.G., ‘Mill on Liberty and Morality’, Philosophical Review 81 (1972).
Buchanan, A., ‘What’s So Special about Rights?’, Social Philosophy and Policy 2 (1984).
Cartwright, J. P. W., ‘Law, Morality and Excuses’, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982).
Cauman, L. S., et al. (eds.), How Many Questions?: Essays in Honour of Sidney Morgenbesser (Indiana: Hackett, 1983).
Cohen, M. (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984).
Cottingham, J. G. ‘Just Punishment’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary vol, 1987).
Cottingham, J. G., ‘Punishment’ in Parkinson, G. H. R. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Cottingham, J. G., ‘Varieties of Retribution’, Philosophical Quarterly (1979).
Cranston, M., What are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973).
D’Entreves, A. P., Natural Law (London: Hutchinson, 1951).
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and Contemporary Social Reality’, in his The Enforcement of Morals. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Devlin, P., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’, in his The Enforcement of Morals. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law. Also repr. in Dworkin, R. (ed.) Philosophy of Law.
Devlin, P., The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).
Duff, A., ‘Intentions, Responsibility and Double Effect’, Philosophical Quarterly (l982).
Duff, A., Intentions, Agency and Criminal Liability.
Duff, A., Trials and Punishments.000
Dworkin, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Dworkin, R., ‘A Reply to Critics’, in his Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd. ed.
Dworkin, R., ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’, Yale Law Journal (1966). Repr. in Thomson, J. J., and Dworkin, R. (eds.), Ethics.
Dworkin, R., ‘No Right Answer?’, in Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law, Morality and Society.
Dworkin, R., ‘On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience’, in Kipnis, K. (ed.), Philosophical Issues in Law.
Dworkin, R., ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.
Dworkin, R., ‘The Model of Rules’, University of Chicago Law Review 14 (1967). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Dworkin, R., A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Dworkin, R., and Thomson, J. J., (eds.), Ethics (000).
Dworkin, R., Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986).
Dworkin, R., Natural Law Revisited’, University of Florida Law Review 34 (1982). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
Ehr-Soon Tay, A. and Kamenka, E.(eds.), Human Rights (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978).
Ezorsky, G. (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment (State University of New York Press, 1972).
Feinberg, J., ‘Civil Disobedience in the Modern World’, Humanities in Society 2:1 (1979). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Feinberg, J., ‘Legal Moralism and Free-Floating Evils’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1980).
Feinberg, J., ‘Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate’, Synthese 72 (1987).
Feinberg, J., ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’, in his Doing and Deserving. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Feinberg, J., ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’, Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1970). Repr. in Flathman, R. (ed.), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy
Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law (5th ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995).
Feinberg, J., Doing and Deserving (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).
Feinberg, J., Social Philosophy ().000
Feinberg, J., Social Philosophy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (4 Vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198?000).
Feinberg, Joel, and Gross, Hyman (eds.), Philosophy of Law (5th ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995).
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
Flathman, R. (ed.), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy.
Frey, R. G. (ed.), Utility and Rights. (000?0).
Frey, R. G., Interests and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Fuller, L. L., ‘Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law’, in his The Morality of Law. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Fuller, L. L., ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review 71 (1957-8). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Fuller, L. L., The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).
Gavison, R. (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy.000
Gewirth, A., ‘Why Rights are Indispensable’, Mind 95 (1986).
Gewirth, A., ‘Why there are Human Rights’, Social Theory and Practice (1985).
