PSY80XXX THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGAL DECISIONMAKING
Steve Penrod 
Office: 21XXN, ph: 212-237-8877    spenrod@jjay.cuny.edu       http://go.to/penrod
This page: http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~spenrod/Experimental/        Back to John Jay College home page

Course Requirements

General Requirements: Complete readings, complete weekly commentaries, prepare an experimental study with stimulus materials, dependent measures and IRB application

Writing Requirements:

Major Written: Write Proposals of 20 pp double-spaced

Minor Written: Commentaries in advance of 10 class meetings, file a 300 word commentary on readings in response to assigned readings. Submit commentary, critiques, evaluations, ideas for discussion. These are due 24 hours in advance of class. Commentaries should be numbered sequentially and the class date to which the commentary refers should be noted. Electronic submission only–see email address above--subject line should read as follows:

        Experimental Class 2/8/06  [indicate the class date] Comment #X

Textbooks
: Wrightsman, L.S. (2001).  Forensic Psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Readings: Assignments include relevant appendices--many readings will be provided electronically for downloading--some will be big files--downloading on campus may be preferable to modem connections. 

No Exam: No final.

Grades: 15% classroom participation, 25% commentaries, 25% timely reading of assignments (assessed at end of semester), 35% papers.

Link to AP-LS membership site: http://www.unl.edu/ap-ls/membership.htm  [$30 including 6 issues of Law and Human Behavior

Readings for Week 1:  

Wrightsman:
CHAPTER 1~ The Challenge of Forensic Psychology 1
CHAPTER 2 Roles and Responsibilities of Forensic Psychologists 25
CHAPTER 3 The Police: Selection, Training, and Evaluation 50

Bruce W. Behrman, Sherrie L. Davey.  Eyewitness Identification in Actual Criminal Cases: An Archival Analysis, Law and Human Behavior 2001 25, 475-491.

This study analyzed 271 actual police cases in order to address several prevalent issues in the eyewitness literature. Suspect identification (SI) rates were obtained for 289 photographic lineups, 258 field showups, 58 live lineups, and 66 lineup identifications preceded by earlier identifications. SI rates were assessed for 3 levels of extrinsic evidence: no extrinsic evidence, evidence of minimal probative value, and evidence of substantial probative value. The SI rates for the photographic lineups were assessed as a function of delay, same vs. cross-race conditions, witness type, and weapon presence. SI rates declined significantly over time; SI rates were significantly greater for the same-race condition. SI rates were much greater for field showups than photographic lineups, 76% vs. 48% with SI rate of 50% and foil identification rate of 24% in live lineups. The SI rates for the field showups did not vary as a function of eyewitness conditions. The relation between confidence and suspect/foil identifications for the live lineups was significant and moderately high. The utility of archival identification studies for eyewitness testimony research is discussed.


Readings
for Week 2:
  

Wrightsman:
CHAPTER 4 Criminal Profiling 71
CHAPTER 5 Hypnosis and Lie Detection in Criminal Investigation 101
CHAPTER 6 Improving Eyewitness Identification Procedures 120

Bruce W. Behrman & Regina E. Richards. (2005). Suspect/Foil Identification in Actual Crimes and in the Laboratory: A Reality Monitoring Analysis.  Law and Human Behavior , 29, 279-301.

Four reality monitoring variables were used to discriminate suspect from foil identifications in 183 actual criminal cases. Four hundred sixty-one identification attempts based on five and six-person lineups were analyzed. These identification attempts resulted in 238 suspect identifications and 68 foil identifications. Confidence, automatic processing, eliminative processing and feature use comprised the set of reality monitoring variables. Thirty-five verbal confidence phrases taken from police reports were assigned numerical values on a 10-point confidence scale. Automatic processing identifications were those that occurred “immediately” or “without hesitation.” Eliminative processing identifications occurred when witnesses compared or eliminated persons in the lineups. Confidence, automatic processing and eliminative processing were significant predictors, but feature use was not. Confidence was the most effective discriminator. In cases that involved substantial evidence extrinsic to the identification 43% of the suspect identifications were made with high confidence, whereas only 10% of the foil identifications were made with high confidence. The results of a laboratory study using the same predictors generally paralleled the archival results. Forensic implications are discussed.
 

