Khrushchev's Indictment of Stalin, Feb. 24-5, 1956

Comrades! . . . . quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual, and about its harmful consequences . . . . it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessin g supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. . . . Such a belief about Stalin was cultivated among us for many years.

The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history . . . and also the role of the Central Committee [of the Communist party] . . . . Lenin . . detected in Stal in in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary General [of the party] because of the fact that Stalin was excessively rude, that he did not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he was capricious and abused his power. . . . . The negative characteristics developed steadily and during the last years [Stalin died in 1953] acquired an absolutely insufferable character. . . . The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient, transformed t hemselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.

[We must] preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts. Stalin acted . . . by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. . . . many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the c ause of communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.

It was during the period 1935 - 1937 - 1938 that the practice of mass repression through the government apparatus was born . . against the enemies of Leninism . . and subsequently against many honest Communists. . . . Stalin originated the concept "ene my of the people." . . . this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. . . . In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, "confessions" were acquired throu gh physical pressure against the accused. . . . many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the party line, became victims. . . . The formula "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating s uch individuals.

Lenin's traits--patient work with people; stubborn and painstaking education of them--were entirely foreign to Stalin. He [Stalin] discarded the Leninist method . . for that of administrative violence, mass repressions, and terror. . . . Mass arrests a nd deportations of thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation. . . . Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes wer e still in existence [a reference to the post 1917 civil war period] . . Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploit ing classes were already liquidated and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of the national economy . . . Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed V.I. Lenin. . . . .

Whereas during the first few years after Lenin's death [in 1924] party congresses and Central Committee plenums took place more or less regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. . . Wa s it a normal situation when thirteen years elapsed between the eighteenth and nineteenth party congresses . . .Even after the end of the war [after 1945] a congress was not convened for more than seven years. . . during all the years of the patriotic war [i.e., World War II] not a single Central Committee plenum took place. . . . In practice Stalin ignored the norms of party life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective part leadership. . . .

The commission [appointed to investigate Stalin's repression] has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of Socialist legality which resulted in the death of innocent pe ople. It became apparent than many party, Government and economic activists who were branded in 1937-38 as "enemies," were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists. . . . It was determined that of the 139 members an d candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the seventeenth congress, 98 persons (70%) were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-38) . . .

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military commanders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations. During th ese years repressions were instituted against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the higher military centers. During this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military exp erience in Spain and in the Far East was almost completely liquidated. . . . Many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the army saw them no more . . .

Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. . . . In the situation which then prevailed I have talked often with Nikolai Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a car, he said: " It has happened sometimes that a man goesto Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next, home or to jail." . . . . .

We should in all seriousness consider the question of the cult of the individual. We cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes . . . .