

What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination

Dominic A. Bearfield is an assistant professor in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He received his doctorate from Rutgers University–Newark. His research interests include patronage, representation, and reform.

E-mail: dbearfield@bushschool.tamu.edu

Despite a long and storied history, patronage and the functions it plays in American politics and public administration are still very much a mystery. This paper examines how patronage has been used and understood in American political science and public administration. The author calls for a reexamination of the concept based on developments found in the field of anthropology. In an effort to generate future scholarship, the author introduces a typology of patronage styles based on this reexamination.

After surveying the literature concerning the function of patronage, Frank Sorauf offered the following assessment: “Very few studies exist of the actual operation of patronage systems across the county . . . In the absence of specific reports and data, one can only proceed uneasily on a mixture of political folklore, scattered scholarship, professional consensus, and personal judgment” (1960, 28). Even now, some 40 years after Sorauf’s initial statement, we still know very little about the functions of patronage. It is perhaps one of the great ironies of the study of American public administration that patronage—one of the core phenomena and concepts in the development and status of the field—has received so little attention from students of public administration in recent years. Sorauf responded to this lack of scholarship by challenging what he described as the “willingness to accept the conventional assumptions about patronage” (1960, 125). At the time of his observation, this critique of reliance on the conventional wisdom resulted in a brief but significant surge of scholarly activity by Sorauf and others.

It is clear that more work remains if we are to improve our understanding of this important concept. In this paper, I review the contributions of Sorauf and others concerning the function of patronage in the United

States. Specifically, I address how this research has shaped the way scholars in political science and public administration have come to define the concept of patronage. In the second half of the paper, I suggest a reexamination of that discipline-based conceptualization of patronage with help from developments found in the field of anthropology in an attempt to reinvigorate the study of this important political and managerial tool.

Examining the Functions of Patronage

In “State Patronage in a Rural County,” a single case study of a rural county in Pennsylvania, Sorauf described the article as “an attempt to apply some of the more familiar assumptions about the value and role of patronage to actual experience” (1956, 1046). Long seen as a tool used by political bosses to reward the party faithful, Sorauf discovered in this particular county that patronage served only a limited function as a political motivational tool. The ability to distribute patronage, he observed, also provided an ego boost to the distributors. In an interesting, although widely overlooked, observation, Sorauf revealed that the patronage system was used “as an ad hoc merit system, whereby skilled and experienced men were recruited by superintendents and care takers and then given even a semblance of tenure regardless of political changes” (1956, 1056). This discovery presents a challenge to the notion that patronage systems are devoid of merit-based principles.

In a second article, Sorauf described several untested assumptions concerning the use of patronage. He identified those assumptions as the ability of parties to administer patronage, the necessity of patronage for effective parties, the vitality of patronage as a reward or incentive, the single use or purpose

It is perhaps one of the great ironies of the study of American public administration that patronage—one of the core phenomena and concepts in the development and status of the field—has received so little attention from students of public administration in recent years.

of patronage, and the nature of the party using patronage (Sorauf 1959, 117–23). These untested assumptions distorted the image of how patronage was actually used and understood, causing him to warn, “it ill behooves political science to accept any untested assumptions, much less public policy based on them” (1959, 117).

A third article introduced what would become a widely accepted definition of patronage. Sorauf defined patronage as “an incentive system—a political currency with which to ‘purchase’ political activity and political responses” (1960, 28). Interestingly, he also thought that patronage was losing much of its potency as an incentive system and that its use would ultimately decline, causing individuals to seek other types of inducements.

Following the publication of these three articles, several notable works emerged that examined the function of patronage and challenged the traditionally held assumptions. For example, one argument is that political actors use patronage jobs in a direct votes for jobs exchange or as an incentive for maximizing votes during an election. In public administration, it is an idea that is closely associated with images of the 1800s, when patronage seekers would fill the streets following an election, clamoring for the spoils of electoral victory. While this image of job seeking may be valid, there are considerable questions about the distribution of jobs as rewards.

Wilson (1961) noted that vote maximizing was only one of the ways that machine bosses put patronage to use. Bosses were often more concerned with maintaining power within their own organization or party than with winning elections. In Wilson’s view, patronage was a way to maximize votes only when the people in charge of distributing patronage felt that their positions were secure. In an unstable situation, the bosses would distribute patronage in ways that would serve to secure their own power base.

Moynihan and Wilson (1964), studying the use of patronage in New York State during the administration of Governor W. Averell Harriman from 1955 to 1959, concluded that there were “too few jobs and too many voters” to use patronage as a way to win votes. The authors supported the idea that patronage was a means for consolidating power, although they concluded that its use in this manner was limited. The study introduced a new assumption concerning the use of patronage, a concept they described as “recognition.”

“Recognizing” certain groups in the community by appointing some of their members to office has long been thought to be a principal function of patronage. Such recognition supposedly binds members of various racial, religious and

nationality groups more closely to the party, or wins them away from a rival party by conferring on them the symbolic and vicarious satisfaction of seeing “one of their own” given prestige, power and income. (Moynihan and Wilson 1964, 296)

The authors concluded that the use of “recognition” during the Harriman administration had very little impact in terms of delivering votes or creating new loyalties.

Gump argued that the use of patronage as a party-building tool was functional, although mixed, in its impact, stating, “[P]atronage has (1) some value to chairmen in maintaining their position in the organization; (2) some value, albeit quite limited, in generating campaign contributions; and (3) some value in obtaining campaign effort” (1971, 107). Gump also noted that “one-third of the chairmen reported giving some attention to a racial minority when dispensing patronage,” but that less than one-tenth considered the use of religion as a factor (1971, 93).

Johnston (1979) noted that patronage jobs tended to be inelastic, which made them less than ideal as a means for “buying” votes. In an additional challenge to the notion of the simple votes for jobs exchange, the article revealed that patrons may overreward an ethnic “in-group” while underrewarding an ethnic “out-group,” even if the out-group has mobilized the vote more successfully. To Johnston, patronage served an important organizational function, but it was more effective as an inducement for building an organization than it was in maintaining one.