 Readings for Week 3:  

Wrightsman:
CHAPTER 7 Police Interrogations and Confessions 140

Kassin, S. M.; Meissner, C. A.; Norwick, R. J. (2005). "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators. Law & Human Behavior, 29, 211-227.

College students and police investigators watched or listened to 10 prison inmates confessing to crimes. Half the confessions were true accounts; half were false-concocted for the study. Consistent with much recent research, students were generally more accurate than police, and accuracy rates were higher among those presented with audiotaped than videotaped confessions. In addition, investigators were significantly more confident in their judgments and also prone to judge confessors guilty. To determine if police accuracy would increase if this guilty response bias were neutralized, participants in a second experiment were specifically informed that half the confessions were true and half were false. This manipulation eliminated the investigator response bias, but it did not increase accuracy or lower confidence. These findings are discussed for what they imply about the post-interrogation risks to innocent suspects who confess.

Kassin, S. M. (2005). On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk? American Psychologist, 60, 215-228.

The Central Park jogger case and other recent exonerations highlight the problem of wrongful convictions, 15% to 25% of which have contained confessions in evidence. Recent research suggests that actual innocence does not protect people across a sequence of pivotal decisions: (a) In preinterrogation interviews, investigators commit false-positive errors, presuming innocent suspects guilty; (b) naively believing in the transparency of their innocence, innocent suspects waive their rights; (c) despite or because of their denials, innocent suspects elicit highly confrontational interrogations; (d) certain commonly used techniques lead suspects to confess to crimes they did not commit; and (e) police and others cannot distinguish between uncorroborated true and false confessions. It appears that innocence puts innocents at risk, that consideration should be given to reforming current practices, and that a policy of videotaping interrogations is a necessary means of protection.

Valentine T. & Pamela Heaton  (1999).  An Evaluation of the Fairness of Police Line-Ups and Video Identifications,  Applied Cognitive Psychology 13, S59-S72.

Mistaken eyewitness identification is a major source of miscarriages of justice. In England and Wales, procedures for obtaining identification evidence are set out in legislation. The vast majority of identifications are obtained using a traditional 'live' identity parade (or line-up). However, in some circumstances video identifications are being used more frequently. Records of line-ups and video identifications used in actual criminal cases were obtained. The fairness of these procedures was compared by use of a mock witness procedure. In a perfectly fair line-up the suspect would be chosen, by chance, by 11% of the mock witnesses. However, 25% of mock witnesses selected the suspect from 25 photographs of live line-ups, compared to 15% of mock witnesses who selected the suspect from video identifications. An analysis of covariance, taking visual features mentioned in the original witness's first description as the covariate, showed that the proportion choosing the suspect was significantly smaller from video identifications. It is concluded that the video line-ups were fairer than the live line-ups, and therefore that wider use of video identifications has the potential to improve the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.

Tim Valentine, Alan Pickering & Stephen Darling.  (2003). Characteristics of eyewitness identification that predict the outcome of real lineups. Applied Cognitive Psychology.

Data were analysed from 640 attempts by eyewitnesses to identify the alleged culprit in 314 lineups organised by the Metropolitan Police in London. Characteristics of the witness, the suspect, the witness’s opportunity to view the culprit, the crime and the lineup were recorded. Data analysis, using mixed effects multinomial logistic regression, revealed that the suspect was more likely to be identified if the witness is younger than 30, the suspect is a white European (rather than African - Caribbean), the witness gave a detailed description, viewed the culprit for over a minute and made a fast decision at the lineup. None of the explanatory variables were significantly associated with a mistaken identification of a foil. No independent, statistically reliable effects of weapon focus, cross-race identification or of the delay before the identification attempt were observed.


Readings for Week 4:
    

Steblay, N., Dysart, J., Fulero, S., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (2003). Eyewitness accuracy rates in police showup and lineup presentations: A meta-analytic comparison. Law & Human Behavior 27(5): 523-540.

Meta-analysis is used to compare identification accuracy rates in showups and lineups. Eight papers were located, providing 12 tests of the hypothesis and including 3013 participants. Results indicate that showups generate lower choosing rates than lineups. In target present conditions, showups and lineups yield approximately equal hit rates, and in target absent conditions, showups produce a significantly higher level of correct rejections. False identification rates are approximately equal in showups and lineups when lineup foil choices are excluded from analysis. Dangerous false identifications are more numerous for showups when an innocent suspect resembles the perpetrator. Function of lineup foils, assessment strategies for false identifications, and the potential impact of biases in lineup practice are suggested as additional considerations in evaluation of showup versus lineup efficacy.
 

