As the end of the
nineteenth century drew near, Germany was embarked on a
new policy--a World Policy--of finding its 'place in the sun', as befitted a great, if relatively new,
nation. Its expansionist program envisioned a large role in world affairs and, correspondingly, the
possession of a large navy--a battle fleet--to sustain such a program. Inevitably, this potential
rivalry with Britain's overwhelming naval power, induced a certain apprehension in the latter, a
country dependent on naval superiority for her very survival in a dangerous world. Such
apprehension was well justified, as judged by the remarks of the prime mover of Germany's naval
program, Admiral Tirpitz (pictured here): "For Germany the most dangerous
naval enemy at present is England. It
is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a
political power factor" (J. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 20)Thus was initiated the great Anglo-German naval rivalry of the years preceding the outbreak of World War I, expressed in Britain's resolve not to be outmatched, but rather to stay ahead of Germany in building the new behemoths of the seas, the Dreadnoughts, despite the huge financial burden involved. The implications of this arms race are delineated by the British foreign secretary in the following speech in the House of Commons in defending the government on a vote of censure alleging the country's naval unpreparedness. The motion was defeated:
... the situation is grave . . (and) is created by the German program [of building a battle fleet]. Whether the program is carried out quickly or slowly the fact of its existence makes a new situation. When that program is completed, Germany, a great country close to our own shore, will have a fleet of thirty-three Dreadnoughts [the latest, powerful battleship type]. . . . It is true that there is not one of them in commission yet; but it is equally true that the whole program . . when completed . . will be the most powerful fleet that the world has yet seen. That imposes upon us the necessity, of which we are now at the beginning -- except so far as we have Dreadnoughts already -- of rebuilding the whole of our fleet. That is what the situation is. What we do not know is the time in which we shall have to do it....
The first thing we have to make sure of is our capacity to build. We have got to keep the situation in hand with regard to our capacity to build. If the situation is not in hand now we shall have to get it in hand, and as long as we are attending to that point of capacity to build I maintain that there is no loss of time in the action which the government are taking. What have we to do with regard to that? Take stock of the plant in the country; of the power which there is in this country to construct ships of this type in order that when we do give orders for ships they will be completed in the shortest possible time; and by that I mean not orders for one ship at a time but for a batch of ships....
As so much has been said in these debates about Germany and so much turns on German construction, I should like to review quite shortly our diplomatic relations with Germany pure and simple. We took things up when we came into office as we found them. The Algeciras conference [to resolve the confrontation between France and Germany over French influence in Morocco] was still in progress. . . During that time between us and Germany there was, owing to diplomatic engagements of which all the world knows, a period of diplomatic tension, but with the close of the conference, that came to an end, and diplomatic relations proceeded perfectly smoothly As far, therefore, as diplomatic relations with Germany are concerned, since the present government came into office there has been peaceful progression and improved relations between ourselves and Germany . .
And now as regards our future diplomatic relations with Germany, I see a wide space in which both of us may walk in peace and amity. Two things, in my opinion two extreme things, would produce conflict. One is an attempt by us to isolate Germany. No nation of her standing and her position would stand a policy of isolation assumed by neighboring powers. I should like to observe that in recent debates nothing has been more unfounded and nothing more malign in its influence than the statement that any difference of opinion that we have had with regard to the question of Austria has been due to the fact that Germany was Austria's friend. On the contrary we have carefully avoided in all our relations anything which was likely to make difficulty or mischief, directly or indirectly, between these two powers. Another thing which would certainly produce a conflict would be the isolation of England . . . attempted by any great continental power so as to dominate and dictate the policy of the continent. That always has been so in history. The same reasons which have caused it in history would cause it again. But between these two extremes of isolation and domination there is a wide space in which the two nations can walk together in a perfectly friendly way; . . .
