Running Head: RADICALIZATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Radicalization from the Middle East to the United States: A Comparative Study of the Radicalization Process

Carolyn Veronica Piliero

City University of New York John Jay College of Criminal Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract

On April 19, 1995 America fell victim to its first terrorist attack since Pearl Harbor (1941), when the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City was bombed. This was, and remains, the first terrorist attack on American soil committed by an American, Timothy McVeigh. Six years after the Oklahoma City Bombing the United States was hit again, this time by jihadi terrorists working to pursue the aims of Al-Qaeda. In this six-year time span our nation bore more destruction than it has ever known in its 223 years as a nation. This study will compare and contrast the differences in the radicalization process between Timothy McVeigh and the 9/11 hijackers.

 

Radicalization from the Middle East to the United States: A Comparative Study of the Radicalization Process

            It remains to be seen what, if any, these attacks have in common with each other. Although the causes of terrorism have been studied at length, there is not nearly enough research concerning how individuals become radicalized. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (Silber and Bhatt, 2007) proposes a four-stage model of radicalization (Pre-Radicalization, Self-Identification, Indoctrination, and Jihadization) that jihadi-Salafis go through prior to committing an act of terrorism. It is important to note that not all individuals who go through the radicalization process perform an act of terrorism. The four stages of radicalization are as follows:

 

·          Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before

they begin this progression.  It is their life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology.

·          Stage 2: Self-Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced

by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for this “religious seeking” is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one’s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews.

·          Stage 3: Indoctrination is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause.  That action is militant jihad.  This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a “spiritual sanctioner.”

·          Stage 4: Jihadization is the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These “acts in furtherance” will include planning, preparation and execution (p.6-7).

 

            Although not every individual or group will go through each of the stages and the stages may not occur in any specific order, the process of radicalization is generally constant for each group.

            For the purpose of this article, I am adapting all of Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) definitions by removing Islam as the basis for which the definitions were created and broadening the radicalization spectrum to include non-Muslim actors. In their article, Silber and Bhatt (2007) propose a beneficial, yet narrow, approach to the radicalization process that applies only to Muslims. Their process appears unique to the jihadi-Salafis but it is not. For this to become apparent, it is essential to remove the Muslim basis from their definitions; once this is done, non-Muslims and secular individuals can be placed into their model, making it clear that the radicalization process is not limited to Muslims and can accommodate any radicalized individual.  This is important because there is nothing inherently different between Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model of jihadi-Salafi radicalization and the process that Timothy McVeigh went through prior to blowing up the Oklahoma City Federal Building. There will be some divergences in the radicalization process between jihadi-Salafis and McVeigh. These divergences will be discussed later; however, they will not significantly impact McVeigh being incorporated into Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model.

            It is possible that Silber and Bhatt (2007) overlooked McVeigh’s example of radicalization because it occurred prior to 9/11 and deemed it irrelevant because it is history and a non-Muslim domestic terrorist attack. I disagree. By including the McVeigh case in the model both the reader and law enforcement officials (Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) intended audience) are given the opportunity to see how the lives of individuals that are considered ‘ordinary and unremarkable’ drastically change and become lives filled with violence and hate. This comparison study will place McVeigh in each of the four stages prescribed by Silber and Bhatt (2007). Jihadization, which represents the culmination of the radicalization process, will hereafter be referred to as the ‘Execution’ stage. By gaining a better understanding of who Timothy McVeigh was and how he became radicalized, it will become clear that, with the slight exception of a few details, his radicalization process fits into the model created for jihadi-Salafis.

            After the 9/11 attacks there was a push for psychologists to piece together a terrorist personality profile so that the government and the American populace could understand why the hijackers chose to commit such an extreme act of violence. It was also believed that with a terrorist personality profile it would be easier for law enforcement to know whom they should be watching. There is universal agreement across a vast number of interdisciplinary fields that there is no personality profile for terrorists.  Furthermore, individuals who commit terrorist acts are not psychotic nor does the vast majority suffer from mental illness. In fact, the majority of individuals who partake in terrorist acts are found to be “unremarkable” people. Terrorists have turned out to be the ‘boy/girl next-door’ whose lives are ordinary. Timothy McVeigh is not the exception to this finding and consequently there is little, if anything, in his formative years to prove otherwise.

Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization

            Timothy ‘Tim’ James McVeigh was born April 23, 1968 to Catholic parents Bill and Mildred ‘Mickey’ McVeigh. The McVeighs also had two daughters: Patty the eldest and Jennifer, who was the youngest of the three. The family started out in a small apartment in Lockport, New York, and would move two times in the early years of McVeigh’s life, before finally settling into a newly built ‘dream’ home on Meyer Road in Pendleton, New York (1978). The McVeigh children lived comfortably and were never without; in fact, they generally had more than their neighbors.

            It is important to note who McVeigh’s parents are, what they brought to, and thought about, the childrearing process. Bill McVeigh worked long hours but his approach was as hands-on as it could be considering he was the primary source of the family’s income. In contrast, Mickey could never get over the life she lost when she decided to marry Bill. In his autobiography, McVeigh did not offer a single happy memory of him and his mother together; as a child he seemed most concerned with pleasing his parents and making his father proud.

            Bill McVeigh is universally described as a quiet, reasonable, hard working, and stable man, who worked exceptionally hard to give his family additional comforts often taking extra shifts or working 12 hour days (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 7). Being a family-man came naturally to him whereas it was a struggle for Mickey. Mickey loved excitement and travel; she was outgoing, while Bill was more reserved and had a passion for gardening (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 11-12). Mickey dreamt of being an airline stewardess and was chronically torn between what she wanted for herself and for her family. Furthermore, she and Bill had fundamental personality differences that they would never be able to reconcile. Mickey had trouble coming to terms with the responsibilities of motherhood, while Bill constantly thought about work and always put the needs of his children first (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 10-13).