Clark, Steven; Tunnicliff, Jennifer L. Selecting lineup foils in eyewitness identification experiments: Experimental control and real-world simulation. Law & Human Behavior. 2001 Jun Vol 25(3) 199-216.

Experimental research on eyewitness identification follows a standard principle of experimental design. Perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups are constructed with the same foils, so that the two conditions are identical except for the presence or absence of the true perpetrator of the crime.  However, this aspect of the design simulates conditions that do not correspond to those of real criminal investigations. Specifically, these conditions can create perp-absent lineups in which the foils are selected based on their similarity to an unknown person—the real perpetrator. Analysis of the similarity relations predicts that when foils for perp-absent lineups are selected based on their match to the perpetrator the false identification rate will be lower than if the foils are selected based on their match to the innocent suspect. This prediction was confirmed in an experiment that compared these two perp-absent lineup conditions. These results suggest that false identification rates in previous experiments would have been higher if the foils had been selected based on their match to the innocent suspect, rather than the absent perpetrator.
 

Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, Solomon Fulero, R. C. L. Lindsay (2001). Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, Law and Human Behavior 25, 459-473.

Most police lineups use a simultaneous presentation technique in which eyewitnesses view all lineup members at the same time. R. C. Lindsay and G. L. Wells (see record 1985-30824-001) devised an alternative procedure, the sequential lineup, in which witnesses view one lineup member at a time and decide whether or not that person is the perpetrator prior to viewing the next lineup member The present work uses the technique of meta-analysis to compare the accuracy rates of these presentation styles. 23 papers were located (9 published and 14 unpublished), providing 30 tests of the hypothesis and including 4,145 participants. Results show that identification of perpetrators from target-present lineups occurs at a higher rate from simultaneous than from sequential lineups, However, this difference largely disappears when moderator variables approximating real world conditions are considered. Also, correct rejection rates were significantly higher for sequential than simultaneous lineups and this difference is maintained or increased by greater approximation to real world conditions.

 

Readings for Week 5

Clark, S. E., & Davey, S. L. (2005). The Target-to-Foils Shift in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups. Law & Human Behavior, 29(2), 151-172.

A theoretical cornerstone in eyewitness identification research is the proposition that witnesses, in making decisions from standard simultaneous lineups, make relative judgments. The present research considers two sources of support for this proposal. An experiment by G. L. Wells (1993) showed that if the target is removed from a lineup, witnesses shift their responses to pick foils, rather than rejecting the lineups, a result we will term a target-to-foils shift Additional empirical support is provided by results from sequential lineups which typically show higher accuracy than simultaneous lineups, presumably because of a decrease in the use of relative judgments in making identification decisions. The combination of these two lines of research suggests that the target-to-foils shift should be reduced in sequential lineups relative to simultaneous lineups. Results of two experiments showed an overall advantage for sequential lineups, but also showed a target-to-foils shift equal in size for simultaneous and sequential lineups. Additional analyses indicated that the target-to-foils shift in sequential lineups was moderated in part by an order effect and was produced with (Experiment 2) or without (Experiment 1) a shift in decision criterion. This complex pattern of results suggests that more work is needed to understand the processes which underlie decisions in simultaneous and sequential lineups.
 

Phillips, Mark R.; McAuliff, Bradley D.; Kovera, Margaret Bull; Cutler, Brian L. (1999). Double-blind photoarray administration as a safeguard against investigator bias. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 940-951.

This experiment examined whether a photoarray administrator's knowledge of a suspect's identity increased false identification rates. Fifty participant-administrators (PAs) presented 50 participant-witnesses (PWs) two perpetrator-absent photoarrays following a live staged crime involving two perpetrators. For one photoarray per trial, the experimenter revealed the suspect's identity to the PA. Each PA presented the photoarrays sequentially or simultaneously in the presence or absence of an observer. When the observer was present, PA knowledge of the suspect's identity had a biasing effect in sequential photoarrays only. This pattern did not emerge when the observer was absent. The experimental manipulations did not affect PAs' and PWs' ratings of photoarray fairness or PWs' ratings of pressure to make an identification. These data suggest that only administrators who are blind to the suspect's identity should present sequential photoarrays.
 