But now I pass to my second point, which is the relations between us with regard to naval expenditure. . . The German view of their program is that it is made for their own needs, and has no reference to ours, and that if we build fifty or a hundred Dreadnoughts they will not build more, but if we cease building altogether they will not build one less. We have no difficulty in hearing that view without reproach, and just as little difficulty in saying quite frankly that our own view of our naval needs is that our expenditure is, and must be, dependent upon the German, although the German is not dependent upon ours. It is essential to us that we should not fall into a position of inferiority; it is essential that we should keep a position of superiority as regards our navy. . . . But public opinion in Germany and in the world at large increasingly measures the probable relations of England and Germany by their respective naval expenditure. An increase of naval expenditure on both sides is undoubtedly viewed by public opinion with apprehension. On the other hand, a decrease of naval expenditure will immediately produce a feeling of increased security and peace. If I was asked to name the one thing that would mostly reassure the world -- or reassure Europe -- with regard to the prospects of peace, I think it would be that the naval expenditure in Germany would be diminished, and that ours was following suit and being diminished also.
Let me follow this further. Is it possible, is there any conceivable method by which this might be brought about? Of course, various arrangements are conceivable. An agreement -- a general agreement -- to limit or reduce naval expenditure, a comparison of naval estimates year by year in advance, to see whether the modification of the one might not lead to the modification of the other; or even if those responsible, the two admiralties, might exchange information as to the figures of their naval expenditure and the progress of their building. All that is unprecedented, possibly, but so is the expenditure. . . . Remember, in Germany there is apprehension with regard to our intentions. I am constantly told . . . that one of the reasons why German public opinion is apprehensive is the fear that we may be preparing an attack upon them -- a most wild apprehension. But see how an increase of naval expenditure, how debates of this kind . . must foster these ideas in the mind of the public. . . . It is, in my opinion, no ground for complaint or reproach against the German government, that they do not enter into any arrangement [to limit naval buildup]. . . On what basis would any arrangement have to be proposed? Not the basis of equality. It would have to be the basis of a superiority of the British navy. No German, as far as I know, disputes that that is a natural point of view for us. But it is another thing to ask the German government to expose itself before its own public opinion to a charge of having cooperated to make the attainment of our views easier. That is the difficulty which it is only fair to state. As against that there is no comparison of the importance of the German navy to them, and the importance of our navy to us. Our navy to us is what their army is to them. To have a strong navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce; but as regards us-- it is not a matter of life and death to them, as it is to us. . . our army is not maintained on a scale which, unaided, could do anything on German territory. But if the German navy were superior to ours, they maintaining the army which they do, for us it would not be a question of defeat. Our independence, our very existence would be at stake. . . for us the navy is what the army is to them . . .
I will, in conclusion, submit to the House the general views on which I approach this great problem. There are those who like and those who dislike naval and military expenditure; there are those who like the martial spirit and those who dislike it. Well, sir, the martial spirit I should be the last to deny has its place, and its proper place, in the life of a nation. That the nation should take pride in its power to resist force by force is a natural and wholesome thing.... That I sympathize with entirely, but I would ask the people to consider to what consequences the growth of armaments has led? The great countries of Europe are raising enormous revenues, and something like half of them is being spent on naval and military preparations ... on what is, after all, preparations to kill each other. Surely the extent to which this expenditure has grown really becomes a satire, and a reflection on civilization. Not in our generation, perhaps, but if it goes on at the rate at which it has recently increased, sooner or later, I believe, it will submerge that civilization .
. . . . the whole of Europe is in the presence of a great danger. But, sir, no country alone can save that. If we alone, among the great powers, gave up the competition and sank into a position of inferiority, what good should we do? None whatever-- no good to ourselves, because we cannot realize great ideals of social reform at home when we are holding our existence at the mercy, at the caprice, if you like, of another nation. That is not feasible. If we fall into a position of inferiority, our self-respect is gone. . . . We should cease to count for anything among the nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left, and we did not become the conscript appendage of some stronger power. That is a brutal way of stating the case, but it is the truth. It is disagreeable that it should be so, but in matters like this I know of no safe way except to look at what is disagreeable frankly in the face, and to state it, if necessary, in its crudest form....Deeply as I feel . . the great evil of increased naval and military expenditure not only here but in Europe, . . . we must be prepared to defend our national existence.
[Ref.: British Parliamentary Debates, March 29, 1909, cols.52ff.]
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