Gewirth, A., Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago University Press, 1982).
Golding, M. P., The Philosophy of Law.000
Gray, J., Mill on Liberty.000
Hacker, P. M. S., ‘Hart’s Philosophy of Law’, in Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law, Morality and Society.
Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Harris, J. W., Legal Philosophies (000 Butterworths, l980).
Harrison, R., Bentham (London: Routledge, 198?000).
Hart, H. L. A., ‘A More Recent Positivist Conception of the Law’, in his The Concept of Law. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Bentham’, Proceedings of the British Academy (1962). Repr. in Summers, R. S., More Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Introduction’, to Austin, J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence
Hart, H. L. A., and Honoré, M., ‘Causation and Responsibility’ in their Causation in the Law. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Hart, H. L. A., and Honoré, M., Causation in the Law (2nd. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’, in Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Between Utility and Rights’, in his Essays on Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Repr. in Ryan, A. (ed.), The Idea of Freedom.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Immorality and Treason’, in Dworkin, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Law.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Legal and Moral Obligation’, in Melden, A. I. (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Legal Rights’, in his Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law. Also repr. in Dworkin, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Law.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality’, University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967).
Hart, H. L. A., ‘The Enforcement of Morality’ in his The Legal Enforcement of Morality.
Hart, H. L. A., ‘Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence’, in his Essays on Jurisprudence and Philosophy.
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1982).
Hart, H. L. A., Essays on Jurisprudence and Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).
Hart, H. L. A., Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Hart, H. L. A., Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).
Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1961).
Hart, H. L. A., The Legal Enforcement of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965),
Hobbes, T., Leviathan. 000
Honderich, T., Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
Hook, S. (ed.), Law and Philosophy (000 New York, 1964).
Hughes, G., ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’, in Summers, R. (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).
Kamenka, E., and Ehr-Soon Tay, A. (eds.), Human Rights (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978).
Kelly, J. M., The Idea of Law.000
Kenny, A., ‘Intention and Mens Rea in Murder’ in Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law, Morality and Society.
King, Martin Luther Jr., ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail’. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Kipnis, K. (ed.), Philosophical Issues in Law.000
Kretzman, N., ‘Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquina’s Court of Conscience’, American Journal of Jurisprudence (1988). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Lacey, N., State Punishment.000
Lloyd, D., The Idea of Law.0000
Locke, J., Second Treatise on Civil Government.000
Lyons D., Ethics and the Rule of Law.000
MacCormick, D. N., ‘Rights in Legislation’, in Hacker, P. M. S., and Raz, J. (eds.), Law, Morality and Society.
MacCormick, N., ‘Natural Law Reconsidered’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1981).
MacCormick, N., H. L. A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), Chs.2-4.
MacCormick, N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (000).
MacDonald, M., ‘Natural Rights’, repr in Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights.
Macfarlane, L. J. Political Disobedience (London: Macmillan, 1971).
Mackie, J. L., Persons and Values.000
Melden, A. I. (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (Washington University Press, 1958).
Mill, J. S., ‘Speech in Favour of Capital Punishment’. Repr. in Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics. Repr. in countless editions.
Mill, J. S., Essay on Bentham, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions.
Mill, J. S., On Liberty, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions. Excerpts from Chs. 1, 2, and 4 repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, ed. by Warnock, M. (Glasgow: William Collins, 1962). Repr. in countless editions.
Mitchell, B., Law, Morality and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).
Moles, R., Definition and Rule in Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