Penrod, S. & Cutler, B. (1995). Witness confidence and witness accuracy: Assessing their forensic relation. Psychology, Public Policy & Law & , 1, 817-845.

Jurors over-believe eyewitnesses, have difficulty reliably differentiating accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses, and are not adequately sensitive to aspects of witnessing and identification conditions. A major source of juror unreliability is reliance on witness confidence, a dubious indicator of eyewitness accuracy even when measured at the time an identification is made. Confidence appears to be influenced by postidentification factors such as repeated questioning, briefings in anticipation of cross-examination, and feedback about the behavior of other witnesses. Juror reliance on witness confidence appears to be unaffected by traditional safeguards such as cross-examination and judges' instructions in eyewitness cases. Expert psychological testimony on the factors that influence eyewitness memory, in contrast, appears to reduce juror reliance on confidence and enhance use of other factors known to affect memory.

 

Readings for Week 6:   

Dunning, David; Perretta, Scott. (2002).  Automaticity and eyewitness accuracy: A 10- to 12-second rule for distinguishing accurate from inaccurate positive identifications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 951-962 

Eyewitness researchers have shown that witnesses accurately choosing the culprit out of a lineup reach their decisions more quickly than those erroneously choosing an innocent individual. However, this research is silent regarding how quickly or slowly witnesses must be, in absolute terms, to indicate that they are accurate or inaccurate. Across 4 studies, the authors discovered that a time boundary of roughly 10 to 12 s best differentiated accurate from inaccurate positive identifications. Witnesses making their identification faster than 10 to 12 s were nearly 90% accurate; those taking longer were roughly 50% accurate. This finding is consistent with previous research showing that accurate witnesses are more likely than inaccurate witnesses to reach their decisions automatically, that is, quickly, without conscious thought or effort.
 

Weber, N., & Brewer, N., Wells, G., Semmler, C & Keast, A. (2003). Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Response Latency: The Unruly 10-12 Second.Rule. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10(3), 139-147.

Data are reported from 3,213 research eyewitnesses confirming that accurate eyewitness identifications from lineups are made faster than are inaccurate identifications. However, consistent with predictions from the recognition and search literatures, the authors did not find support for the "10-12-s rule" in which lineup identifications faster than 10-12 s maximally discriminate between accurate and inaccurate identifications (D. Dunning & S. Perretta, 2002). Instead, the time frame that proved most discriminating was highly variable across experiments, ranging from 5 s to 29 s, and the maximally discriminating time was often unimpressive in its ability to sort accurate from inaccurate identifications. The authors suggest several factors that are likely to moderate the 10-12-s rule.
 

Bradfield, Amy L.; Wells, Gary L.; Olson, Elizabeth A. (2002).  The damaging effect of confirming feedback on the relation between eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,  112-120

The authors investigated eyewitnesses' retrospective certainty (see G. L. Wells & A. L. Bradfield, 1999 ). The authors hypothesized that external influence from the lineup administrator would damage the certainty—accuracy relation by inflating the retrospective certainty of inaccurate eyewitnesses more than that of accurate eyewitnesses ( N = 245). Two variables were manipulated: eyewitness accuracy (through the presence or absence of the culprit in the lineup) and feedback (confirming vs. control). Confirming feedback inflated retrospective certainty more for inaccurate eyewitnesses than for accurate eyewitnesses, significantly reducing the certainty—accuracy relation (from r = .58 in the control condition to r = .37 in the confirming feedback condition). Double-blind testing is recommended for lineups to prevent these external influences on eyewitnesses.
 

Bradfield, A., & McQuiston, D. E. (2004). When Does Evidence of Eyewitness Confidence Inflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial? Law & Human Behavior, 28(4), 369-387.

