When the Bolsheviks established the first Communist state in Russia in 1918, this presaged the socialist subjection of the entire means of production of the economy-- agriculture, industry, commerce--to the control of the new revolutionary government. Such an attempt to transform overnight the entire economy in the wake of war and revolution and in the midst of the ensuing civil war in the country inevitably produced chaos and disruption as opposing armies--the Red Army of the new state and its anti-Bolshevik enemy, ravaged the countryside. By 1921, with Lenin's government victorious, it was obvious that the harsh policy (i.e., so-called War Communism) that had been adopted toward the peasants--forcible expropriation of grain supplies in order to feed the army and the towns--would have to be withdrawn, lest the regime itself lose the support of the peasantry. Thus the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) which conciliated the peasants by acknowledging the right to communal or private property safe from arbitrary exactions from the state while also allowing the reappearance of capitalism for small-scale entrepreneurs (so-called NEP-men). Needless to say, these necessary concessions in the interests of economic recovery and, perhaps, survival of the regime itself created considerable friction in the ranks of the Communist party, with the more radical elements viewing NEP as tantamount to a betrayal of the socialist ideal for which they had fought.

NEP, of course, was but a pause on the road to the future Communist utopia, and not expected to extend beyond two decades or so. But Lenin's death in 1924 provided the opportunity for factious argument among Party leaders over the issue of NEP versus a fully elaborated socialist reconstruction of the economy primarily in the interest of an industrial proletariat. During this period--the mid-1920s-- Stalin used his great influence in the Party to isolate his anti-NEP opponents, the so-called Left Opposition led by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Once this had been accomplished by 1928, Stalin took an about-turn on his hitherto neutral stance owing to a renewed crisis in agriculture, aggravated by a poor harvest, that had become apparent in the previous year. This crisis stemmed from the nature of the economy itself; backwardness, poverty and low yields in the agricultural sector coupled with a weak industrial base rooted in Russia's slow development compared to the mature industrial economies of the Western democracies. Since the greater part of the national revenue derived from agriculture, it was assumed that modernization and mechanization of this sector would offer greater grain yields and, correspondingly, revenue that could be employed to strengthen and expand the country's industrial base (Note: the prices paid by the government for grain was way below the market price). Such a process could proceed naturally over time as had occurred under capitalism in the West, but to the Party leaders of a pariah nation, menaced (as they believed) by the Western capitalist states, such a long wait would be dangerous in view of the country's weakness. Moreover, in the face of the government's price policy and the fact that few industrial goods were available for purchase by the peasants, the latter chose to sow less or, alternatively, hoard their surplus grain in anticipation of the higher prices to be obtained in the private market.

Thus arose the government's "grain procurements crisis" of 1928 and Stalin's decision to launch a crash program of industrialization that depended for success on a corresponding program of agricultural modernization. This would be realized within the next year as the famous state-directed Five-Year Plan for the Soviet economy. Meanwhile, however, the decision had been made to abolish NEP and return to what amounted to the civil war pattern of War Communism; literally, to "rob" the peasants of their grain. In this brutal campaign the ones to suffer most were the better-off peasants (i.e., the so-called kulaks who represented some 5% or so of the 25 million peasant households), though little consideration was given as to who exactly bore that status, with inevitable harsh consequences for many other peasants.

The following extract is from a speech made by Stalin to Party officials in Siberia in January 1928 which offers clear evidence of his abuse of allegedly timorous Party activists and the scapegoating of the better-off and more productive peasants in an apparent attempt to foment class warfare.

You are no doubt aware that this year our country's grain accounts show a shortage . . . Because of this the Government and the Central Committee [of the Communist party] have had to tighten up grain procurements in all regions and territories so as to cover this deficit in our grain accounts. The deficit will have to be met primarily by the regions and territories with good harvests, which will have not only to fulfill, but to overfulfill the plan for grain procurements.

