Since the public announcement of German rearmament in 1935, in defiance of the treaty of Versailles, there had been apprehension among the European states, large and small, as to Germany's intentions. That they would not be pacific was made clear in the following year with the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone that had been permanently demilitarized by the same treaty. Thus, it was felt that it would only be a question of time as to when Hitler would proceed to realize the pan-German dream of German-Austrian unity (i.e., Anschluss): after all, Hitler himself had been born in Austria. Inasmuch as the earlier aggressive moves had produced no serious retaliation from either Britain or France, it was not to be expected that the absorption of Austria under threat of invasion on March 12 (soon to be endorsed by referendum of the Austrian people) would be met by other than words of protest from the Western powers. The gravest implications of Hitler's action, however, now pointed to Czechoslovakia, France's vulnerable ally now that hope of French assistance had been dealt a death blow by the earlier remilitarization of the Rhineland zone along the Franco-German border.
. . . . His Majesty's Government [i.e., Great Britain]have throughout been in the closest touch with the situation. The (British) Foreign Secretary saw the German Foreign Minister on the 10th March, and addressed to him a grave warning on the Austrian situation and upon what appeared to be the policy of the German Government in regard to it. . . . Late on the 11th March our Ambassador in Berlin registered a protest in strong terms with the German Government against such use of coercion [i.e., the threat of invasion], backed by force, against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence. Such action, Sir Nevile Henderson [the British ambassador] pointed out, was bound to produce the gravest reactions, of which it would be impossible to foretell the issue. Earlier that day I made earnest representations in the same sense to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs . . .
I do not wish to enter into any long argument about the historical narrative of events as described by (the German Foreign Minister), but I am bound at once to refute his statement to the effect that His Majesty's Government were not within their rights in interesting themselves in the independence of Austria, and that, as in the opinion of the German Government relations between Austria and Germany are a purely internal affair, His Majesty's Government, as a third party, has no concern in them. The interest of His Majesty's Government in this question cannot, however, on any tenable ground, be denied.
In the first place, Great Britain and Austria are both members of the League (of Nations), and both were signatories, as was also the German Government, of treaties which provided that the independence of Austria was inalienable except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Quite apart from this, His Majesty's Government are, and always must be, interested in developments in Central Europe, particularly events such as those which have just taken place, if only for the reason . . . that the object of all their policy has been to assist in the establishment of a sense of greater security and confidence in Europe . . . Throughout these events His Majesty's Government have remained in the closest touch with the French Government who, I understand, also entered a strong protest in Berlin on similar lines to that lodged by His Majesty's Government. It seems to us that the methods adopted throughout these events call for the severest condemnation and have administered a profound shock to all who are interested in the preservation of European peace. . . .
. . . In appraising recent events it is necessary to face facts, however we may judge them, however we may anticipate that they will react upon the international position as it exists to- day. The hard fact is--and of its truth every hon. Member can judge for himself--that nothing could have arrested this action by Germany unless we and others with us had been prepared to use force to prevent it.
I imagine that according to the temperament of the individual the events which are in our minds to-day will be the cause of regret, of sorrow, perhaps of indignation. They cannot be regarded by His Majesty's Government with indifference or equanimity. They are bound to have effects which cannot yet be measured. The immediate result must be to intensify the sense of uncertainty and insecurity in Europe. Unfortunately, while the policy of appeasement would lead to a relaxation of the economic pressure under which many countries are suffering to-day, what has just occurred must inevitably retard economic recovery and, indeed, increased care will be required to ensure that marked deterioration does not set in.
This is not a moment for hasty decisions or for careless words. We must consider the new situation quickly, but with cool judgment. . . . As regards our defense programs, we have always made it clear that they were flexible and that they would have to be reviewed from time to time in the light of any development in the international situation. It would be idle to pretend that recent events do not constitute a change of the kind that we had in mind. Accordingly we have decided to make a fresh review, and in due course we shall announce what further steps we may think it necessary to take.
[Ref.: E. L. Woodward et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39, 3rd ser., I (H.M.S.O., 1949), pp. 44-8]
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