            The couple made three attempts to salvage their marriage before legally separating in 1984 (after rumors that Mickey had been unfaithful). The couple decided that the children were old enough to choose which parent they would live with; the girls did not want to be separated from each other and picked their mother and Tim stayed with his father stating “I don’t want dad to be alone” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 24).  Mickey moved during each of the couple’s separations, relocating as far as Pensacola, Florida. After their final separation, Bill McVeigh sold the family’s ‘dream’ home and moved into a smaller two-bedroom home with Tim. Bill was nervous about raising a teenager alone; he switched to the night shift so that McVeigh (16) would not be alone and unsupervised for extended periods of time (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 35). The change in hours allowed Bill to see Tim off to school in the morning and them to have dinner together in the evening (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 34-36).

            Prior to the McVeighs’ legal separation, both parents worked fulltime and often the children came home to an empty house (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 24). Tim McVeigh would later state that he “never felt that close to his parents and wished they had spent less time at work and more time with him and his sisters;” consequently the only person McVeigh says he loved is his paternal grandfather Ed McVeigh. Ed McVeigh taught his grandson the ins and outs of domestic life: rolling coins, washing and drying dishes, and cooking on the grill. The bond that McVeigh should have formed with his parents skipped a generation and was formed with his grandfather (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 26-28). Ed McVeigh taught his grandson by example and was patient with the young child, ensuring that he never taught him something new until McVeigh had grasped all of his previous lessons. It was Ed McVeigh who taught the younger McVeigh about gun safety, accountability, and respect. Both men shared a passion for guns and often went target shooting together (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 26-28). McVeigh’s “self-esteem soared when the elder McVeigh placed a rifle in his hands for Tim, the gun was nourishment for his self-esteem… he was determined to prove himself worthy of [his grandfather’s] crowning display of confidence in his character” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 27). McVeigh clearly recalls the love and admiration he felt for his grandfather, but when asked if he loved his other family members he maintains that he had a fondness for each of them but was never able to associate love with any of them (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 26).

            After his arrest and conviction for the Oklahoma City bombing, McVeigh adamantly denied that his parent’s numerous separations and reconciliations were in any way responsible for his actions. As a child, he described being frightened by their voices at night while they were fighting and that sometimes they were so angry he thought they would “kill each other” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 34). Despite this admission, McVeigh maintained that his “childhood was no better or worse than those of millions of other children…of divorced couples,” however, contrary to his protests McVeigh consistently “lashed out when the concept of working mothers and two-income families came up, he considered this a major problem in American Society” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 24-25).

 

In the past thirty years, because of the woman’s movement, they’ve taken an influence out of the household…When I came home from school, I looked for something to do. Years ago, there [would have been] a mom there who said, “Do the dishes,” or “Let’s talk about what happened at school.” Maybe even there was a Dad there. Maybe the mom said, “Well, your dad will be home in two hours. If you’re having trouble with bullies, why don’t you talk to your dad?

I can’t contribute anything I am now due to any lack of my parents’ presence in the home…but I do say that I have very few memories of interactions with my parents (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p.25-25).

 

McVeigh grew up in a dysfunctional family, and although he claims it did not effect him later in life, he grew up in a household with an emotionally detached father and a mother who was pining to live out her youth. Most children enter their adult lives with the ability to say they love more than one family member. Possibly, McVeigh felt no attachment to his parents because they were not emotionally or physically available to him. His statement is striking because it refers to what was missing from his childhood and touches on the issue of bullies; bullies would always be an area of contention for McVeigh who saw himself in a constant struggle to fight off aggressors who picked on the weak. McVeigh came to loathe bullies by the age of 10 after a larger child humiliated him in front of his father and his friend during a little league baseball game. The bully grabbed McVeigh’s cap and when he tried to retrieve it he was punched in the face, bringing McVeigh to tears. McVeigh ran to his father’s station wagon and wept while feeling shame because “the men in the McVeigh family were not supposed to cry” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 22). McVeigh’s second encounter with bullies almost resulted in a ‘swirlie’ (the process of sticking ones head in a toilet and flushing) but he managed to fight them off (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 32). This attack reinforced his hatred of bullies and would, in his later life, evolve into “a seething hatred of any person, institution, or even nation that seemed to be picking on the weak” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 77).

With the exception of McVeigh’s run-ins with bullies and his parent’s marital squabbles, McVeigh had an uneventful childhood. What neighbors remember him for is his vivid imagination and creative games. Tim played the games that are familiar to all little boys: cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, and make believe wars between good and evil. In these games Tim always represented the ‘good guy’ and fought for the weak against the mighty (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 16). In his mind he would never stop playing these defensive games; when he blew up the Murrah Building he believed he was punishing the United States government for their actions.

The only childhood friends McVeigh made were the children of his neighbors. Apart from this small group he did not appear to have many friends and in high school moved from one social group to the next. His childhood friendships ended either because they were disrupted by the McVeighs’ relocation or petered out naturally as childhood friendships often do. He was never a part of any tight knit group and his friendships became little more than sporadic social correspondence after he graduated high school.

         This is the end of McVeigh’s Pre-Radicalization stage and it is no different from the jihadi-Salafis Silber and Bhatt (2007) studied in that nothing in McVeigh’s story stands out, is striking, or even memorable. The environment McVeigh grew up in is consistent with the criteria Silber and Bhatt (2007) have established for the Pre-Radicalization stage.

“Despite the absence of a psychological profile of a likely candidate for radicalization, there is commonality among a variety of demographic, social, and psychological factors that make individuals more vulnerable to the radical message… Their gender, age, family’s social status, stage in life as well as psychological factors all affect vulnerability” (p. 22).