Morison, W. L., ‘Some Myths about Positivism’, Yale Law Journal 68, (1958).
Morison, W. L., John Austin (London: Edward Arnold, 1982).
Morris, H. (ed.), Freedom and Responsibility.000
Morris, H., ‘Punishment for Thoughts’, The Monist 49 (1965).
Murphy, J. G., Civil Disobedience and Violence.000
Murphy, J. G., Retribution, Justice and Therapy.000
Murphy, J. G., and Coleman, J. L., Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence (Westview Press, l990).
Nagel, E., ‘On Three Arguments for Natural Law’, in Cauman, L. S., et al. (eds.), How Many Questions?.
Neu, J., ‘What is Wrong with Incest?’, Inquiry 19 (1975).
Nielsen, K., ‘The Myth of Natural Law’, in Hook, S. (ed.), Law and Philosophy.
Norrie, A. W., Law, Ideology and Punishment.000
Nozick, R., ‘Retributive Punishment’ in his Philosophical Explanations. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations(Oxford: Oxford University [Clarendon] Press, 1981).
O’Connor, D.J., Aquinas and Natural Law (London: Macmillan, 1957).
Parkinson, G. H. R. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 000
Pennock, J. R., and Chapman, J. W. (eds.), Nomos, vol.12: Political and Legal Obligation (000 New York, 1970).
Plato, Crito, in Woozley, A. D. (ed.), Law and Obedience.
Posner, R. A., The Problems of Jurisprudence.000
Postema, G. J. Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198000).
Postema, G. J., ‘Bentham and Dworkin on Positivism and Adjudication’, Social Theory and Practice 5:3-4 (1980).
Primoratz, I., ‘Punishment as Language’, Philosophy 64 (1989). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Primoratz, I., Justifying Legal Punishment.000
Rachels, J. (ed.), Moral Problems: A Collection of Philosophical Essays (2nd. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
Rawls, J., ‘A Theory of Civil Disobedience in Dworkin, D. (ed.), Philosophy of Law.
Rawls, J., ‘Civil Disobedience’, in A Theory of Justice. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Rawls, J., ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’ in Hook, S. (ed.), Law and Philosophy.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University [Belknap] Press, 1971).
Raz, J., ‘Autonomy, Toleration and the Harm Principle’ in Gavison, R (ed.), Issues in Legal Philosophy.
Raz, J., and Hacker, P. M. S., (eds.), Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
Rees, J., J. S. Mill’s ‘On Liberty’.
Regis, E. (ed.), Gewirth’s Ethical Rationalism (Chicago University Press, 1984).
Riddall, J. G., Jurisprudence.000
Roe v. Wade, United States Supreme Court, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Ryan, A. (ed.), The Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Sartorius, R., ‘Hart’s Concept of Law’, in Summers (ed.), R. S., More Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford, 1971).
Singer, P. (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Singer, P., Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
Skillen, A., Ruling Illusions: Philosophy and the Social Order (Harvester Press, 1977).
Soper, P.. ‘The Obligation to Obey the Law’ in Gavison, R. (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy.
Strauss, L., Natural Right and History (000 Chicago, 1953).
Summers, R. S. (ed.), Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Summers, R. S. (ed.), More Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Summers, R. S., ‘Prof. H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law’, Duke Law Journal 4 (1963).
Summers, R. S., Lon L. Fuller (London: Edward Arnold, 1984).
‘Taking Dworkin Seriously’, Social Theory and Practice, 5:3-4 (1980).
Ten, C. L., ‘Fantastic Counterexamples and the Utilitarian Theory’, in his Crime, Guilt and Punishment. Repr. in Feinberg, J., and Gross, H. (eds.), Philosophy of Law.
Ten, C. L., Mill on Liberty.000
Ten, C. L., ‘The Soundest Theory of Law’, Mind 88 (1979).
Ten, C. L., Crime, Guilt and Punishment(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Thomson, J. J., ‘A Defence of Abortion’, in Dworkin, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Law.
Thomson, J. J. and Dworkin, G. (eds.), Ethics.
Thoreau, H. D., ‘On The Duty of Civil Disobedience’ (in most editions of Walden 000).
Twining, W. L., ‘Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of Herbert Hart’, Law Quarterly Review 95 (1979).
Waldron, J. (ed.), Nonsense Upon Stilts (London: Methuen, 1987).
Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Walker, N., Why Punish?000
White, A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Action000.
White, A. Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
Williams, G.’, The Concept of Legal Liberty’, in Summers, R. S., More Essays in Legal Philosophy.
Wolfenden, J, et al., Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (London: H.M.S.O., 1957).
Wollheim, R., ‘The Nature of Law’, Political Studies 2 (1954).
Woozley, A. D. (ed.), Law and Obedience.000
 