Other contributions to the literature on patronage include important histories by Van Riper (1958) and Mosher (1982) detailing the development of the American civil service system and Freedman’s (1994) examination of the “American tradition” of patronage. Hecla (1977) and Maranto (2005) have offered valuable examinations of federal political appointees and the appointee system. Several scholars have discussed the impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning the use of patronage (Freedman 1988; Hamilton 1993, 1999; Meier 1981; Roback and Vinzant 1994) and the subsequent emergence of antipatronage programs (Hamilton 2002). Maranto (1998), Durant (1998), Goodsell (1998), Knott (1998), and Murray (1998) have contemplated the consequences of eliminating tenure for federal employees. In a similar vein, Maranto and Johnson (2006) suggested that some states are better equipped than others to deal with the introduction of at-will employment in the public sector.

These provide tremendous insight into how patronage has been used and also how we understand the concept of patronage. They also, although unintentionally,

reveal how the fields of political science and public administration have narrowed the definition of, and by extension the functions of, patronage in ways that hamper future investigation.

Reconceptualizing Patronage

In his critical examination of the term “accountability,” Dubnick (2002) argued that it is important to distinguish “word” from “concept” as a source of meaning or understanding for ambiguous and contested terms. This is an important distinction when applied to the term “patronage.”

Words are “lexical” and defined, tied to contextualized meanings that narrow and focus conceptualizations. Concepts viewed outside the lexicon of a particular usage, in contrast, are important because they provide the categories and meanings through which we understand our world. Therefore, how concepts are defined as “words” is an important issue in any community of scholars or practitioners. Assuming the position that such definitions are the product of social interactions and mechanisms, we can see that concepts can emerge in different ways through the meanings assigned to contested words within different communities. Scientists often strive for the “ideal” definition of a concept by developing terminology that is clear, objective, and measurable. At the other extreme are concepts so loosely defined that their meanings are tied to the specific context of their use in what Habermas (1984) terms the “lifeworld.” Between these two extremes are a range of conceptual images, ideas, and associations that provide some degree of stability and familiarity to any particular term.

For instance, after reviewing the work of Sorauf and other political scientists, Alex Weingrod noted that “patronage in the vocabulary of political science has a kind of ‘folk’ meaning. That is, patronage refers to the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support” (Weingrod 1968, 379). This definition, he argued, can be contrasted against the definition of patronage used in anthropological studies, which he describes as “the analysis of how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends.”

For Weingrod, the distinction between the two definitions is not merely rhetorical, but one that scholars conducting research on patronage must clearly articulate. He noted that “specificity is required not merely for reasons of clarity, but also since defining patronage

. . . when the term patronage is used in political science and public administration, it is automatically understood as a synonym for political patronage. . . . Consequently, acts of patronage that occur outside of the context of a political party or machine receive little or no attention.

in one way or the other determines how issues are posed” (1968, 380). So, when the term “patronage” is used in political science and public administration, it is automatically understood as a synonym for political patronage. Hence, the assumptions advanced by Sorauf all relate to the use of patronage in the context of political partisanship and machine activity. Consequently, acts of patronage that occur outside the context of a political party or machine receive little or no attention. However, a shift from the political science definition to the anthropological definition by

public administration scholars opens the field up to a realm of new insights and research opportunities. While the anthropological definition, which will be explained in greater detail in the next section, does not preclude researchers from examining patronage that happens within political parties or political machines or from examining the assumptions related to those two types of organizations, it does free the researcher from the restrictions posed by defining patronage as the examination of those organizations.

Assumptions about Patronage

Perhaps the first thing that must be done is to present new assumptions to be reexamined. As mentioned earlier, concepts are often associated with ideas and images that help provide additional clarity and stability. In public administration, the two leading assumptions can be described as follows: *Patronage is the study of political parties and machines* and *Patronage is evil*. Both assumptions have been essential to the development of the political science definition and have remained quite durable, dating back to the antipatronage attacks of Progressive Era reformers. Quite ironically, they have also remained amazingly resilient despite the emergence of research questioning their validity.

Patronage Is the Study of Political Parties and Machines

Scholars using the anthropological definition of patronage have focused on the relationship between patron and client. The principles of reciprocity and kinship have been central to their study. However, with the political science definition, it is assumed that the nature of this kinship, or the thing that initially draws client to patron or patron to client, is the political party or machine (although occasionally, in the case of machines, ethnicity is used as a stand-in for party; see Erie 1990). While this does explain some patronage relationships, the focus on party can obscure or overlook other forms of kinship that might explain the link between patron and client. Fifty years ago,

Van Riper (1958) identified the concept of ideological patronage, whereby patrons and clients share a common political ideology or philosophy. In this case, ideology trumps political party as the basis for kinship. Other associations such as school and university affiliation, professional designation or certification, class, and/or geographic region are all potential ways to explain the link between a particular patron and client.

Just as important, the focus on party and political activity obscures how patron–client networks develop in bureaucratic settings. Roback and Vinzant (1994) described a phenomenon they identified as the “cult of personalism,” whereby managers and executives develop patronage networks within a bureaucratic organization to build or increase their own power within the organization. This, of course, can occur without any relationship to partisan politics. Yet a view of patronage focused on political party is poised to miss this form of patronage.

Patronage Is Evil

The civil service reform movements of the Progressive Era significantly altered the legitimacy of patronage as an acceptable form of personnel management. From this period, a narrative emerged proclaiming that patronage was an inherently unproductive and destructive (evil) activity that cannot contribute to the progress or improvement of society (Mosher 1982; Van Riper 1958). In effect, politicians, reformers, muckrakers, and scholars demonized the concept, instilling it with a negative valence that remains the dominant perspective used in contemporary public administration. In some areas, this negative valence became so strong and pervasive that patronage has emerged as a “folk devil” that can be used to invoke what sociologists refer to as a “moral panic” (Bearfield 2006).