Two studies investigated perceptions of eyewitness confidence inflation: increases in a witness's confidence between the time of the identification and the trial. Experiment 1 (N=90) demonstrated that, for White participants, assessments of the strength of the defense case, the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when there was evidence that the eyewitness's confidence increased over time (mere inflation condition), compared with a control condition. In addition, assessments of the defendant's guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when the eyewitness was aggressively challenged about the change in her confidence report (inflation + challenge). Experiment 2 (N=360) demonstrated that, for Hispanic participants, sensitivity to confidence inflation did not interact with manipulations of the eyewitness's or defendant's race (White vs. Hispanic). In addition, the confidence inflation effect did not replicate with the Hispanic participants. Results are interpreted in terms of the in-group bias in legal judgments and directions for future research.

Penrod 2003 NSF Research Proposal you need read only the 15 pages of proposal text -- password=grant

  
Readings for Week 7:
   

Bradfield, A., & McQuiston, D. E. (2004). When Does Evidence of Eyewitness Confidence Inflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial? Law & Human Behavior, 28(4), 369-387.

Two studies investigated perceptions of eyewitness confidence inflation: increases in a witness's confidence between the time of the identification and the trial. Experiment 1 (N=90) demonstrated that, for White participants, assessments of the strength of the defense case, the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when there was evidence that the eyewitness's confidence increased over time (mere inflation condition), compared with a control condition. In addition, assessments of the defendant's guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when the eyewitness was aggressively challenged about the change in her confidence report (inflation + challenge). Experiment 2 (N=360) demonstrated that, for Hispanic participants, sensitivity to confidence inflation did not interact with manipulations of the eyewitness's or defendant's race (White vs. Hispanic). In addition, the confidence inflation effect did not replicate with the Hispanic participants. Results are interpreted in terms of the in-group bias in legal judgments and directions for future research.
 

Morgan, C. A., Hazlett, G., Doran, A., Garrett, S., Hoyt, G., Thomas, P., et al. (2004). Accuracy of eyewitness memory for persons encountered during exposure to highly intense stress. International Journal of Law & Psychiatry, 27(3), 265-279.

In the present study, accuracy of suspect recognition after high-stress and low-stress interrogation was assessed. We also compared accuracy of eyewitness recognition using three established law-enforcement methods for identifying crime suspects: the live lineup, the photo-spread technique, and the sequential photo method. Based on previous literature and the Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines, we hypothesized that accuracy rates of suspect recognition would be higher when using the sequential, compared to the live lineup and photo-spread techniques. We assessed differences in accuracy in eyewitness identification for cued and uncued photographs of suspects presented during the sequential photo method. Because studies in humans have shown that memory may be facilitated by contextual cues, we hypothesized that accuracy of suspect recognition would be better for cued, compared to uncued, photographs. 509 of 530 consecutively recruited, active-duty military personnel enrolled in military survival school training were the subjects of this investigation. Contrary to the popular conception that most people would never forget the face of a clearly seen individual who had physically confronted them and threatened them for more than 30 min, a large number of subjects in this study were unable to correctly identify their perpetrator. These data provide robust evidence that eyewitness memory for persons encountered during events that are personally relevant, highly stressful, and realistic in nature may be subject to substantial error.
 

Deffenbacher, K. A.; Bornstein, B. H.; Penrod, S. D. & McGorty, K. (2004).   A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory.  Law and Human Behavior, 28, 687-706.

In the past 30 years researchers have examined the impact of heightened stress on the fidelity of eyewitness memory. Meta-analyses were conducted on 27 independent tests of the effects of heightened stress on eyewitness identification of the perpetrator or target person and separately on 36 tests of eyewitness recall of details associated with the crime. There was considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively impact both types of eyewitness memory. Meta-analytic Z-scores, whether unweighted or weighted by sample size, ranged from -5.40 to -6.44 (high stress condition-low stress condition). The overall effect sizes were -.31 for both proportion of correct identifications and accuracy of eyewitness recall. Effect sizes were notably larger for target-present than for target-absent lineups, for eyewitness identification studies than for face recognition studies and for eyewitness studies employing a staged crime than for eyewitness studies employing other means to induce stress.

