The Serbian Government who, by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighborly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Serbia. . . . there was no room for any doubt that our honor, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Serbia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary. . . .
It was necessary to present to Serbia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Serbian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Serbia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories; . . .
. . . . From the beginning, the [Austro-Hungarian] Government met the apprehensions of the [European] Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria- Hungary and this State [viz., Serbia]. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time given to Serbia for answering our demands would have given the [Serbian] Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the interference of single Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Serbia had ordered general mobilization, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war.
The suggestion of the British Government that the settlement of the Serbian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part of the [Serbian] Government would have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Serbia. The Entente Powers [viz., France, Russia, Britain], however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria- Hungary, which were painful to Serbia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the [Serb] Kingdom would have been lost, and Serbia would have been encouraged to continue her endeavors to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary [viz., Bosnia-Herzegovina]. . . .
The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they . . . ranged themselves beside the Kingdom [of Serbia] with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula [i.e., the Balkans wars of 1912-13], had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Serbian conflict, the world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race.
There can be no doubt that the small Serbian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighboring Monarchy [Austria-Hungary]of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs [viz., Bosnia- Herzegovina], if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of [Serbia] in her struggle for the realization of the Great-Serbian projects.
In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles [Black Sea outlet], which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries.
As the realization of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the endeavor of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union [i.e., the Dual Alliance] which barred the way to the universal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the [Austro- Hungarian] Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union [of Slavic states], and to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Serbian intrigues in its frontier territories . . . In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Serbia was a catspaw which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.
The [Austro-Hungarian] Government . . . again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the [Russian Government] that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Serbian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of [Austria-Hungary]. As early as the 24th July, in the communiqué of that date, she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilized a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilization of the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan; this was a threat to the Monarchy. On the 31st July she ordered general mobilization, disregarding the repeated warnings of the [Austro-Hungarian] Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Government, which had been made on the 26th, that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures which must consist in the mobilization of the army, and that mobilization meant war.
On the 24th July the [Austro-Hungarian] Ambassador in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Serbian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Serbia. The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorized by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Serbia under her protection; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Serbian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.
. . . It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilization in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the [Russian Government] answered by mobilizing the whole of the Russian forces. . . .
Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia. They took the road pointed out by honor and duty.
Ref.: The Austro-Hungarian Red Book (From Collected Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd.7860, 1915)