For example, David Rosenbloom, testifying before the New York State Commission on Government Integrity in 1990, stated, “[B]y definition, I think that [patronage], leads people to believe government is corrupt” (see also Freedman 1994). Caiden listed patronage as a common “bureaupathology.” Bureaupathologies are the “vices, maladies and sickness of bureaucracy” (1991, 490). Roback and Vinzant succinctly captured the pervasiveness of this negative view by stating that “patronage is associated with staffing policies that result in marginally qualified people, waste and corruption” (1994, 501).

This assumption poses a problem for the study of patronage. The view of patronage as evil or corrupt presents a tautological problem in which researchers only study patronage in environments in which there

is evidence of some form of corruption. For example, Powell noted that the study of patronage systems could be an important heuristic “for the understanding of a wide range of political behavior which political scientists . . . consider to be either pathological, deviant or of minor import” (1970, 412).

Evidence of a tautological problem is supported by Freedman’s suggestion that research on patronage has been slowed because “[n]o one wants to admit to a practice that bears the taint of corrupt machine politics” (1994, vii). A narrowly constructed definition of patronage, which views itself as the study of evil and corruption, precludes empirical examination not only of any potential positive benefits that may result from the patron–client relationship but also of examination of the very concept of patronage.

While these assumptions have been useful in illuminating and stabilizing the political science definition, they have also distorted the concept of patronage in ways that have proven harmful to the study of this important concept. First, the study of patronage has been unnecessarily limited or restricted to the study of political parties and machines. This, in turn, has distracted scholars from the study of patronage in other types of organizations. Second, the negative valence associated with patronage has created a tautological problem, which leads scholars to place a disproportionate emphasis on patronage as corruption and precludes serious empirical examination of the potential benefits from patronage.

Rethinking Patronage

In this section, we turn to the anthropological definition to expand our understanding of patronage and its functions. According to Boissevain (1966), patronage is “founded on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. By patron, I mean a person who uses his influence to assist and protect some other person, who then becomes his ‘client,’ and in return provides certain services to his patron. The relationship is asymmetrical, for the nature of the services exchanged may differ considerably” (1966, 18). This paper will focus on what

Lande (1973) would describe as “supportive exchange dyads.” In a supportive exchange dyad, the two parties, patron and client, exchange services that are beneficial to both parties. In this case, patrons provide inducements and rewards to clients, and in return expect the clients to reciprocate with varying degrees of loyalty (Boissevain 1966; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Kaufman 1974; Lande 1973; Powell 1970; Scott 1972).

While there are several types of exchange dyads, Powell noted the unique nature of the patron and client exchange:

In a supportive exchange dyad the two parties, patron and client, exchange services that are beneficial to both parties.

It is important to note that patron–client ties clearly are different from other ties which might bind parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but which do not rest on the reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services—such as relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation, and so forth. Such elements may be present in the patron–client pattern, but if they come to be dominant the tie is no longer a patron–client relationship. (1970, 412)

This presents a different image of patronage than the one commonly associated with the public administration/political science definition. The public administration/political science definition conjures up images of ward bosses who lord over their clients, demanding campaign contributions and strict voter loyalty to the machine, threatening to fire those who disobey or do not follow the rules. While it is possible, even probable, that some ward bosses did govern in this manner, under the anthropological definition, these dyads would not be patron–client relationships. Scott (1972) noted that the patron does not seek compliance strictly by force or the authority afforded by official position. Instead, the relationship is governed by the individual morality of the client and informal community sanctions that create a “debt of obligation,” or a sense of loyalty, that binds the client to the patron.

In his essay “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics,” Kaufman synthesized the work of Scott and Powell, along with Lande’s (1973) work on dyads or two-person groups, to develop the following:

The patron–client relation is defined . . . as a special type of dyadic exchange, distinguishable by the following characteristics:

- a) the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status;
- b) it is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to the other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to materialize;
- c) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community norms. (1974, 285)

This definition serves as the foundation for the typology of the use of patronage introduced in the next section. The typology reveals how a patron would use patronage as a tool to achieve certain goals, and in return, the patron expects a degree of loyalty from the client or recipient. As mentioned earlier, the expectation of loyalty is an essential part of the patron–client relationship. Law or contractual obligation does not govern these relationships. Instead, the patron must

rely on the client to remain faithful once he or she has received the good or service.

Although there is considerable disagreement concerning the degree to which the relationship between patron and client is voluntary (Kaufman 1974), it has been noted that these relationships often occur in a competitive marketplace where clients have the ability to “shop” their allegiance or loyalty to a variety of patrons (Scott 1972). This, in turn, causes the patron to vary the duration that he or she can expect to be the recipient of a client’s loyalty, choosing between short-term and long-term expectations.

There are two ways to think about the goals of the patron. In the first case, patronage is used in service of the principal as a means for consolidating power in ways that will allow the patron to increase or maintain their scope of power or influence (Johnston 1979; Moynihan and Wilson 1964; Sorauf 1960). In the second case, patronage is a tool used by the patron in pursuit of a broader principle or normative goal. Merton (1968) suggested that the pursuit of normative goals is a secondary or latent function of how political machines use patronage. I am arguing that these are not at all secondary goals. Instead, in the hands of many patrons, these normative goals *are* the primary goal.

I argue that patrons pursue their principal or principle goals by invoking a variety of “patronage styles.” The four styles are as follows:

- *Organizational patronage* is used to strengthen or create political organizations.
- *Democratic patronage* seeks to achieve democratic or egalitarian goals using patronage.
- *Tactical patronage* uses the distribution of public offices to bridge political divisions or cleavages as a means of achieving political or policy goals.
- *Reform patronage* emerges when those committed to reforming the existing patronage system themselves engage in the practice as the means of replacing the corrupt political regime that preceded them.