 

Course Guidelines

2.- Assessed Term Paper
Written work serves three functions: it aids learning, enables you to practice the skills of written communication, and helps me in the assessment of your abilities and progress. You will be asked to do one term paper of a length between 1,600 to 2,500 words – 8 to 10 double-spaced word-processed pages --  (lengths exclusive of reference and footnotes) during the course. The paper must show evidence of individual thought and must both be properly documented and have a complete bibliography. Information on the essay questions appears in the Syllabus (or Course Outline and Reading List). The paper should be handed in to me on or before the deadline which is announced in this Course Guidelines (see §3, below).
Please note that a handed-in hard-copy (i.e., a printed copy) is the only acceptable format for the paper (E.g., Computer discs are not acceptable formats; nor are submissions via fax or e-mail deemed acceptable).
Since philosophy, and writing philosophy papers, may be new to you, here are some hints on how to approach essay writing, outlining the goals you should set yourself.
Each member of the class will be required to do one essay on a topic chosen from the list. The list includes suggestions for questions you might address within the scope of the topic. Don’t just mechanically answer them in the order in which they are asked, and don’t limit yourself to answering just those questions. Answer them by incorporating your answers into an essay that you have organised.
In your essay you should try to identify the central philosophical issues and arguments raised by the text(s). What is the author’s position? What arguments does he or she give for that position? What are the premises of each argument? Are the premises true? Is it a valid argument, that is, does the conclusion actually follow from the premises?
In an essay your aim should be to show that you understand the topic and that you can give a reasoned defence of your conclusions. You will be judged on the quality (especially the intelligibility) of your arguments. Make sure that you know what you are talking about, and can give an account of it without referring to the written material.
Remember you have a reader. Always consider whether I will understand what you are writing. Take care that other readers, reading ideas for the first time, can follow. In particular, resist the temptation to race through your essay thinking ‘There is no need for me to explain this for the Professor knows what I mean, surely?’. I will not understand or enjoy reading your piece if what you actually expect me to do is to attempt to read your mind!
Don’t be afraid to admit that you haven’t made up your mind about some important point, or even that you haven’t been able to understand some crucial point in a text or lecture. Asking for help (in a prepared and structured manner) can be a very good way of revealing the depth of your thought and of your research too. If you are confused, don’t write a confused essay. Give an organized essay that explains clearly just what you find confusing.
I need not take it that any view you put forward is your own personal view. It can be useful to play the ‘devil’s advocate’, defending a view you don’t hold, or one that is unpopular.
Here are some rules of thumb for essays:
*       Write a clear and well-structured essay.
*       Use mainly simple, direct sentences.
*       Use examples to help make your points clearer.
*       Emphasize important points.
*       Try to make good use of link paragraphs.
*       Don’t be afraid to use the word ‘I’, as in ‘I think...’.
*       Make sure that your essay has a theme that can be summed up briefly.
*       Start your essay with a clear statement of your theme and an outline of your plan of attack.
*       Although you might partition and classify your subject into clearly distinguishable sections, do not do your final work in unconnected parts; write an essay well-structured and flowing from one point in the argument to the other.
*       Conclude with a brief but clear summing up of your main points.
*       Generally use the active voice (e.g., ‘Smith says that...’, not ‘It is said (written, asserted) by Smith that . . .’).
*       Try to avoid unfamiliar words.
*       When you must use unusual terms or terms that have a technical meaning, pause to define and explain them and to make sure that your reader will understand you.
You will be judged on the quality of your ideas (as reflected in your essay), and on how effective your essay was as a vehicle for these ideas. (Please see my ‘Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy’ – which was distributed at the beginning of the term -- for further guidance on philosophy essay-writing.)
 

3.- Deadline
The term paper is due on Tuesday November 23th. No deadline extensions will be given. (Warning: Dates on calendars are closer than they appear!) Papers must be handed to me in person at the beginning (i.e., within the first fifteen minutes) of class. Do not hand work directly into my mail box. NB: Students failing to submit coursework will be dismissed from the course and will receive an F mark as their final course grade.
Please note that you are required to keep both a hard copy of your paper as well as back-ups of its corresponding computer file(s). Hardware/software failures will not be considered justifiable reasons for belated submissions of work.
 

