Lenin's "April Theses"

The Tsarist autocracy in Russia, tottering after nearly three years of crippling warfare, collapsed in a few days of rioting in the streets of St. Petersburg in February 1917. It gave the opportunity to middle-class politicians, hitherto excluded from the corridors of power, to set about the establishment of a constitutional state. The great hope of enlisting the people in the quest for the democracy never before experienced by Russians was hindered from the outset by the new government’s decision to stand by its Western allies in the war against Germany, thus ignoring the universal desire to end the huge sacrifices endured by the with the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. Moreover, inactivity in advancing social progress through the distribution of land to the peasants left an opening to radical and opportunistic elements (namely, extreme socialists and revolutionaries) in their effecting a second Russian revolution in that year; one that would be led by the Bolshevik [uncompromisingly Communist] party under Lenin. The following advice was issued to his followers in April as the program that would facilitate the establishment of what would become the first Communist state .

  1. In our attitude towards the war . . . . not the slightest concession to "revolutionary defencism" [i.e., the pro-war policy of the Provisional Government established after the collapse of the tsarist regime] is permissible.
    The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: a) that the power pass to the proletariat[i.e., the urban working class] and the poor sections of the peasantry bordering on the proletariat; b) that all annexations[i.e., forced acquisition of territory in event of victory] be renounced in actual fact and not in word; c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests. . . . .
    The most widespread propaganda of this view in the army on active service must be organized.

  2. The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution--which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power m the hands of the bourgeoisie[i.e., capitalist middle-class]--to the second stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry.
    This transition is characterized, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognized rights. . ... ; on the other, by the absence of violence in relation to the masses, and, finally, by the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism.
    This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the special conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.

  3. No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be explained, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations. . . .

  4. Recognition of the fact that in most of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies[i.e., workers’ and soldiers’ councils established throughout Russia which, while recognising the authority of the Provisional government, operated also as pressure groups to further the claims of the working classes and peasants] our Party is in a minority, and so far in a small minority, as against a bloc of all the petty-bourgeois opportunist elements[reference here is to the moderate Socialist leaders or Mensheviks who dominate the Soviets] who have yielded to the influence of the bourgeoisie and convey its influence to the proletariat . . .
    It must be explained to the masses that the Soviets of Workers' Deputies are the only possible form of the revolutionary government, and that therefore our task is, as long as this government yields to the influence of the bourgeoisie, present a patient, systematic, and persistent explanation of the errors of their tactics . . .
    As long as we are in the minority we carry on the work of criticizing and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes.

  5. Not a parliamentary republic--to return to a parliamentary republic from the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would be a retrograde step--but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the country, from top to bottom.
    Abolition of the police, the army and the bureaucracy [to be replaced by reliable anti- bourgeois elements]
    The salaries of all officials, all of whom are to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker.

  6. . . . . Confiscation of all landed estates.
    Nationalization of all lands in the country, the disposal of the land to be put in the charge of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies . . . .

  7. The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank, and the institution of control over it by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. . . . . . .

  8. Party tasks:
    . . . .Change of the Party's name. Instead of "Socialial Democracy," whose official leaders throughout the world have betrayed Socialism and deserted to the bourgeoisie . . . , we must call ourselves a Communist Party. . . . .

(Ref.: Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, Vol. I, pp. 88-91)

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