Each of the four styles has enjoyed a position of prominence in the American use and understanding of patronage. A patron’s use of a given style is situational, determined by the individual’s needs or goals. Actors are not limited to any one type during their tenure in office. For example, during an election cycle, a patron may use the organizational style to build a staff of loyal supporters, but later, in the middle of the term, invoke the tactical form to win crucial support for a particular policy or ideal.

As mentioned earlier, in order to achieve their goal, patrons seek loyalty from their clients by supplying inducements and/or rewards. While the next section focuses largely on the distribution of public sector

jobs, it should be noted that patronage can be used to refer to any number of scarce resources controlled by the patron and desired by the client (Dahl 2005; Freedman 1994; Wilson 1961). For instance, increasingly scholars and journalists have focused on the use of public sector contracts as a form of inducement. Described as “pinstripe patronage,” the move toward privatization has produced an increase in the number of public contracts available to patrons at all levels of government (Birnbaum 2004; Freedman 1994; Hamilton 1999; Schwartzman and Wiggins 2003). Other inducements include, but are not limited to, jobs, favors, and appointments to boards and committees. Recent examples include the patronage network built by Sharpe James, the former mayor of Newark, New Jersey, who controlled the appointment of individuals to important city and local commissions¹ (Mays 2006).

While acknowledging the diversity of inducements that a patron might make available to potential clients, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that the style used by the patron is not influenced by the type of inducement offered. The relevance of this typology for American public administration is the focus of the next section.

The Four Styles of Patronage

Organizational Patronage

Patronage in American political life is most commonly associated with partisan reward. However, a simplistic association between patronage and party advantage only tells part of the story. A more accurate reflection would demonstrate how political actors used patronage to build political organizations like political parties and city and state machines.

The use of patronage was an essential part of the family machines created during the early days of the nation. In states such as New York, the limited suffrage of the era essentially restricted most political activity to a few prominent families. In this environment, elite families traded patronage positions as acts of prestige and loyalty. As one scholar noted, “We find brothers succeeding brothers and sons following fathers in the same local office, or simply redistributing the offices among themselves from term to term” (Gitterman 1892, 93). During this period, patronage was a tool for perpetuating aristocratic privilege. In the United States, the capacity to leave public offices to heirs replaced the role of titles, as found in European societies (Aronson 1964).

By the 1800s, the use of patronage had developed into a tool to mold loose coalitions of voters into political machines and eventually political parties. For example, Aaron Burr created the famous Tammany organization that transformed voters of Irish descent in New York City into a powerful political organization (Gitterman 1892). Tammany Hall served the dual

distinction of allowing persons of a particular ethnicity to maximize their votes on issues and around candidates that were important to them while also allowing its members “to combat the aristocrats who under Alexander Hamilton had succeeded in gaining control of the new government” (Friedrich 1937, 13). Tammany Hall would go on to become the most powerful of the New York City machines, making its name synonymous with the use of patronage.

Although Andrew Jackson is widely associated with the use of patronage as a partisan tool, on the national level, the distinction actually belongs to Thomas Jefferson (Fish 1904; Friedrich 1937). As the first president elected who was not a member of the Federalist Party, Jefferson faced the challenge of dealing with an administration filled with his political rivals. In addition, as the first Republican elected to the office of president, there was tremendous pressure on Jefferson to reward members of the party who had been loyal to him. Jefferson’s solution was to create an administration that reflected the country’s political diversity. Initially, Jefferson proceeded with caution in filling offices. However, once he perceived that public sentiment was behind him, he became much more aggressive in his use of patronage. Despite an initial desire to create a representative administration, once an equal balance of Federalists and Republicans in the administrative offices was achieved, Jefferson filled all new positions with people loyal to the Republican Party (White 1948).

Martin Van Buren, the political strategist behind Andrew Jackson’s rise to the presidency, took the use of organizational patronage one step further, deftly building a national political party by promising state and local politicians control over patronage appointments in exchange for their support of Jackson’s presidential run in 1828². Van Buren’s idea was that a national party could be constructed in support of Jackson based on “Jackson’s availability, his personal popularity, and the ambiguity of just where he stood on the issues of the day” (Aldrich 1995, 122). Because of this, Van Buren was able to convince local and state leaders to sign on to the Jackson ticket without having to change their individual positions. As important, Van Buren promised the local leaders control over patronage positions that would result from Jackson’s victory, including the post office and local customs houses.

The contemporary use of organizational patronage reflects the transition from party organizations to personal organizations based on the personality attributes of a particular patron. According to Freedman (1994), Kevin White of Boston and Coleman Young of Detroit both built powerful personal organizations using patronage. Rudolph Giuliani also built a powerful personal organization during his time as mayor of New York City by insisting on extreme loyalty from his appointees (MacGillis 2007). Unlike the transfer of

power that occurs between old and new patrons in party organizations, personal organizations essentially dissolve once the individual leaves office (Freedman 1994).

Frequently overlooked is the study of patronage in nonpartisan, bureaucratic settings. Roback and Vinzant (1994) stated that managers with discretion over the hiring process often engage in the practice of “empire building” by influencing hiring and promotion decisions in a way that leads to an increase in their personal power or of the power of a favored group. Norton and Morris (2003) noted that in the Executive Office of the President, individuals have engaged in empire building to increase staff size as a means of conveying their power and status. Carpenter (2001) argued that bureau chiefs are able to shape the culture of an agency by recruiting new applicants from their own personal networks based on education, class, and other forms of kinship. This allows the bureau chief to establish a power base that is distinct and different from that of the agencies’ external stakeholders. While this amounts to a dramatic shift in our understanding of what is patronage, it is a necessary shift if we are to improve our understanding of its function. However, despite the growing preoccupation with the size of government, the role of patronage within bureaucratic organizations has received scant attention.