Throughout this stage McVeigh proves to be a likely candidate for the radicalization process because he is a male, under the age of 35, from a middle class background, has a high school diploma, no criminal background, and is highly intelligent, yet remains ‘unremarkable’ (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 22). All of the 9/11 hijackers share these common denominators with McVeigh. Furthermore, McVeigh is even more vulnerable because of his parents marital problems, his mother’s adultery and later her abandonment of her son. There is no divergence between the groups during the Pre-Radicalization stage. As McVeigh enters the Self-Identification stage, he is looking for guidance and seeking like-minded individuals (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 22).

 

Stage 2: Self-Identification

         Self-Identification, according to Silber and Bhatt (2007), is the “phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors,” begin to explore other ideologies (p. 30). Silber and Bhatt (2007) believe that this stage is often brought on by a crisis, which shakes the core beliefs of an individual resulting in their mind being open to new beliefs (p. 30). McVeigh suffered two crises during this stage. The first crisis was mild and shared by many adolescents who graduate high school not knowing what they will do next. During this initial crisis McVeigh began reading for pleasure and started to educate himself in topics that interested him. The literature that appealed to him the most was either gun related or patriotic in nature. McVeigh also began to research the freedoms the Constitution gives Americans in the Bill of Rights. McVeigh began to slowly introduce himself to gun culture, which tends to have roots in Right-Wing extremism.

         The second crisis occurred after McVeigh served in the Persian Gulf War and failed to gain entrance into the elite Special Forces (Green Berets). It had been McVeigh’s goal to join the Special Forces since he entered the military. His failure to meet this goal came at the end of his service in the Persian Gulf War. Throughout his service, McVeigh had become increasingly disillusioned and disenchanted with the armed forces and the United States government in general. He was torn over the lives of the two Iraqi soldiers he had killed and believed it was in vain, as the Persian Gulf War had posed no direct threat to the nation that he had sworn to protect.

         There is a correlation between the ideologies jihadi-Salafis are drawn to and with the literature McVeigh so readily identified. Both ideologies are radical and express particular extremist views that only appeal to those individuals prone to be sympathetic to such ideology. In the Self-Identification stage individuals open their minds up to literature and viewpoints that were previously unknown to them. Based on their lives during the Pre-Radicalization stage they will either accept or reject such rhetoric. Individuals going through the radicalization process self-identify with the literature that appeals to them the most. In the case of the jihadi-Salafis, individuals are drawn to the idea that the West is waging a war against Islam and that it is every Muslim’s obligation to fight a Jihad or ‘Holy War’ against the infidels. McVeigh believed in the freedom of man and his right to self-determination. McVeigh is familiarizing himself with literature written by individuals that advocate using force to uphold personal freedoms. Right-Wing extremists believe that the government is waging a war against the people in an effort to ban personal freedoms and, more importantly, impose anti-gun legislation. In both cases the individuals going through the radicalization process are being introduced to the idea or war and fighting on the morally superior party’s behalf. A correlation exists because extremist literature is created with one purpose in mind: establish and maintain members. The illustrations below follow McVeigh throughout the Self-Identification stage.

Crisis 1: The Plight of the Emerging Adult

         After graduating high school in 1986, McVeigh did not plan on attending college despite the fact that he had been awarded a $500 per year scholarship based on his high IQ. In his father’s opinion, McVeigh spent the immediate days after his graduation “laying on the couch” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 42). Although during this time McVeigh claims he was “deep in thought” contemplating what would be next for him (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 42). For the first time in his life McVeigh began to educate himself. He thought about what appealed to him most: guns, the outdoors, and exploring in his car. It is presumed that around this time he realized that he believed heavily in the freedoms the American forefathers fought for during the Revolutionary War. This belief in freedom “served as his guiding principal, as the value he loved most of all,” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 42) and is what moved McVeigh to research the Second Amendment, the ‘Right to Bear Arms.’

         The older McVeigh appealed to his son after his high school graduation to “consider the bread and butter issues of life” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 42); he wanted McVeigh to utilize the scholarship he had won and get a college education. With some encouragement McVeigh enrolled at Bryant and Stratton for a two-year Associate’s degree as a computer systems analyst. Shortly after enrolling, McVeigh became upset when he realized that Bryant and Stratton had incorporated a liberal arts curriculum into their computer analysis program (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 43). McVeigh had just finished high school and he was adamant that he did not want to return to the subjects that had “bored” him throughout his youth (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 43). McVeigh stayed at the institution long enough to take the school’s standardized mathematics exam. He found the questions easy and breezed through the test in 20 minutes, receiving a 99 on his exam and achieving the highest grade in the school’s history (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 42). Regardless of his exam grade, McVeigh dropped out of college claiming that he knew more than his teachers: “I’m smart, he thought. I don’t need a piece of paper to tell me I’m smart. I don’t need to pay for a diploma” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 43). He would later regret this stance.

         After dropping out of college, McVeigh doubled his efforts to educate himself, falling deeper into the literature of gun culture. After seeing The Turner Diaries advertised on the back of an issue of Soldier of Fortune magazine, McVeigh mailed away for the book, believing it was a work that advocated ‘gun-rights.’ The Turner Diaries is written under the pen name Andrew Macdonald, who is in actuality William L. Pierce the former American Nazi Party official. The book follows the story of Earl Turner, a man who is fighting for his right to bear arms against an increasingly repressive government who is trying to do away with civil liberties. Turner and his group decide to take up arms and fight back against the government, which is oppressing them. The story ends with the FBI building in Washington D.C. being bombed by Turner and his group. For Turner this is a suicide mission and with the fall of the ‘System’ he becomes a martyr. The book begins years after the bombing took place and recounts the story of the heroic Turner, told through his diary entries. Turner is immortalized in the book as a heroic man who freed the country from an oppressive regime. 

