The July (1914) Crisis: The British Viewpoint

Britain, as one of the great powers, was an interested onlooker of the assassination of the Archduke. As far as she could judge from the events of early July, the affair appeared to be one that could be peacefully resolved by Serbia's efforts to root out the evident anti-Austrian agitation that had troubled the relations between her and the Austro-Hungarian empire. But the Austrian government had ä card up its sleeve;" namely, the assurance of Germany that she would support Austria in whatever move she would take to settle the affair. Austria's intentions, therefore, only became clear to the Triple Entente powers (Russia, Britain, France) with the issuance of the Austrian ultimatum of July 23, almost a month after the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. Immediately, the concerned onlookers became active participants in the developing crisis.

Communication of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to the British ambassador at Paris:

July 24, l914

. . . . I told M. Cambon [French ambassador in London] . . I would say to the (German) ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it, but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia [an ally of France] had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over [i.e., when the July 23 ultimatum had expired], Austria would march into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers. I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.
He replied that it was so.
I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

[Ref.: Edmund von Mach, Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the War in Europe (Macmillan, 1916), pp. 91-2]

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