Tactical Patronage

Tactical patronage is a means for bridging political cleavages or gathering support for a particular policy idea or program. Examples of cleavages include geographic (urban/rural, north/south, east/west), economic (sectoral, e.g., agricultural, industrial), social (class divisions, e.g., haves/have-nots), racial (black/white), ethnic (native/immigrant), and political parties (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 33–46).

In an effort to bridge *political* divisions, both George Washington and Abraham Lincoln relied heavily on the use of tactical patronage during their presidencies. The responsibility of making administrative appointments fell almost totally to Washington, who, while deeply concerned about issues of “fitness” (Mosher 1982), was also aware of the power of tactical patronage to achieve cleavage-bridging goals such as geographic diversity. It is clear that Washington understood that in order to ensure the success of the new republic, he would have to pay attention to issues such as geography and the opinions of senators, congressional representatives, and others when making administrative appointments (Van Riper 1958, 16–20). Washington also believed that it was important to select people who were “friendly” to the direction and mission of the new republic, another demonstration of his use of tactical patronage.

In an effort to bridge *political* divisions, both George Washington and Abraham Lincoln relied heavily on the use of tactical patronage during their presidencies.

While Washington invoked the use of tactical patronage to hold together the new republic, Lincoln used tactical patronage to try to hold the Union together during the Civil War. It appears clear that Lincoln embraced “the accepted doctrine of the day” concerning the use of patronage, particularly for tactical purposes. “The civil service was a great treasury to be drawn on at will. If a man drew on it for purposes high and good, provided the efficiency of the service was tolerable, he did all that could be expected of him” (Fish 1902, 68). The belief that it was acceptable to use patronage in pursuit of lofty goals and values appears to have shaped Lincoln’s patronage policy concerning preservation of the Union during the Civil War (Van Riper 1958). Lincoln’s use of patronage in this situation is tactical, as opposed to another, more partisan type of patronage. Lincoln’s ultimate goal was not to give partisan advantage to the Republican Party but to use patronage to maintain the party as a means of preserving the Union.

Tactical patronage can also be used by patrons as a way of advancing important policy agendas. While it is commonly assumed that political party is the basis for the kinship between patron and clients, clients are often selected because they share, or are at least willing to strongly support, the ideological positions of the patron (Van Riper 1958). Once assured of a client’s ideological loyalty, patrons assign clients to agencies with the expectation that the client will influence public policy in ways that support the patron positions.

Recent history provides several examples of the use of tactical patronage as patrons seek to advance particular policy agendas. Harris and Milkis (1996) noted that President Ronald Reagan used the political appointment system to alter the policy orientation of independent regulatory commissions such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission in an attempt to make the agencies more business friendly. According to the authors, appointees were selected specifically “so that the Reagan zeal for the free market infused agency policy.” Maranto similarly suggested that President Bill Clinton attempted to use the appointment process to change the direction of the U.S. Forest Service, “emphasizing the conservation mission and deemphasizing timber harvesting” (2005, 26). In both cases, the appointments were a tactic to bring the policies of the agencies in line with the ideological wishes of the patrons.

Democratic Patronage

The use of democratic patronage presents an interesting case. Although it is the most clearly articulated type of patronage in terms of justifying the practice, it is also the most vulnerable to distortion and abuse.

Democratic patronage seeks to use the patronage function as a means for providing equal access and opportunity in the distribution of government jobs.

The concept of “rotation in office” offered by Andrew Jackson is perhaps the best example of democratic patronage. Many consider Jackson’s presidential victory as the triumph of the common person over the aristocracy that had dominated American political life for its first 40 years (Aronson 1964). When Jackson arrived in Washington following his election, thousands of office seekers from around the country who sought patronage positions greeted him (Van Riper 1958).

Jackson provided a hint of his approach during his first inaugural address:

The recent demonstrations of public sentiment inscribes on the list of Executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with the freedom of elections, and the counteraction of those causes which have disturbed the rightful course of appointment and have placed or continued power in unfaithful or incompetent hands. (quoted in Van Riper 1958, 31)

Despite Jackson’s announcement of impending reform, Fish (1904) suggested that many in the administrative class took his warning rather lightly. Despite what appeared to be a dismissive response from the administrative class, Jackson revealed his new approach in his first annual address to Congress. While the first paragraph is quite familiar to students of public administration, the longer passage that follows details the full force of Jackson’s rotation approach:

There are, perhaps few men who can for any great length of time enjoy office without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interest and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man would revolt. Office is considered as a species of property, and government rather as a means of promoting individual interests than as an instrument created solely for the service of the people. Corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct feelings and principles divert government from its legitimate ends and make it an engine to support the few at the expense of the many. The duties of all public officers are or at least admit of being made, so

plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally gained by their experience. I submit, therefore, to your consideration whether the efficiency of the Government would not be promoted and official industry and integrity better secured by a general extension of the law which limits appointments to four years.

In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. No individual wrong is therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is a matter of right. The incumbent became officer with a view to public benefits, and when these require his removal they are not to be sacrificed to private interests. It is the people, and they alone, who have right to complain when a bad officer is substituted for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living as that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property now so generally connected with official station, and although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system. (Jackson 1829)

With these words, Andrew Jackson delivered what White called “the most important defense of rotation in office that has ever been made by an American” (1954, 318). The statement by White is also important because it distinguishes the idea of rotation advanced by Jackson from the concept of spoils practiced by later administrations. White noted, “Jackson made no reference to party advantage that rotation would induce, nor to its effect upon executive power. He made no defense of the abuses that might follow from the theory of rotation and he would have certainly have denounced them could he have foreseen them” (1954, 319). To equate Jackson with the spoils system seems at least unfair, if not entirely inaccurate (Aronson 1964; Mosher 1982).³

In contemporary terms, the use of affirmative action programs, specifically programs designed to increase the number of individuals from underrepresented groups, are a modern form of democratic patronage. Unlike the tactical style of patronage, whereby managers use “recognition” as a largely symbolic gesture to bridge divisions or cleavages, affirmative action programs in the form of democratic patronage can be a useful tool for creating a representative bureaucracy. While the

beneficiary of affirmative action is not under any official obligation to carry forth the democratic goals of the patron, the desire to achieve these goals are communicated through both formal and informal cues such as diversity recruitment and diversity training programs.