         After reading The Turner Diaries, McVeigh believed that it was possible for a similar scenario to occur and that the American government was currently moving towards abolishing the people’s right to bear arms. The Turner Diaries is not a book that simply advocates gun rights, rather, it is heavily ridden with anti-Semitic rhetoric and advocates killing Jews, blacks, and ‘race traitors.’ McVeigh denies that he was attracted to the book based on its racial content; he maintains that he gave the book to close friends because it was a work about gun rights. During this time McVeigh began to invest in expensive guns, which he could barter if the nation’s currency fell flat. This became a very realistic possibility for McVeigh once he learned that the U.S. dollar was no longer backed by the gold standard.

         Abruptly, McVeigh told his father he was joining the army and left the following day (May of 1988). Again, McVeigh excelled on the army’s aptitude exams and had his choice between any of the army’s prestigious branches (Navy, Air Force, Marines, intelligence), yet he chose to become a member of the infantry. He believed the infantry would allow him to improve his advanced marksmanship, enhance his survival skills, and possibly help release his ‘restless energy;’ the unlimited ammunition and access to elite weapons also appealed to McVeigh (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 59).

         McVeigh excelled while in boot camp, taking pleasure in the tasks other unit members hated (long marches, the grueling and oppressive heat of the south, and crawling through the dirt under barbed wire). Consequently, he was the fastest soldier with the best shot and knew the army’s weapon and procedure manuals better than some of his superiors. McVeigh was often the first cadet to volunteer for any assignment (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 63-64). William David Dilly, a fellow soldier in his unit stated: “any captain or lieutenant would gladly take a hundred Tim McVeighs in their platoon… the man was a perfectionist” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 72). For the first time in his life McVeigh was the best and had earned the respect of his cohorts based on his hard work and dedication to becoming the best soldier. McVeigh felt he fit in more in the army than he had at home in Pendleton and relished the structure and code of honor the army provided (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 63). While still in boot camp, McVeigh decided he wanted to become a member of the Special Forces and further extended himself so his superiors would view him as a potential recruit.

         While in boot camp, McVeigh met Terry Lynn Nichols, a 33-year-old Michigan native who harbored intense anger against the federal government pertaining to gun laws and the financial burdens of farmers in the Mid-West (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 64). Despite his political views, Nichols’ age and maturity lead commanders to name him squad leader. In Nichols, McVeigh found the camaraderie he had long been searching for; both men shared the same zeal for the Second Amendment and found time to discuss the government and weapons. “Two days into training Tim and Terry were like brothers. Dilly said. They were drawn to each other. It was almost like Tim idolized Terry” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 65).  In the spring of 1989, Nichols left the army after attaining a ‘hardship discharge.’ The bond the two men forged would not be broken by Nichols departure; they would be reunited after McVeigh’s discharge from the army (1991).  McVeigh met another recruit that he would call a friend in Michael J. Fortier of Arizona. Fortier and McVeigh shared similar political views and would often go target shooting together (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 69).

         After McVeigh graduated from boot camp (August of 1988) he was assigned to Fort Riley, Kansas. The following year (June 1989), after receiving a perfect score during his tryout, McVeigh was assigned to a mechanized unit to train as a Bradley fighting vehicle gunner. The Bradley is a 25-ton vehicle designed to transport troops, “but with three highly effective guns it was also an effective battle machine. The gunner’s job involved more than sharpshooting; a gunner also had to recognize targets, learn about the weak spots on certain enemy vehicles, and make split second decisions on which gun to use in a certain situation” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 75-76). McVeigh would go on to become the top gunner out of 120 gunners and have his vehicle designated as the Division’s Display Vehicle. McVeigh believes this time period as the happiest in his life and he re-enlisted in the army for another 4-year term in September 1990 (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 77).

         Shortly after his re-enlistment, McVeigh’s invitation to join the Special Forces arrived and he was told to report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in mid-November (1990). Unfortunately McVeigh would be unable to report for his tryout; he was advised a few weeks prior to his appearance at Fort Bragg that his unit was being deployed to Saudi Arabia to fight in the Persian Gulf War (August 1990- February 1991). McVeigh was conflicted by fighting overseas in a war that posed no threat to the United States: “I took an oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. I don’t like going to other nations. I thought the principle was defending yourself” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 77). Although McVeigh was hesitant to fight a war that posed no direct threat to his country, he strongly opposed the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who he believed was the epitome of a bully due to his brutality and desire to pick on a weaker nation.

Crisis 2: The Realities of War

            Before McVeigh and his company landed in Saudi Arabia in 1991 he was able to visit his family and friends. His neighbors Richard and Linda Drzyzga found McVeigh to be different during this visit “they could see he was not the same happy-go-lucky Tim who used to play with their son… he was worried about going to war” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 78). Shortly before saying goodbye, with tears in his eyes, McVeigh confided in Linda: “Mrs. D, I’m coming home in a body bag” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 78). McVeigh’s fear was a real possibility not just because of his standing as an infantryman but because of the assignment his company had been given:

“They and three other Bradley crews were to be detached from Charlie Company and assigned to ride into battle in front of a unit of eight M-1 tanks… The M-1 Abrams tanks were heavily armored and they weighed sixty-four tons more than double the weight of the Bradley (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 75-76). McVeigh explained further that: “if the Bradley goes first and blows up, the Abrams can come up behind and push it through, with its horse power, and ignite any other mines that might not have been taken out by the mine vehicle” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 79).