4.- Use of Literature: Reading
A good place to start reading for any philosophy essay is the appropriate article in the eight-volume Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (ed. by P. Edwards, New York & London: Collier-Macmillan, 1967). Although this is now rather old, it will usually provide a concise summary of opposing perspectives on any major topic in philosophy. It also provides references to ‘classic’ books and journal articles.
A more recent source from my own former university in England is An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (ed. G. H. R. Parkinson et al., London: Routledge, 1988). The articles here are longer and more discursive than in the Edwards encyclopaedia, but are very useful for getting perspective on a topic. This also provides further references.
The latest authoritative reference works are The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (ed. by Ted Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. By Robert Audi), and The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
Always use the literature recommended, but don’t be dismayed if you can’t get hold of all the recommended readings; a selection will suffice. You may use lecture notes, where relevant, to inform the essay, but don’t simply insert transcribed lecture notes into an essay. Always express them in your own words.
When taking courses in philosophy you will encounter two major different sorts of reading, which require different degrees of concentration and effort in order to derive from them what is intended and sought after. To carry out your assignments effectively, you should be able to distinguish between them and bring to bear the proper approach to each.
Encountering Primary Works, classics of philosophy, is at the core of a philosophy course. Unlike textbooks, their meaning is not necessarily self-evident, since they are often translated from foreign or ancient languages and frequently reflect the assumptions of cultures or ages very different from our own. Even those produced by writers of our own time and place may contain a richness of thought and imagination which takes several careful readings to begin to uncover. They are not, in short, to be memorized verbatim and taken at face value; rather, they need to be approached slowly and carefully, and may be full of surprises.
Secondary Works include works of scholarship which present original research and interpretations of the subject you are studying. They are usually written by and for academics, and may be at a level of sophistication which you haven’t generally encountered. I have tried to recommend works which may challenge you, since they require an active effort to comprehend. They are to be read for the major points, and especially for the arguments which lead to those points. Remember that articles from philosophy journals are likely to be very focused. This means that they will not necessarily give a general overall view of the subject, or take pains to introduce the subject properly, but they will often contain the depth of material you require after having introduced the topic. It is better to have read a few articles thoroughly than to have read many superficially.
Remember also that effective reading is active reading. While reading you should not regard yourself as a passive receptacle into which information is being poured. Rather, you are an active and intelligent agent who has to make an effort to make contact with the thoughts of the author. Active reading is alert reading. The words should not simply drift by your eyes, but should impress themselves on your mind so that you are aware of their meaning. If you find yourself having to ask what the text means, try paraphrasing it, repeating its meaning or argument in other words. Taking notes is a good way of following an argument, since it requires acting, condensing and paraphrasing. If you find passages which you simply cannot understand, you should mark them and ask me about them in or after the class. You should approach your reading in the context of the ideas developed in the lectures, to see how the texts complement or contradict what I say there. Seminar discussion provides you with a forum in which to test the accuracy of your understanding of what you have read, and you should present interpretations in order to get the reactions of your teacher and fellow students. Don’t be afraid of making mistakes, since texts sometimes are not clear and several conflicting readings are possible. Out of such disagreement, good discussion is often generated.
 

5.- Use of Literature: Quotations
You are encouraged to make extensive use of source materials, both primary and secondary, when writing philosophy essays, but you should be aware that all quotations should be acknowledged. A very good rule is to never use a quotation to make a point, but rather to use quotations to illustrate what you have already said in your own words. When you do quote from another author, principles of honesty, as well as of sound scholarship, require that you put such material between quotation marks and indicate the source (either in brackets, or in a footnote). When you use someone else’s idea, or point, you should always acknowledge its source. A separate bibliography at the end of the essay is also required, as well as being good practice for writing in any subject.
It is perfectly acceptable to make full use of quotations in your work; but to attempt to pass off someone else’s words as your own is plagiarism -- a serious offence. Plagiarism could result in an essay being awarded a fail mark. (Please see the John Jay College of Criminal Justice document, entitled ‘Plagiarism Policy’, which is attached at the end of the present Guidelines).
 