Reform Patronage

Banfield and Wilson (1963) described the paradoxical position faced by reformers who have successfully gained elective office. Although the authors were writing specifically about reformers who formed independent local parties to push their reformist agenda, the challenge faced by these individuals can also be adapted to reformers of previously established political parties:

Reform parties, however—even those that have been reasonably successful at the polls—do not last very long. The reason is that, like all formal organizations, they can endure only by offering a continuing and sufficient stream of inducements to those (for example, voters and party workers) whose cooperation they require. This they find impossible to do. They have no specific, material inducements to offer, and if they did they would be prevented by their principles from offering them. They must, therefore, rely on nonmaterial inducements, especially the satisfaction of doing one's duty as a citizen. Unfortunately, this appeals to relatively few people, and ordinarily even to them only so long as their indignation at some recent outrage to civic decency stays hot. (1963, 143)

Reformers, who in their campaign rhetoric promised to “Throw the bums out!” and were elected based on ideals such as an opposition to patronage were expected, in both symbol and practice, to reject the administrative practices of the previous officeholders. However, once in control, these same reformers faced the prospect of expeditiously replacing their recently disposed political enemies with political friends and allies, thereby feeding the patronage desires of their own parties or organizations. As a result, what emerges is the reformers' paradoxical position: If they stick to their ideals of not using (or, in their minds, abusing) patronage, the movement will wither and die once the zeal of their initial supporters has waned.⁴ However, if the reformers build their own political machine and opt to use patronage to staff the organization with people loyal to their cause, they would appear as hypocrites, making themselves vulnerable to both political rivals and the next wave of reformers.

During the presidency of Andrew Jackson, the main opposition party, the Whigs, repeatedly complained

about Jackson's use of patronage, including an attempt to limit the president's power of appointment. In the mid-1830s, Whigs in the Senate argued for a repeal of the Four Years Law of 1820 and attempted to constrain the president's power to remove individuals from their public offices (Fish 1904; Van Riper 1958). The Whigs then positioned themselves as the party of civil service reform, taking particular offense to the use and/or abuse of the federal patronage system. “[Speeches given by the Whigs] exhibited high ideals of the civil service pleasing to contemplate, and are full of passages suitable for quotation by the civil service reformer” (Fish 1904, 142).

Based mostly on the perception that they represented the party of reform, the Whigs captured the White House in 1840. As Fish stated, “[T]he result of the election was to place the Whigs in full control of the government and give them an opportunity to put into effect the reform they had been so long preaching” (1904, 143). However, instead of reform, the result was more like business as usual. “Though the Whigs had castigated the Jacksonian practices concerning the patronage, they nevertheless felt compelled by practical considerations to follow precedent” (Van Riper 1958, 41).

The pattern of “opposition to victory to adoption” represents the core of reformist patronage. The challenge to maintain momentum or to reward loyalties represents the paradox faced by many reform groups on both the national and local levels. For example, in the period following its founding in 1778, the Council of Appointment in New York used reform patronage as a means of blocking those still loyal to King George from working in state government. “During the continuance of the struggle with England it was of course necessary to restrict the offices to the friends of the independence” (Gitterman 1892, 92). Yet while the Council was successful in its use of reform

The challenge to maintain momentum or to reward loyalties represents the paradox faced by many reform groups on both the national and local levels.

patronage against those loyal to King George, in the wake of this reform, as noted in the section on organizational patronage, another patronage system emerged in its place based on social class and family kinship.

Evidence of the paradox is not limited simply to historical examples. In July 2006, Cory Booker was sworn in as the mayor of Newark, New Jersey. On this day, Booker, who had campaigned as a government reformer, was replacing five-time incumbent Sharpe James, who had decided only months before not to seek reelection. During his 20 years in office, James had emerged as the head of the Newark's “mighty machine” (Mays 2006). In fact, the perception of James's power was so complete, observed David P. Rebovich, “Newark was dismissed by people inside and outside the city as a huge patronage operation” (2007, 5). It is only slightly

ironic that during the campaign, the *Star-Ledger*, the state's leading paper, ran an article under the headline "Man vs. Machine: Would Booker Become James?" reminding readers that in 1986, it was Sharpe James "preaching the gospel of reform" as he ran against Kenneth Gibson, the city's first African American mayor, who also ran as a reformer when he took on the Hugh Addonizio machine in the 1970s. The article went on to wonder whether Booker would be able to escape the lure of machine politics (Parks and Mays 2006, 1), and by implication, avoid the use of patronage.

During his first few days in office, Booker set out to make a distinction between himself and his predecessors by noting that he planned to operate an administration based on professionalism instead of patronage (Wang and Mays 2006), invoking the oft-used and century-old reformist rhetorical strategy of making merit, or in this case professionalism, dichotomous to patronage. However, as noted earlier, shifting the basis of kinship from political party, ethnicity, or race to educational attainment, university affiliation, examination proficiency, or any of the other designations used to determine merit or represent professionalism is not the same as eliminating or even imposing patronage. It is simply altering the common factor that links patron and client.

Thus, the paradox of reform leads to an irony, for a concerted effort to overcome the paradox requires the adoption of a system of hiring that favors certain groups with certain connections and credentials. This, in turn, results in a new patronage network under the guise of meritorious hiring of experts based on a specific set of experiences or credentials (Carpenter 2001). It is quite ironic that the implementation of merit requires a strong patronage effort.