Garcia-Penrod 2004 NSF Research Proposal  you need read only the 15 pages of proposal text password= grant

 

Readings for Week 8:  

Kassin, Saul M.; Tubb, V. Anne; Hosch, Harmon M.; Memon, Amina  On the "general acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research.   American Psychologist. 2001 May Vol 56(5) 405-416

In light of recent advances, this study updated a prior survey of eyewitness experts (S. M. Kassin, P. C. Ellsworth, & V. L. Smith, 1989). Sixty-four psychologists were asked about their courtroom experiences and opinions on 30 eyewitness phenomena. By an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that the following phenomena are sufficiently reliable to present in court: the wording of questions, lineup instructions, confidence malleability, mug-shot-induced bias, postevent information, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication, the cross-race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference. Results also indicate that these experts set high standards before agreeing to testify. Despite limitations, these results should help to shape expert testimony so that it more accurately represents opinions in the scientific community.
 

Wells, G.L., Small. M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R. S., Fulero, S. M. & Brimacombe, C. A. E. (1998).  Eyewitness identification procedures: Recommendations for lineups and photospreads.  Law and Human Behavior, 22, 603-647.

There is increasing evidence that false eyewitness identification is the primary cause of the conviction of innocent people. In 1996, the American Psychology/Law Society, Division 41 of the American Psychological Association, appointed a subcommittee to review scientific evidence and make recommendations regarding the best procedures for constructing and conducting lineups and photospreads. Three important themes from the scientific literature relevant to lineup methods were identified and reviewed, namely relative-judgment processes, the lineups-as-experiments analogy, and confidence malleability. Recommendations are made that double-blind lineup testing should be used, that eyewitnesses should be forewarned that the culprit might not be present, that distractors should be selected based on the eyewitness's verbal description of the perpetrator, and that confidence should be assessed and recorded at the time of identification. The potential costs and benefits of these recommendations are discussed.
 

Kassin, S. M. (1998). Eyewitness identification procedures: The fifth rule. Law & Human Behavior, 22, 649-653. 


Readings for Week 9:     

Wrightsman:

CHAPTER 8 Alternative Dispute Resolution and Trial Preparation 166

CHAPTER 9 Jury Selection 190

Studebaker, C. A. & Penrod, S. D. (2005).  Pretrial Publicity and Its Influence on Juror Decision Making.  In N. Brewer & K. D. Williams, Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective.  New York: Guilford.

Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Penrod, S. D., Pathak-Sharma, M. K., Groscup, J. L. and Devenport, J. L. (2002). Studying Pretrial Publicity Effects:  New Methods for Testing and Improving External Validity. Law and Human Behavior, 26, 19-41.


Readings
for Week 10:
     

Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Pathak-Sharma, M. K., & Penrod S. D.  (2000). Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects: Integrating Content Analytic Results.  Law and Human Behavior, 24, 317-336.

Lisa Chrzanowski Dissertation


Readings
for Week 11:
  

Penrod, S. Pretrial Publicity NSF grant proposal.

Wrightsman:
CHAPTER 15 Discrimination 314
CHAPTER 16 Sexual Harassment 334
CHAPTER 17 Death Penalty Trials and Appeals 348
 

Readings for Week 12:  

Wrightsman:
CHAPTER 18 Influencing Public Policy 371

Gross, S. R. (1984). Determining the neutrality of death-qualified juries. Law and Human Behavior, 8, 7-30.

Cowan, C.L. & Thompson, W. & Ellsworth, P. (1984). The effects of death qualification on jurors' predisposition to convict and on the quality of deliberation. Law and Human Behavior, 8, 53-80. 

Bersoff, D.N. (1987). Social science data and the Supreme Court. Psychology and Law, 42(1), 52-58. 


Readings
for Week 13:
  

Lockhart vs.McCree APA Amicus Brief. (1987). American Psychologist, 42, 59-68.
Lockhart vs McCree 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
Elliott, R. (1991). Social science data and the APA: The Lockhart brief as a case in point. Law and Human Behavior, 15, 59-76.
Ellsworth, P. (1991). To tell what we know or wait for Godot? Law and Human Behavior, 15, 77-9. 


Readings
for Week 14:
   

Solomon M. Fulero and Norman J. Finkel. (1991). Barring Ultimate Issue Testimony An "Insane" RuIe? Law and Human Behavior, 15, 495-507. 

Kovera, M.B., McAuliff, B.D., & Hebert, K.S. (1999). Reasoning about scientific evidence: Effects of juror gender and evidence quality on juror decision in a hostile work environment case. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 362-375.

Jen Groscup NSF proposal