The naval expedition that brought the U.S. President's formal request for trade and other concessions made a profound impression on the Japanese leadership and left them in no doubt as to how much they had fallen behind the Western powers in their ability to protect their national security. Unwilling to make its own decision on how to react, the Bakufu administration took the unprecedented step of canvassing the territorial daimyo lords for their opinions on how to meet the crisis Japan now faced. The following is one of those responses that favored an aggressive posture and rejection of the American demands.
It is my belief that the first and most urgent task is for the bakufu to make its choice between peace and war . . . When we consider the respective advantages and disadvantages of war and peace, we find that if we put our trust in war, the whole country's morale will be increased and even if we sustain an initial defeat we will in the end expel the foreigner. . . . However, I propose to give here in outline the . . reasons why we must never choose the policy of peace.
[a]. . . the Americans who arrived recently, though fully aware of [the policy of exclusion], entered Uraga [in Edo Bay] displaying a white flag as a symbol of peace and insisted on presenting their written requests. Moreover, they . . fired heavy guns in salute and even went so far as to conduct surveys without permission. They were arrogant and discourteous, their actions an outrage. Indeed, this was the greatest disgrace we have suffered since the dawn of history. . . . The foreigners, having thus ignored our prohibition and penetrated our waters, . . threatening us and making demands upon us, should it happen not only that the bakufu fails to expel them but also that it concludes an agreement in accordance with their requests, then I fear it would be impossible to maintain our national [integrity as a state]. . . .
[b] The prohibition of Christianity is the first rule of the Tokugawa [the ruling shogunate] house. Public notices concerning it are posted everywhere, even to the remotest corner of every province. . . . The bakufu can never ignore or overlook the evils of Christianity. Yet if the Americans are allowed to come again this religion will inevitably raise its head once more, however strict the prohibition; and this, I fear, is something we could never justify to the spirits of our ancestors. . . .
[c] To exchange our valuable articles like gold, silver, copper, and iron for useless foreign goods like woolens and satin is to incur great loss while acquiring not the smallest benefit. The best course of all would be for the bakufu to put a stop to the trade with Holland. . . .
[d] For some years Russia, England, and others have sought trade with us, but the bakufu has not permitted it. Should permission be granted to the Americans, on what ground would it be possible [then] to refuse if Russia and the others . . request it . . .
[e] It is widely stated that the foreigners have no other [i.e., apart from trade] evil designs and that if only the bakufu will permit trade there will be no further difficulty. However, it is their practice first to seek a foothold by means of trade and then to go on to propagate Christianity and make other unreasonable demands . . .
[f] . . . If the people of Japan stand firmly united, if we complete our military preparations and return to the state of society that existed [in earlier times], then we will even be able to go out against foreign countries and spread abroad our fame and prestige. But if we open trade at the demand of the foreigners, for no better reason than that . . . men have shown fear merely at the coming of a handful of foreign warships, then it would truly be a vain illusion to think of evolving and long-range plan for going out against foreign countries. . . .
[g] I hear that all, even though they be commoners, who have witnessed the recent actions of the foreigners, think them abominable; and if the bakufu does not expel these insolent foreigners root and branch there may be some who will complain in secret, asking to what purpose have been all the preparations of gun-emplacements. . . . Since even ignorant commoners are talking in this way, I fear that if the bakufu does not decide to carry out expulsion, if its handling of the matter shows nothing but excess of leniency and appeasement of the foreigners, then the lower orders may fail to understand its ideas and hence opposition might arise from evil men who have lost their respect for bakufu authority. It might even be that bakufu control of the great lords would itself be endangered. . . .
[h] There are those who say that . . . one must recognize that peace has now lasted so long that our armaments are inadequate . . [and that] thebakufu would be forced to conclude a peace settlement and so its prestige would suffer still further damage. Hence [it is argued], the bakufu should . . placate the foreigners, meanwhile exerting all its efforts in military preparations, so that when these preparations have been completed it can more strictly enforce the ancient [exclusionary] laws. . . . However, to my mind the people here [in Edo] are temporizing and half-hearted. . . there is not the slightest chance that the feudal lords will complete military preparations, however many years may pass, unless they are set an example in military matters by the bakufu. . . . Again, relaxation of the expulsion laws was ordered in 1842 [after China's defeat by Britain in the Opium War], with the apparent object of first placating the foreigners and then using the respite to complete military preparations, but here, too, I do not think the various lords have made any particular progress in rearming in the twelve years that have since elapsed. On the arrival of [the U.S. ships under Commodore Perry], all fell into a panic . . . it shows a shameful spirit. I therefore believe that if there be any sign of the bakufu pursuing the policy of peace, morale will never rise . . . and the gun-batteries and other preparations made will accordingly be so much ornament, never put to effective use. But if the bakufu, now and henceforward, shows itself resolute for expulsion, the immediate effect will be to increase ten-fold the morale of the country and to bring about the completion of military preparations . . . Hesitant as I am to say so, only by so doing will the shogun be able to fulfill his 'barbarian-expelling' duty and unite the men of every province in carrying out their military functions. . . .
I have tried to explain in general terms the relative advantages and disadvantages of the war and peace policies. . . . In these feeble days men tend to cling to peace; they are not fond of defending their country by war. They slander those of us who are determined to fight, calling us lovers of war, men who enjoy conflict. . . . In view of our country's tradition of military courage, however, it is probable that once the bakufu has taken a firm decision we shall find no cowards among us . . . It is therefore my belief that in this question of coastal defense it is of the first importance that the bakufu pay due heed [through purchase of modern ships and guns and constructing coastal batteries]. . and that having once reached a decision it should never waver from it thereafter. . . .
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