            The entire platoon believed that they were on a possible suicide mission; being offered by their commanders as sacrificial lambs during the kick-off of the ground war (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 79).

            The mission weighed heavily on McVeigh’s mind and on top on the stress of being the first Bradley in the line of fire, McVeigh had an even greater issue. As the Bradley’s gunner McVeigh was responsible for the nine lives on the vehicle. It was his job to detect enemy fire before it reached the Bradley, decide which weapon to use to counter the attack, and launch a counter attack to either disable the incoming missile and/or take out the enemy prior to them firing on the Bradley (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 80). “If I slack off, I’m not only killing myself, I’m letting down everyone in that vehicle McVeigh explained” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 80). McVeigh told other soldiers “I think we are all going to die, we’re going to get pushed through by a fuckin’ tank” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 80). McVeigh was under immense pressure as the lead gunner to perform and would wait with the knowledge of his mission and his personal fears for seven weeks before the start of the Allied Forces’ ground assault.

            During his service with the armed forces, McVeigh became upset that the army lied to soldiers and to the media. On February 13, 1991 the U.S. Air Force dropped two ‘smart bombs’ on the Amira bomb shelter in Baghdad, killing 300, people most of whom were women and children. The bombs devastated the shelter and were dropped because the Americans believed the Iraqi military was using the shelter and this was not a correct assumption (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 82-83).

            A second instance of bad faith on the military’s part occurred on February 16, 1991. An American Apache helicopter crew fired on a Bradley killing two Americans and then used machine-gun fire on the American soldiers who were trying to escape the vehicle. The gunfire did not stop until the ground radioed the helicopter to alert them that they were killing Americans (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 82-83). The following morning McVeigh’s platoon had been called in by a commander and notified that the Iraqis had hit a Bradley in a surprise attack. McVeigh did not know the truth of both instances until after he was released from the army (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 82-83).

            As the ground war began, McVeigh did not believe the people he was fighting were the same ones the government had deemed “blood thirsty zealots, slashing throats, and firing chemical weapons” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 85). What McVeigh saw before him was a rag-tag group of men who had no idea who they were fighting, nor the means or technical know-how to oppose such an adversary (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 89). The Iraqis were attempting to fight the Allied Forces with obsolete Soviet weapons. As McVeigh and his platoon pushed forward, Iraqis were deserting their posts in large numbers, surrendering to their opponent without ever putting up a fight. On the second day of the ground war, McVeigh and his platoon spotted an entrenched enemy nest. McVeigh noticed a flash of light from his viewfinder and while moving fired on the Iraqi soldier who was 19 football fields away; he hit the soldier directly in the chest and his body exploded the force was so great that a soldier standing next to him was killed with the same bullet: “His head just disappeared…I saw everything above the shoulders disappear, like in a red mist…The guy next to him just dropped” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 88).

            McVeigh was torn over killing the soldiers despite the Army Commendation Medal he received for his action while under fire. This was the first time McVeigh had ever used a weapon against a human being and “his first taste of killing left him angry and uncomfortable” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 90). Later, when questioned about the soldiers for his autobiography, he would recall:

“What made me feel bad was number one, I didn’t kill them in self-defense. When I took a human life, it taught me these were human beings, even though they speak a different language and have different customs. The truth is, we all have the same dreams, the same desires, the same care for our children and our family. These people were humans, like me, at the core” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 90).

            McVeigh’s assignment in the Persian Gulf ended when he was summoned back to Fort Bragg (March 1991) to begin his tryout for the Special Forces; he had been waiting for this day since he joined the army in 1988.

            Michael and Herbeck (2001) draw on McVeigh’s feelings after serving three months in the Persian Gulf. McVeigh left the Persian Gulf depleted both emotionally and physically (p. 101). His nerves were fried from being cooped up in the Bradley, constantly scanning the sky for an incoming attack. During the past few months he had worried incessantly about the lives of the men in his vehicle and his own had taken a toll on the young sergeant. He was suffering from post-traumatic stress, which comes from fighting in a war and taking the lives of others. From being inside the Bradley he had put on weight and was out of shape; a far cry from the top physical condition he was in prior to the war (p. 101). McVeigh was excited about finally having the chance to be a part of the elite fighting squad. He believed that the members of the Special Forces would share his zeal and commitment to the army which he did not find amongst his fellow infantrymen (p. 100). McVeigh had grown tired of being surrounded by soldiers who did not really want to be in the army (p.100-101). “He loved the idea of being a part of a tight-knit, no-nonsense fighting unit” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 101).

            McVeigh’s excitement about his future with the Special Forces quickly dissipated as he realized he was not ready for his tryout. Commanders, understanding the stress the returning soldiers were suffering having just returned from the war, offered to let them delay their tryouts until they were re-acclimated and on top of their game (p. 101). None of the returning soldiers took advantage of the commander’s offer; they did not want to show signs of weakness and were not sure if the offer was, in actuality, a test of their endurance (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 101).

            Michael and Herbeck (2001) state that McVeigh’s decision to push ahead with the tryout would be the turning point in his life. He quickly began to see that he was not physically prepared to endure the rigorous physical exam. As he began his 55 meter swim in full gear plus combat boots, he watched others finish their second lap in the pool while he was still struggling to complete his first (p.102). He faired better on the obstacle course but for the first time in his life he was not finishing in first place. Once, McVeigh had relished long marches through the woods and he would even go out a second time with extra weight on his back once his company had returned to the barracks (p. 102). As he tried to keep up with the other recruits his feet became torn and his heels were covered with blisters; throughout the five-mile march it was as if his legs were weighed down with lead (p. 102). McVeigh voluntarily dropped out of the program on the second day: “he was one of the last to finish… and dragged himself to the barracks, feeling as demoralized as one of those shell-shocked Iraqi servicemen… His three years in the military had seen one success after another, but now his star was falling” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 102-103).