Concluding Thoughts

This paper has attempted to reinvigorate the study of patronage in the field of public administration. To accomplish this, I have suggested a reexamination of the concept based on the definition of patronage more commonly found in anthropology. I have also offered an initial typology concerning the use of patronage based on the alternative definition. The hope here is that the new typology can be used to counter generations of narrowly focused studies that approached patronage as a pathological legacy of the past requiring condemnation and elimination. Instead, the typology can serve as a foundation for generating testable hypotheses that will help deepen our understanding of the actual uses of patronage, both positive and negative.

There remains a clear need to improve our understanding because, as Freedman (1994) reminded us only a

decade ago, patronage is not outdated but is very much a part of our present and future. One only needs to look at the selection and placement of political appointees under President George W. Bush to see that political actors still consider it a vital tool. Initial examinations by scholars and journalists have revealed that partisanship, conservative political ideology, and religion may have played a role in the selection of political appointees in several executive branch departments and agencies (Moyers 2007; Warshaw 2006), including the Office of Faith-Based Programs (Kuo 2006) and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department (Savage 2006). Investigation of these traits based on the anthropological definition can provide useful information on the basis for kinship between client and patron. With a link established, the typology can be used to explain how political appointees helped the administration pursue the various goals put forth in this paper.

The anthropological definition will also open opportunities for researchers to explore the use of patronage beyond the distribution of political appointments. As mentioned earlier, the use of patronage in bureaucratic

settings provides a rich and new way to think about the use of patronage. Because of the wide discretion often afforded to mid- and low-level managers in the recruitment and selection of employees (Ban, Drahnak-Faller, Towers 2003; Lavigna and Hays 2004), there would be appear to be an increased opportunity for those managers to engage in

various types of patronage. To address this, we must improve our understanding of the role played by kinship and loyalty during the employee recruitment and selection process.

The turn to anthropology represents an opportunity. Patronage has been an essential tool of governance throughout history, and it has been central to our understanding of American public administration for well over two hundred years. Despite this extensive history, our understanding of the forms, functions, and dynamics of patronage remains superficial at best and tainted by conceptual assumptions at worst. Students of patronage in public administration would benefit from an exchange of disciplinary lenses, surrendering those inherited from political science for the more analytic set found in anthropology and other fields.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Melvin J. Dubnick, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Laurence Lynn Jr., Kenneth Meier, and William West for their comments and encouragement and Emily Gunn for her tireless research support. I would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions and advice.

The anthropological definition will . . . open opportunities for researchers to explore the use of patronage beyond the distribution of political appointments.

Notes

1. While there is some debate over the amount of direct or indirect control that a mayor has over appointees (Dahl 1974), in Newark, it appears that James was able to use these appointments to increase his influence (Mays 2006).
2. Prior to his career in national politics, Van Buren was an active figure in the politics of New York State, where the Council of Appointment headed by DeWitt Clinton “twice turned [Van Buren] out of office for partisan reason” (Gitterman 1892, 112).
3. White does indicate that the men surrounding Jackson, including supporters in Congress, may have spoken of using rotation “in more immediate or practical terms” (1954, 319). While there does not appear to be any evidence that Jackson’s advancement of rotation was driven by partisan goals, with assistance from the Four Year Law of 1920, the practice of opening up a large number of public offices every four years (Van Riper 1958), political actors were able to use Jackson’s theory of rotation to fill large numbers of public offices with partisan allies and friends, thereby compromising the intended democratic purpose.
4. Or, as Edward J. Flynn eloquently explained in *You’re the Boss*, “it would be nonsense to pretend that devotion and personal ego are all that hold a machine together” (1947, 20–26).

References

- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aronson, Sidney H. 1964. *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service: Standards of Selection in the Administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ban, Carolyn, Alexis Drahnak-Faller, and Marcia Towers. 2003. Human Resources Challenges in Human Service and Community Development Organizations: Recruitment and Retention of Professional Staff. *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 23(2): 133–53.
- Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. 1963. *City Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bearfield, Domonic A. 2006. The Demonization of Patronage: Folk Devils and the *Boston Globe’s* Coverage of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks. In *American Public Service: Radical Reform and the Merit System*, edited by James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West, 101–20. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Birnbuam, Jeffrey H. 2004. Boeing Has a Powerful Ally with Hastert; House Speaker Throws His Clout Behind Controversial Air Force Tanker Deal. *Washington Post*, July 18.

- Boissevain, Jeremy. 1966. Patronage in Sicily. *MAN* 1(1): 18–33.
- Caiden, Gerald E. 1991. What Really Is Public Maladministration? *Public Administration Review* 51(6): 486–93.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 2005. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dubnick, Melvin J. 2002. Seeking Salvation for Accountability. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, Boston.
- Durant, Robert F. 1998. Rethinking the Unthinkable: A Cautionary Note. *Administration & Society* 29(6): 643–52.
- Erie, Steven P. 1990. *Rainbow’s End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840–1985*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fish, Carl R. 1902. Lincoln and the Patronage. *American Historical Review* 8(1): 53–69.
- . 1904. *The Civil Service and the Patronage*. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Flynn, Edward J. 1947. *You’re the Boss*. New York: Viking Press.
- Freedman, Anne. 1988. Doing Battle with the Patronage Army: Politics, Courts, and Personnel Administration in Chicago. *Public Administration Review* 48(5): 847–59.
- . 1994. *Patronage: An American Tradition*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Friedrich, Carl J. 1937. The Rise and Decline of the Spoils Tradition. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 189: 10–16.
- Gellner, Ernest, and John Waterbury. 1977. *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*. London: Duckworth.
- Gitterman, J. M. 1892. The Council of Appointment in New York. *Political Science Quarterly* 7(1): 80–115.
- Goodsell, Charles T. 1998. A Radical Idea Welcomed—But with Some Butts. *Administration & Society* 29(6): 653–59.
- Gump, W. Robert. 1971. The Functions of Patronage in American Party Politics: An Empirical Reappraisal. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 15(1): 87–107.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hamilton, David. 1993. The Staffing Function in Illinois State Government after Rutan. *Public Administration Review* 53(4): 381–86.
- . 1999. The Continuing Judicial Assault on Patronage. *Public Administration Review* 59(1): 54–62.