6.- Timing, Planning, and Structure
Start the reading soon after having decided upon an essay title. Leave some time for reflection between finishing the reading and starting to write the essay. Write a first draft. Leave ample time for revising and rewriting your essay before the deadline.
All written work needs structure. At the highest level, this means that an essay should normally have an introduction, a body and a conclusion. Each of these parts in turn should be structured.
Make a general plan of the essay first. Structure matters most in the middle section, which comprises the bulk of the essay. If you have problems structuring essays, get into the habit of dividing them into sections, and putting in section headings.
Make at least one rough draft before writing the essay. (Believe it or not, it’s easy for a teacher to tell whether essays have been drafted beforehand or not).
Feel free to discuss your essay plans with fellow students, or to let someone else read the essay before you hand it in. Always read the essay after you have written the final draft, in order to correct silly errors and prepare for your presentation. A few minutes spent just reading your own essay can pay substantial dividends in terms of marks.
 

7.- Style and Presentation
Writing philosophy is a matter of finding a balance between reporting other people’s views and expressing your own. An essay should never be just an account of what someone else thought, without any indication of your opinions. Try to present your own ideas and draw your own conclusions. Personal reflection is central to philosophy. But remember that it’s argument we’re interested in, not autobiography, so opinions must be reasoned reflections on the material, not just your ‘reactions’.
Doing a draft means that you have the opportunity to tidy up a badly presented essay. Essays should be presented in double-spaced form or with wide margins, on standard paper. This leaves ample room for me to make comments on the work. Forcing me to write my comments in a small corner of the last page does nothing to raise your mark!
Always write legibly, or type. But do not think that just because you use a typewriter or word-processor you are absolved from demands of tidiness or correct spelling. If you do have a word-processor, use a spell checker.
 

8.- The ‘Mid Term’ Examination
You are required to take a one-hour essay-style examination (no open books nor open notes are allowed during the examination) at ‘mid-term’ on the subjects covered in the lectures erstwhile. The format of the examination is as follows: you will be given two questions out of which you must answer any ONE question. As explained above, your final grade is arrived on the basis of one term paper, as well as both a ‘midterm’ and a final examinations. The ‘midterm’ examination will be marked and commented upon. This exam is aimed at advancing your knowledge of the subject and in helping you develop rather different skills than those cultivated in the writing of outside-class essays. Both these goals are extremely important specially so in light of the fact that you must seat a comprehensive final examination. The mid-term examination is on Thursday October 28th. NB: Students failing to sit the mid-term examination will be dismissed from the course and will receive an F mark as their final course grade. Please see my ‘Advice on Philosophy Examinations’ for further guidance on examinations.
 

9.- The Final Examination
You are required to take a 2-hour comprehensive essay-style examination (no open books nor open notes allowed during the examination) at final examinations week. The format of the examination is as follows: you will be given twelve questions out of which you must answer THREE questions. As explained above, your final grade is arrived on the basis of one term paper, as well as both a ‘midterm’ and a final examinations. NB: Students failing to sit the final examination receive an F mark as their final course grade. Please see my ‘Advice on Philosophy Examinations’ for further guidance on examinations.
NB: Please take note, at once, of the final examination date by consulting the Final Examination Schedule which is printed in the current semester’s College Directory of Classes. You must seat the final examination on the date corresponding to your class period and section. No alternative examination dates will be given. Avoid vacation and other types of travel before the last day of final examinations week.
 