            McVeigh returned to Fort Riley; this was the first time he had failed to accomplish anything in his military career and more importantly he had failed to realize the dream that he had chased for the past three years. Immediately upon his return, his battle buddies realized McVeigh was not the same; he still excelled in his duties but his ‘gung-ho’ attitude was gone and had been replaced with bitterness and anger as McVeigh tried to distance himself from others (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 104).

            The second crisis McVeigh endured after failing to accomplish his goal of joining the Special Forces was a pivotal moment in his life. He had gone through the army working towards being the best soldier in the company (a feat he had achieved) only to have his dream crushed by his psychical and emotional inadequacies after returning home from war. The army would never be the same for McVeigh and everything about the institution became a hassle for the sergeant (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 108). He became upset when he was denied an off-post housing allowance and incited with anger when the army attempted for charge him $80 for a stain on his mattress (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 108). Michael and Herbeck (2001) document that everyone who knew McVeigh believed he would make a career out of his army experience based on his previous zeal and dedication to the armed forces and military decorations (p. 108). However, McVeigh turned down a military career. Furthermore, he declined a prestigious offer, generally reserved for older servicemen, to be the personal gunner to the battalion commander (p. 109). This assignment would have given McVeigh notoriety on the base and put him in a position of power amongst his fellow infantrymen (p.109). In late 1991, McVeigh turned down the offer during a meeting with the commander and stated he was leaving the army (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 108-109).

            McVeigh left the army crushed. Although he had experienced some spectacular highs, the lows were beginning to replay in his mind and overshadow his accomplishments. He was becoming increasingly angry with the army for the lies he had been told during the Persian Gulf War (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 110).

 “He no longer felt comfortable serving a government that, in his opinion, pushed the values of political correctness at the expense of individual rights. McVeigh felt he could no longer stomach being part of a government that fought so hard against the Second Amendment rights of gun owners… he had lost faith in both the army and the government. The more he thought about it, the worse he felt about the killing he had done for the American government” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 110).

Silber and Bhatt (2007) believe:

 “individuals most vulnerable to experiencing this phase [Self-Identification] are often those who are at a crossroad in life-those who are trying to establish an identity, or a direction, while seeking approval and validation for the path taken…political and personal conflicts are often the cause of this identity crisis…sometimes brought about by “moral shock” (p. 30).

McVeigh was indeed at a crossroad when he turned his back on a military career. Furthermore, he experienced ‘moral shock’ when he was fed lies by the military and killed men who he believed his country should not have been fighting. He was in the midst of an identity crisis; he knew what he believed in his heart yet everything around him was contrary to his beliefs. Again, when compared to the 9/11 hijackers McVeigh is not significantly different. The 9/11 hijackers were educated men who had gone abroad to attain advanced degrees, in the hopes of furthering their lives; only to come to the realization that there were no careers waiting for them in their home countries. While abroad the 9/11 hijackers felt alienated and turned towards like-minded people in mosques. In contrast, McVeigh traveled around the United States working the gun show circuit (where he met like-minded individuals) and attending patriot events. McVeigh’s lack of religious affiliation or a place of worship, should not cast him out of Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model. Patriotism, freedom, and the right to bear arms were to McVeigh what Islam was to the 9/11 hijackers.

 

Stage 3: Indoctrination

            Throughout this stage, McVeigh intensified his beliefs and “concluded, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist when action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant [jihad]” (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p.7). McVeigh precisely fits into Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) model. Jihad roughly translates to mean ‘holy war’ and such a war is specific to the individual fighting it. An Islamic jihad is not different from a secular jihad; both groups are fighting for their virtues. McVeigh came to the same conclusions during the Indoctrination stage that the jihadi-Salafis came to which is that their beliefs were so righteous and strong that militant action was needed to defend and support the virtues which they stood for.

            Silber and Bhatt (2007) believe that during this stage “association with like-minded people is an important factor…as the self-selecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced.” Although ‘group-think’ is highly important, it did not play a roll in McVeigh’s decision to take militant action. There is a divergence between the 9/11 hijackers who were a part of a formed cell (The Hamburg cell) and McVeigh who generally worked alone. Although McVeigh was not a member of a terrorist cell, he was a member of the radical paramilitary community, determined to defend his and his community’s rights against what he perceived was a repressive government that had committed heinous atrocities at Ruby Ridge (1992) and Waco (1993). As McVeigh traveled the gun show circuit, he interacted with extremists swapping the latest conspiracy theories. McVeigh’s constant intermingling with extremists allowed him to continue to become radicalized and his interactions took the place of a group. McVeigh and the 9/11 hijackers ensured that while they continuously became radicalized, peers sympathetic to their beliefs surrounded them.

            McVeigh’s Indoctrination and terrorist attack were built fundamentally on the same principals the 9/11 hijackers used. Both groups believed that they were fighting back against a tyrannical government that was waging war on their respective people. During the Indoctrination stage both groups adopted virulent ideology and began interpreting life through this particular lens (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p.8-9, 36). Neither of the groups were able to see events objectively after they had become indoctrinated. Accordingly, any event viewed through this distorted lens further cemented the beliefs within both sets of attackers.

 

The Path to ‘Execution’

            After returning to Fort Riley, McVeigh had reached out to Terry Nichols; the more the two men corresponded the more McVeigh came to share Nichols “disgust for the federal government” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 107). After McVeigh’s discharge from the army he went home to a town that had no use or opportunities for a man with his particular skill set. Upon leaving Pendleton, McVeigh had incorrectly assumed that a stellar army record would be the equivalent of a college degree. He was unable to attain the higher-level jobs which he had originally hoped for and consequently ended up right back were he had started; working for minimum wage as a security guard for Burns Security. Due to his low paying job, McVeigh enlisted in the Army Reserves for the extra $150 a month they offered; he was crestfallen to learn he was going backwards and his years of hard work meant nothing to the civilian population (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 114).