You know, of course, what the effect of the deficit may be if it is not made good. The effect will be that our towns and industrial centers, as well as our Red Army, will be in grave difficulties; they will be poorly supplied and will be threatened with hunger.
Obviously, we cannot allow that. What do you think about it? What measures are you thinking of taking in order to perform your duty to your country? I have made a tour of the districts of your territory and have had the opportunity to see for myself that your people are not seriously concerned to help our country to emerge from the grain crisis . . .
You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer to engage in unbridled speculation. That is true. But the kulaks are not simply waiting for prices to rise; they are demanding an increase in prices to three times those fixed by the government. Do you think it permissible to satisfy the kulaks? The poor peasants and a considerable section of the middle peasants have already delivered their grain to the state at government prices. Is it permissible for the government to pay the kulaks three times as much for grain as it pays the poor and middle peasants . . .

If the kulaks are engaging in unbridled speculation on grain prices, why do you not prosecute them for speculation? Don't you know that there is a law against speculation--Article 107 of the Criminal Code . . under which persons guilty of speculation are liable to prosecution, and their goods to confiscation in favor of the state? . . . You say that enforcement of Article 107 [directed against speculators only when introduced in 1926] against the kulaks would be an emergency measure, that it would not be productive of good results, that it would worsen the situation in the countryside . . .. Supposing it would be an emergency measure--what of it? Why is it that in other territories and regions enforcement of Article 107 has yielded splendid results, has rallied the laboring peasantry around the Soviet Government and improved the situation in the countryside, while among you, in Siberia, it is held that it is bound to produce bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what grounds?

You say that your prosecuting and judicial authorities are not prepared for such a step.
Who is to blame for that? Obviously, it is your Party organizations that are to blame; they are evidently working badly, and are not seeing to it that the laws of our country are conscientiously observed. I have seen several dozen of your prosecuting and judicial officials. Nearly all of them live in the homes of kulaks, board and lodge with them, and, of course, they are anxious to live in peace with the kulaks. . . . Clearly, nothing effective or useful for the Soviet state is to be expected from such prosecuting and judicial officials. . . .

I propose:
a) that the kulaks be ordered to deliver all their grain surpluses immediately at government prices;
b) that if the kulaks refuse to obey the law, they should be prosecuted under Article 107 . . . and their grain surpluses confiscated in favor of the state; 25 percent of the confiscated grain to be distributed among the poor peasants and economically weaker middle peasants at low government prices . . .

You will soon see that these measures yield splendid results. and you will be able not only to fulfill, but even overfulfill the plan for grain procurements. But this does not exhaust the problem. These measures will be sufficient to correct the situation this year. But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again sabotage the grain procurements next year. . . . . it may be said with certainty that so long as there are kulaks. so long will there be sabotage of the grain procurements. In order to put the grain procurements on a more or less satisfactory basis, other measures are required.

What measures exactly? I have in mind developing the formation of collective farms and state farms. Collective and state farms are, as you know, large-scale farms capable of employing tractors and machines. They produce larger marketable surpluses than the landlord or kulak farms. It should be home in mind that our towns and our industry are growing and will continue to grow from year to year. That is necessary for the industrialization of the country. Consequently, the demand for grain will increase from year to year, and this means that the grain procurement plans will also increase.

We cannot allow our industry to he dependent on the caprice of the kulaks. We must therefore see to it that in the course of the next three or four years the collective farms and state farms, as deliverers of grain, are in a position to supply the state with at least one-third of the grain required. This would relegate the kulaks to the background and lay the foundation for the more or less proper supply of grain to the workers and the Red Army. But in order to achieve this. we must develop the formation of collective and state farms to the utmost, sparing neither energy nor resources. It can be done, and we must do it.

. . . The grain problem is part of the agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is an integral part of the problem of building socialism in our country. . . . Today the Soviet system rests upon two heterogeneous foundations: upon united socialized industry and upon individual small-peasant economy based on private ownership of the means of production. Can the Soviet system persist for long on these heterogeneous foundations?
No, it cannot. Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates in the country, the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist. Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country. . . .

What is required for that is to pass from the socialization of industry to the socialization of the whole of agriculture. . . . It implies, firstly, that we must gradually, but unswervingly, unite the individual peasant farms, which produce the smallest marketable surpluses, into collective farms [i.e., kolkhozes], which produce the largest marketable surpluses. It implies, secondly, that all areas of our country, without exception, must be covered with collective farms (and state farms) capable of replacing not only the kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers of grain to the state. It implies, thirdly, doing away with all sources that engender capitalists and capitalism, and putting an end to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism.

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