10.- Class Notes Handouts
At the end of every class each student will receive a substantial handout containing class notes. These handouts are not substitutes for doing the essential readings or for attending the lectures. These handouts are only aide memoires to the lectures and presuppose that you have done the essential readings. The handouts do not, on the main, contain complete and self-sufficient arguments. You cannot successfully write an essay (or prepare for the ‘midterm’ and Final examinations) just from these notes; wider reading is essential to give you a broader grasp of the topic and help you develop your own ideas and critical reactions.
These notes are simply intended as a supplement to and not a substitute for in-class note taking. Students ought to take their own notes.
Although I shall make every effort to deliver these notes both in class and free of charge, circumstances beyond my control (e.g., college budget constraints, policy or processes) might force me to seek alternative arrangements for their distribution. In the event of this occurring, students obviously will be notified.
 

11.- Attendance
You are expected to attend every class (remember, they take place two times a week) on time. Bring the relevant book or books. It’s good to get in the habit of referring to the text during discussion. Missing two classes will be regarded as a cause for concern and missing four classes will result in the student being unable to submit coursework or take the examinations.
Justified late arrivals within the first fifteen minutes of class are counted as half absences; late arrivals after the first fifteen minutes of class are registered as full absences.
Please note that all absences (e.g., justified and unjustified absences, absences due to late registration, etc.) are counted toward the total allowable absences in the course.
 

12.- Classroom Rules and Regulations
CUNY’s rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order obviously apply at all times. Additionally, eating and drinking in the classroom, walking in and out of the classroom during class, leaving the classroom before my explicit dismissal of the class, persistent tardiness, as well as in-class use of tape recorders, video cameras, cellular phones, beepers, and other electronic devices which are likely to cause nuisance, is categorically and absolutely prohibited. Any student engaging in any manner of conduct prohibited under this section shall be subject to the following range of sanctions: absent mark, warning, expulsion from class, over-all grade deduction, suspension from course.
The above prohibitions do not apply to students who due to disability, illness, or extreme hardships are forced or required to violate the said prohibitions. Such students nonetheless must request an explicit waiver from me.
 

13.- Ideal Goals and Practical Realities
The above advice represents a set of goals for you to aim at. But do not get discouraged if, in a particular week, you do not meet all the suggested standards. A short or weak essay is generally better than no essay at all, and it is nearly always better to produce something than to risk falling behind with your work program. Try to plan your time and keep up to date; experience shows that it is hard to catch up later if you fall behind. Above all, if you do get into difficulties don’t just let things slide; it’s always better to have a talk with me, and discuss any problems that may arise. Members of the faculty are here to help you, and we can only do that job if you keep the lines of communication open.
 

14.- Office Hours
Office: Tenth Avenue Building, Room 325. Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, from 12:35 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.; and from 4:35 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Please ring extension 8347 or send me an e-mail (to the following address: EChavezArvizo@jjay.cuny.edu) to make an appointment if you must see me outside these times.
 

Some Thoughts on Essay-Writing in Philosophy

2.- Bear in mind that the question asked is important for the actual writing of the essay. The question is also important for the preparatory reading; that is, you do the reading with particular questions in mind, trying to find material to help you answer these, rather than (for example) reading vaguely and generally ‘around’ the topic.

3.- One of the hardest and most important stages is sorting out the material you have compiled -- from e.g., lecture notes, reading -- for use in your essay. There is no easy way here, but note the point that the sorting out has to be governed by the plan/argument/framework you develop for the essay, so that material (e.g., ‘good points’, quotations, etc.) is selected for inclusion for a reason -- that relates to the argument of your essay -- and not simply because you’ve done a lot of work and it seems a shame to leave it out!

4.- The point about structure is important in its own right. An essay should be a developing sequence of thought, one step leading to the next.

5.- Note that it is likely to be mainly here that your own originality emerges. I imagine that most ideas, etc. you will derive from others -- e.g., lectures, books, handouts, etc.. You make these your own to the extent that you assent to them and maybe use them in your essay. What is undeniable original is the framework, the argument, the sequence of thought you come up with.