            Michael and Herbeck (2001) draw from their interviews with McVeigh that during 1992, McVeigh contemplated suicide at least once. He continued to read radical literature and came to believe that he was a victim of reverse discrimination (p. 118). McVeigh had scored high on civil service exams (the state toll collectors test and the federal civil service test for the U.S. Marshals), yet his name was never called and he began to fester with resentment (p. 118). His mood changed and he began to lash out at people. McVeigh realized something within him was not right, and requested security details where he would have little to no contact with the public (p. 120). McVeigh became an activist in his community by writing letters to his local newspapers and his congressmen, twice having his letters published (February, 11 1992 and March, 10 1992) in the local paper (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 113-119). After realizing he did not fit in at ‘home,’ McVeigh decided to leave Pendleton, New York (February 1993) in hopes of finding a ‘free state’ that had less taxes and more opportunities for a man like himself (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 138).

“And then you come back to the world and everything is different. You’ve seen the extremes, the ultimate highs, lows, and realities. Who gives a shit about conversation about the weather, or about who’s late for work, or who stubbed their toe? The daily grind, all of the sudden, has gotten much more intolerable. Normal coffeepot conversation becomes intolerably boring. You separate yourself from these encounters, and from people, to escape” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 123).

He set out on a 26-month road trip visiting 40 of the 50 states and during this time sporadically stayed with Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier.

            The three men believed heavily in the ‘New World Order,’ a term originally used during a speech by President Bush (1990) which fringe groups picked up and “used to refer to a consolidation of free governments throughout the world into a single, tyrannical global power” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 133). McVeigh and his two friends were convinced that the federal government was gradually working to undo the Second Amendment. Furthermore, they believed “America was becoming an overtaxed police state” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 128-129). The men took the incident at Ruby Ridge[1] to be solid evidence that they were correct in their beliefs. “The killings also became a rallying cry for militia and survivalist groups” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 129).

            It was the events at Waco[2] (1993) that convinced McVeigh that his way of life and virtues were under attack by the government. He and Nichols believed the government had attacked the Davidians for their way of life and used undue force against them (CS gas had been used); they believed the fire was set on purpose because the federal agents were not winning the siege. McVeigh was enraged over the weapons that were used against women and children and felt this was the “ultimate bully attack” perpetrated by the government (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 162).  “The blaze at the Waco compound more than any other single event, was the turning point in his life… he was now beginning to think that something else would have to be done. Something” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 161).

            Months after the event, McVeigh was still fuming over the attack at Waco; he viewed this and the attack at Ruby Ridge to be only two of thousands of events where the government had broken the law and attacked its citizens (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 161-162). He began to “warn others (Michael Fortier and his wife Lori) that the time had come to take action against the government… he had turned into a virulent anti-government activist” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 162-163). Waco was McVeigh’s breaking point that would move him through the Indoctrination stage and into the final stage: Execution (formerly ‘Jihadization’). Like the 9/11 hijackers, as McVeigh had “become indoctrinated, they re-define their direction in life…rather than seeking and striving for the more mainstream goals of getting a good job, earning money, and raising a family, the indoctrinated radical’s goals are non-personal and focused on achieving “the greater good” (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 36). McVeigh was no longer interested in having a traditional life, he was giving up a life of normalcy to become a militant activist.

 

Stage 4: Execution [Jihadization]

            The Execution stage has six sub-parts: Decision to commit Jihad, Traveling abroad, Training/Preparation, “Outward Bound”-like Activities, Mental Reinforcement Activities, and Attack Planning (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 43-45). Silber and Bhatt (2007) offer this list of six sub-parts as a likely radicalization trajectory individuals may follow, however, not all of the sub-parts need to be completed to commit an act of terrorism.

            According to Silber and Bhatt (2007), the Execution Stage occurs when “members accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning, preparation, and execution” (p. 7). McVeigh considered himself the ultimate warrior; he had been trained to fight, protect and moreover, he was prepared to die to further his cause:

“McVeigh felt his bombing was a necessary act, an act of extremism in the service of liberty. His actions would wipe many innocent people off the face of the earth, but someday, McVeigh was convinced, historians would call him a martyr, maybe even a hero” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 198).

The 9/11 hijackers also believed that they were committing a necessary act, which would result in them becoming martyrs. Throughout this stage both groups prepared for their actions with absolute devotion to their cause.

            It was McVeigh who decided to take action and introduced the idea to Nichols and Fortier in late September 1994:

“The [truck] bomb he was planning would consist of more than 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with about 1,200 pounds of liquid nitromethane, 350 pounds of Tovex[3], and the miscellaneous weight of 16 55-gallon drums, for a combined weight of about 7,000 pounds” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 194).

 McVeigh had a list of criteria he used to pick the federal building he would destroy: “his target building…had to have at least two federal law-enforcement agencies under its roof… it had to be either the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Drug-Enforcement Administration. Any additional federal agencies he considered a bonus” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 199). McVeigh had chosen these three agencies because of their involvement in the attacks at Ruby Ridge and Waco. Nichols accepted McVeigh’s course of action, however, Fortier stated: “I would never do anything like that, unless there was a U.N. tank in my front yard” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 193). McVeigh did not believe Fortier would not participate in the attack and continued to plan as if he had agreed to. Fortier was a radicalized individual, however, he never made it past the Indoctrination stage. He was not committed to an attack on the government and had not cemented an emotional tie to either McVeigh or Nichols; he merely considered himself their friend and would only fight to defend himself and his family.