- . 2002. Is Patronage Dead? The Impact of Antipatronage Staffing Systems. *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 22(3): 3–26.
- Harris, Richard A., and Sidney M. Milkis. 1996. *The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hecl, Hugh. 1977. *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Jackson, Andrew. 1829. First Annual Message to Congress. In *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897*, vol. 2. edited by J. D. Richardson, 442–62. New York: Bureau of National Literature.
- Johnston, Michael. 1979. Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage. *American Political Science Review* 73(2): 385–98.
- Kaufman, Robert R. 1974. The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-Politics: Prospects and Problems. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16(3): 284–308.
- Knott, Jack H. 1998. A Return to Spoils: The Wrong Solution to the Right Problem. *Administration & Society* 29(6): 660–69.
- Kuo, David. 2006. *Tempting Faith: An Inside Story of Political Seduction*. New York: Free Press.
- Lande, Carl H. 1973. Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics. *American Political Science Review* 67(1): 103–27.
- Lavigna, Robert, and Steven W. Hays. 2004. Recruitment and Selection of Public Workers: An International Compendium of Modern Trends and Practices. *Public Personnel Management* 33(3): 237–53.
- MacGillis, Alec. 2007. Critics of Giuliani's Point to Cronyism; City Hall Appointments Said to Tarnish Credentials. *Washington Post*, November 25.
- Maranto, Robert. 1998. Thinking the Unthinkable in Public Administration: A Case for Spoils in the Federal Bureaucracy. *Administration & Society* 29(6): 623–42.
- . 2005. *Beyond a Government of Strangers: How Career Executives and Political Appointees Can Turn Conflict to Cooperation*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Maranto, Robert, and Jeremy Johnson. 2007. Bringing Back Boss Tweed: Could At-Will Employment Work in State and Local Government and, If So, Where? In *American Public Service: Radical Reform and the Merit System*, edited by James S. Bowman and Jonathan P. West, 77–97. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Mays, Jeffrey. 2006. Newark's Mighty Machine Is Left Leaderless. *Star-Ledger* (Newark, NJ), March 29.
- Meier, Kenneth J. 1981. Ode to Patronage: A Critical Analysis of Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions. *Public Administration Review* 41(5): 562–68.
- Merton, Robert K. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Mosher, Frederick C. 1982. *Democracy and the Public Service*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moyers, Bill. 2007. *Bill Moyers Journal*, PBS, May 11.
- Moynihan, Daniel P., and James Q. Wilson. 1964. Patronage in New York State, 1955–1959. *American Political Science Review* 58(2): 286–301.
- Murray, William L. 1998. Rejoinder to Maranto: Been There, Done That. *Administration & Society* 29(6): 670–76.
- New York State Commission on Government Integrity. 1990. Restoring the Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity. *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 18(2): 173–249.
- Norton, Noelle, and Barbara Morris. 2003. Feminist Organizational Structure in the White House: The Office of Women's Initiatives and Outreach. *Political Research Quarterly* 45(4): 477–87.
- Parks, Brad, and Jeffrey Mays. 2006. Man vs. Machine: Would Booker Become James? *Star-Ledger* (Newark, NJ), April 14.
- Powell, John Duncan. 1970. Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics. *American Political Science Review* 64(2): 411–25.
- Rebovich, David. 2007. Newark's Betrayal; And What It Portends for the Future. *New Jersey Lawyer*, July 23.
- Roback, Thomas H., and Janet C. Vinzant. 1994. The Constitution and the Patronage-Merit Debate: Implications for Personnel Managers. *Public Personnel Management* 23(3): 501–13.
- Savage, Charlie. 2006. Civil Rights Hiring Shifted in Bush Era: Conservative Leanings Stressed. *Boston Globe*, July 23.
- Schwartzman, Paul, and Ovetta Wiggins. 2003. In Prince George's, True but Not Tried; Johnson Hires Loyalists Even When Experience Doesn't Fit the Job. *Washington Post*, November 12.
- Scott, James C. 1972. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. *American Political Science Review* 66(1): 91–113.
- Sorauf, Frank J. 1956. State Patronage in a Rural County. *American Political Science Review* 50(4): 1046–56.
- . 1959. Patronage and Party. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 3(2): 115–26.
- . 1960. The Silent Revolution in Patronage. *Public Administration Review* 20(1): 28–34.
- Van Riper, Paul P. 1958. *History of the United States Civil Service*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
- Wang, Katie, and Jeffrey Mays. 2006. Booker, Taking Oath, Urges City Onward. *Star-Ledger* (Newark, NJ), July 2.
- Warshaw, Shirley Anne. 2006. Choices for the President: Structuring the Second-Term Cabinet of President George W. Bush. In *The Second Term of George W. Bush: Prospects and Perils*, edited by

Robert Maranto, Douglas M. Brattebo, and Tom
Lansford, 63–78. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.

Weingrod, Alex. 1968. Patrons, Patronage, and
Political Parties. *Comparative Studies in Society and
History* 10(4): 377–400.

White, Leonard D. 1948. *The Federalists: A Study in
Administrative History*. New York: Macmillan.

———. 1954. *The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History, 1829–1861*. New York: Macmillan.

Wilson, James Q. 1961. The Economy of Patronage.
Journal of Political Economy 69(4): 369–80.

We Invite Your Feedback

Do you have something you would like to say to **PAR**?
A comment? A suggestion? Our editorial team invites your feedback.

Email us at: par.letters@ucdenver.edu

Conventional mail: Public Administration Review, SPA, University of Colorado Denver, 1380 Lawrence
Street, Suite 500, Denver, CO 80204