6.- A possible way of structuring your essay would be to indicate at the start, in broad outline, what you’re going to do; to make sure that each new step in the structure/argument is given a new paragraph; to make sure that the links between each step  are clear to you -- in as far as you can make them clear to the reader! -- and to conclude by reviewing where you have got to and, (if you can) drawing out any final thoughts from what has preceded.

7.- Do not plunge into writing the essay without first having got clear in broad outline what the structure is going to be!

8.- There are of course many ways of starting an essay. I think one full-proof way is to state what you consider to be involved in an answer to the question asked, what in your view is necessary to a satisfactory discussion of the topic set, with probably a brief indication of how you intent to go about it.

9.- It may be helpful to know the existence of a whole category of cliché phrases which can help you get into the essay for example:
· ‘Any discussion of the question . . . must pay attention to the following points . . .’
· ‘In examining this question/the question whether . . . I propose to/it is necessary to discuss . . .’
· ‘This question . . . raises four main issues which I propose to examine in turn . . .’
· ‘The statement that . . . (title of the essay) . . . is in some ways ambiguous and a first step must be to attempt to clarify what it involves . . .’.

10.- Points (8) and (9) above, obviously, indicate only possibilities; but however you decide to start your essay I think it should be clear, concise, and ‘businesslike’!

11.- In a number of disciplines (perhaps those that are centrally concerned with research findings) the convention maybe not to use the first person singular -- ‘I think’, ‘It seems to me’, etc. In philosophy, what you think is important and it is entirely appropriate, desirable even, that you should use the first person singular.

12.- It is very important though also to note that it is not  sufficient to record what you think, equally, probably more, important, is that you should give reasons supporting your views, and that you should have thought carefully as to whether, and why, they are good reasons!

13.- Philosophy essays will involve references to factual matters, which it is possible to be straightforwardly right or wrong about. For example, Descartes was influenced by 16th and 17th century discoveries and ideas in astronomy and physics; Plato did draw a distinction between knowledge and right opinion.

14.- However much of philosophy is concerned with questions of value and opinion, for example, ‘should animals be used in medical research? ‘Is a foetus a person?’ Hence, much of the time, there is no straightforward right or wrong answer; often there are different possible answer, each supported by reasons; and sometimes it may be difficult to come to a fair conclusion as to what you think is the best answer.

15.- Hence philosophy essays will typically be a matter of examining different possibilities, trying to do justice to different views, trying to adjudicate between them. It is not necessarily a matter of thinking you must end up with the ‘right’ answer.

16.- N.B. If you decide to use material from books word-for-word, you should include it as a quotation and acknowledge your source.

17.- Putting things clearly --emphasised above in the reference to structure and to a step-by-step developing argument/discussion -- is also furthered by careful use of punctuation; by not having vastly long paragraphs -- do not be afraid of using paragraphs of possibly no more than one sentence if appropriate (if, for example, you want to make a link between one step and the next); it is not a bad principle to make only one main point per paragraph! It is probably a good idea to re-read to make sure you have expressed yourself clearly. Also, essays are clearer in another sense, i.e., visually, if you use paper with wide spaces allow a reasonable width of margin, and leave one line blank between paragraphs.

18.- Essays are, among other things for assessment, for you to learn something , and for you to achieve something. Also, good essays are not easy to produce! for all these reasons, you  should not assume that I am unwilling or unable to help sort out any problems that may arise!

19.- In the light of all this, you can see that the criteria used in assessing your essay will be:
· did he/she answer the question?
· was the answer clearly set out, clearly structured, with a progressing, step-by-step line of thought?
· how far has she/he given carefully thought out reasons for views and opinions expressed?
· did he/she get straightforwardly factual points right?
· was she/he aware of/was justice done to different points of view?

20.- Read the Course Guidelines for further information and thoughts on essay-writing in philosophy.

Professor Enrique Chávez-Arvizo
 

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