            McVeigh was the only one of the three to fully commit to the Execution stage. He was willing to die in the Ryder truck to ensure that the bombs went off. Conversely, Nichols did not want to see the mission through. After helping McVeigh acquire the materials needed to create the bomb, Nichols attempted to back out of the plan. On Easter Sunday, 1995 Nichols failed to meet McVeigh to drop the getaway car in Oklahoma City. McVeigh called Nicholas at home and threatened both he and his family’s lives: “get in your fucking truck! Now! This is for fucking keeps,” McVeigh screamed into the phone (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 251-252). He also threatened to make an anonymous call to the authorities implicating Nichols in the actions he had already committed (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 252). Nichols relented and went with McVeigh to drop off the car (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 252).

            Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) ‘travel abroad’ sub-stage is not important because the Oklahoma City bombers were former U.S. soldiers. During this stage McVeigh and Nichols did not travel abroad for training, it was not necessary since they had been trained in the military. In the case of the 9/11 Hamburg cell, travel was necessary to receive training in combat, weapons, and explosives. The attackers in the Hamburg cell were students who did not have the means to enter into combat without the training Al-Qaeda offered in Afghanistan.

            Up until McVeigh resorted to threats and scare tactics to ensure that his friends continued to assist him in the bombing, the men continued the friendship they had shared since their days together in boot camp. When McVeigh was not selling items at gun shows he was often staying with either Nichols or Fortier. Silber and Bhatt (2007) maintain that during the Execution stage members engage in activities (camping, white-water rafting, paintball, and target shooting) to reinforce their commitment to jihad (p. 44). Again, McVeigh and his cohorts do not fall into this sub-part because such activities were already normal parts of their lives. These men were involved in the paramilitary community; they carried guns, went target shooting, camping, and spent time outdoors normally. Also, Nichols and Fortier did not need to partake in such activities because they were not committed to McVeigh’s jihad and were not planning suicide missions.

Conclusion

            By not including Timothy McVeigh in the radicalization model it appears that radicalization is confined, or is exclusive, to Islam; this is not the case. Religion alone should not be the basis for excluding McVeigh from the model. There are more similarities between McVeigh and the 9/11 hijackers than there are differences. The 9/11 hijackers are the exception to the jihadi-Salafi radicalization process because they were hand picked by Al-Qaeda’s Central Cell and given a specific and well-funded mission. No other jihadi group received a directive from Al-Qaeda’s leadership; instead they received training and returned to either their home or host countries to commit acts of terror. If Silber and Bhatt (2007) were to revise their article they should recognize that McVeigh was one of the first individuals to go through their radicalization process. Furthermore, he is the only domestic terrorist who stood trial for his crimes and was convicted. McVeigh’s trial, letters to various media outlets, subsequent interviews, and his autobiography paint a clear and vivid picture of his radicalization process. There is significantly less primary information on the jihadi-Salafi terrorists Silber and Bhatt (2007) studied. The 9/11 attacks were a suicide mission leaving scattered information behind. We are left trying to find the pieces of their radicalization process, and attempting to form a clear picture that will never be as fully complete as McVeigh’s. 

            From Silber and Bhatt’s study it is clear that none of the attackers were psychotic individuals, rather, they were people who did not fit in and could not assimilate into their respective environments. Each individual (regardless of religion) had created and then fixated on what they considered to be utopia. The idea that their dreams would never come to fruition combined with years of isolation, resentment, and moreover, an unremarkable existence made them likely candidates for the radicalization process. When all parties committed to jihad, in the name of their respective virtues, they granted themselves lives they would not have normally attained. Suddenly they were important beings on a righteous quest for justice, willing to die for their cause. McVeigh is not the anomaly; he is the beginning and should be incorporated into Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) radicalization model.

 

 

References

Abanes, R. (1996). American militias (pp. 147-153). Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity           Press.

Herbeck, D and Michael, L. (2001). American terrorist Timothy McVeigh & the                     

            tragedy at Oklahoma City. New York, NY: Avon Books.

Macdonald, A. (1978). The turner diaries. Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard            Books.

Roleff, T. (Eds.). (2004). The Oklahoma city bombing. New York, NY: Greenhaven Press

Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat.          Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department. Retrieved from:

            http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-  Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

 


[1] “On August 21, 1992, federal agents attempted a raid on the remote hillside cabin of Randy Weaver, a white separatist accused of selling an illegal sawed-off shotgun to a police informant. Agents had tried to pressure Weaver into becoming an informant against the racist group called the Aryan Nations, but Weaver refused. A gun battle broke out when federal marshals arrived at Weaver’s cabin to arrest him. His 14 year-old-son… and [a] U.S. Marshal… were killed. The next day, Weaver’s wife… was fatally shot by an FBI sniper while standing in the doorway holding with her infant daughter…Federal agents and marshals laid siege to the cabin for 11 days before Weaver surrendered" (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 128-129).

[2] “On February 28, 1993, federal agents raided the Mount Carmel home and church of the religious group known as the Branch Davidians. 76 agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms arrived beneath covered cattle wagons and a shootout erupted, taking the lives of four agents and injuring dozens more. Fatalities were higher on the Branch Davidians’ side. Six lives were lost, and more were wounded… after the shootout the ATF retreated” (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 141). The Davidians held their ground refusing to come out for 51 days. The standoff ended as massive fire engulfed the wooden compound and armored vehicles rammed the walls (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 160-161).

[3] Tovex: a high-explosive blasting gelatin shaped like 18-inch-long sausages (Michael and Herbeck, 2001, p. 193).