It was a foregone conclusion in the minds of the governments of France and
Britain that once the German union with Austria had been effected, Hitler would have as his next
goal the resolution of the problem of the German ethnic minority in Czechoslovakia, whose
northern border was now with an enlarged Germany. The ethnic Germans --some 3 million--resided
along that border in a region known as the Sudetenland. Just as Hitler had used the Franco-Soviet
pact as his excuse to remilitarize the Rhineland, so also he alleged anti-German designs in the
accession of Czechoslovakia to that pact. He could get his way by demanding autonomy for the
Sudetenland within the Czech state but, given Hitler's Pan-German dream, it was more likely he
would resort to aggressive action, via the annexation of the Sudetenland, should diplomacy fail.
Therefore, the question of how to prepare for this eventuality in a manner that would avoid war
troubled both Britain and France, most particularly the latter country which had a treaty with
Czechoslovakia promising military assistance in the event of outside aggression.
The following document illustrates the concerns of the British government which could only have
added to French concerns on how their commitments to Czechoslovakia might be fulfilled should
the worst happen.
The French Government have recently, on a number of occasions, reaffirmed in public the obligations they have assumed towards Czechoslovakia, and have asserted that those obligations would be faithfully carried out if the need arose. M. Delbos, when (French) Foreign Minister, was good enough to explain . . . to the (British) Prime Minister . . . during his visit to London . . . his conception of the operation of the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of I925 in such an event. M. Delbos said that if there were no act of aggression the treaty would not come into operation, but, if there were armed intervention by Germany, it was evident that the treaty would apply. He observed that, in practice, the matter would depend upon the gravity of the facts. . . . if the aggression were real, whatever form it took, the treaty would apply. . . .
His Majesty's Government [i.e., the British government]have given anxious consideration to the situation created by the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich, and, in particular, to the possibility of German action in Czechoslovakia similar to that already taken in Austria. They fully share the preoccupations of the French Government at the present time, and although neither the French Government nor the Czechoslovak Government have requested from them any declaration of the attitude they would adopt in the event of an unprovoked attack being made upon Czechoslovakia, His Majesty's Government have carefully reviewed their present commitments in the light of the present situation, and have earnestly considered whether it is in their power to give any further undertaking which might help to stabilize the position in Europe.
The French Government are, of course, aware of the extent of the undertakings by which His Majesty's Government are at present bound. Their obligations to Czechoslovakia are those of one member of the League (of Nations) to another. . . .
The specific obligation of His Majesty's Government to France, apart from the obligation of one member of the League to another, is that contained in the Treaty of Locarno. . . .they will accordingly come to the assistance of France in the event of an unprovoked act of aggression upon Her by Germany. His Majesty's Government wish at the same time to inform the French Government that, with a view to making further arrangements as regards the technical conditions in which these obligations should be carried out in the case of unprovoked aggression, they propose at an early date to authorize confidential communications on a technical footing between the British and French Air Staffs. . . .
These are the obligations which His Majesty's Government have assumed, and His Majesty's Government intend to abide by them . . . they cannot see their way to add to them. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the anxieties of the French Government and their wish for further assurances, but they are confident that the French Government will appreciate in their turn the reasons which have always precluded this country from entering in advance into new and more extensive commitments in respect of the European continent. His Majesty's Government have frequently had occasion to state that, for reasons connected both with domestic politics and with their association with other parts of the British Commonwealth, which preclude His Majesty's Government from surrendering their liberty of decision in advance, it is impossible for them to assume any further commitments in Europe beyond those embodied in the Treaty of Locarno . . . His Majesty's Government could certainly not go so far as to state what their action might be in the event of an attack upon Czechoslovakia by Germany. They are accordingly not in a position to undertake an obligation in advance to render military assistance to France in cases and circumstances not covered by the Treaty of Locarno.
His Majesty's Government would not, however, pretend that, where peace and war are concerned, legal obligations are alone involved, and that if war broke out it would be likely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations. It would be quite impossible to say where it might end and what Governments might become involved. The inexorable pressure of facts, revealing threats to vital interests, might well prove more powerful than formal pronouncements, and in that event it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries, besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately be involved. This is especially true in the case of two countries with long associations of friendship like Great Britain and France, which are devoted to the same ideals of democratic liberty and are determined to uphold them. . . .
It is undeniable that the military position of Czechoslovakia has been seriously weakened by the incorporation of Austria in the Reich. The absence of fortifications along the former Czechoslovak-Austrian frontier lays the heart of Czechoslovakia open to German attack. There is little hope, therefore, that military operations against Germany by the two countries which have given Czechoslovakia pledges of assistance, namely, France and the Soviet Union, could be made effective in time to prevent the military occupation of Czechoslovakia if and when Germany decided to make an attack upon her. The restoration of Czechoslovakia would therefore have to await the conclusion of a victorious campaign against Germany by those who had taken up arms in Czechoslovakia's defense. The war in any case would be likely to be a long one, and if His Majesty's Government became engaged, would not be in a position to contribute at the outset such forces as would help to secure an early victorious conclusion. Their main contribution, in the early stages of the war, would be exercise of economic pressure by means of sea power, and this, as experience has shown, is slow in operation and tardy in its effects.
His Majesty's Government feel, therefore, that every possible step should be taken both by the French Government and by His Majesty's Government to help remove the causes of friction or even of conflict by using their good offices with the Government of Czechoslovakia to bring about a settlement of questions affecting the position of the German minority. His Majesty's Government believe that it is possible to find such a solution of German minority questions as would be compatible with ensuring the integrity of the Czechoslovak State, while retaining that minority within the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. .
[Ref.: E.L. Woodward, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39, 3rd ser. I (H.M.S.O.) pp. 83-6]
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